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Executive Summary
Vietnam’s economic achievement over the last two decades constitutes one of the most
successful development stories of the last century. The Doi Moi reform program voted
in 1986 gradually led the transition from a centrally-planned to a market-oriented
economy. In rural areas, reforms were aimed at placing back farmers at the center
of decision making as a way to boost agricultural production and alleviate poverty.
The reforms entailed a deep transformation of institutions through a redefinition of
the roles of state, the market and communities in allocating resources. Agricultural
markets were gradually liberalized, user rights were transferred to smallholder farm-
ers for most of the agricultural land, and anti-poverty programs were implemented.
At the national level, the high economic growth in all sectors of the economy have
permitted a drastic reduction of poverty. These successes however did not take place
evenly through the country, and mountainous regions have lagged behind in this pro-
cess. The poverty incidence in the Northern Uplands was still twice as large in 2008
than in the rest of the country. In addition, the rapid population growth combined
with the intensification and expansion of agricultural systems into fragile ecosystems
have considerably increased pressure on natural resources. This accentuates the risk
for resource-based economies to get trapped in a vicious circle whereby environmen-
tal degradation and poverty mutually reinforce each other and durably undermine
economic development. The existence of complex relations between poverty and en-
vironmental degradation in fragile ecosystems implies that equity, economic growth
and environmental sustainability cannot be treated as separate objectives but must
jointly be addressed to ensure sustainable development.
Drawing on a conceptual framework that highlights the determinant role of insti-
tutions in the poverty-environment nexus, this thesis investigates to which extent does
the current institutional framework addresses objectives of equity, economic growth
and environmental sustainability. It focuses on three critical institutional dimensions:
the definition of property rights, the functioning of intertemporal markets, and social
capital. More specifically, the thesis addresses the following research questions: (i)
Has the individualization of land access and land titling program enhanced tenure
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security, and thereby the adoption of soil conservation practices? (ii) Has a land mar-
ket emerged? (iii) Is the credit market equitable and efficient? Is the state-governed
formal sector competitive? Does it induce a more equitable and efficient allocation
than other sectors? (iv) Does ethnic diversity undermine collective action and the
formation of social networks? Empirical evidence in this thesis builds on a rich and
primary quantitative household- and village-level dataset collected in 2007/2008 in
Yen Chau, a mountainous district of the Northern Upland region, as well as qualita-
tive information gathered in the field through focus group discussions and numerous
informal discussions with local stakeholder.
The thesis is structured into seven chapters. After an introductory chapter (chap-
ter 1) that states the problem background, presents the conceptual framework and
introduces the main research questions and hypotheses addressed in the thesis, chap-
ter 2 introduces the study area and presents the data. Chapters 3 thru 6 contain
research on micro-economic impacts of land property rights (chapter 3 and 4), credit
institutions (chapter 5), and social capital (chapter 6). Chapter 7 summarizes research
findings, discusses them and concludes.
The third chapter examines the land reform voted in 1993, which after forty years of
collectivization, was aimed at privatizing and securing land access through the issuance
of long term use right certificates. The objective of this large titling program is to boost
agricultural production, enhance the conservation of natural resources and reduce
poverty. After analyzing the history and content of the land law, the article describes
the implementation of the reform in Yen Chau. It then investigates to which extent the
reform is influencing the adoption of soil conservation technologies by farmers through
descriptive statistics and econometric models of agroforestry adoption that account for
selection bias due to incomplete exposure. Results first reveal that the implementation
of the reform has been a long and costly process, particularly in mountainous regions
where the overlap of the law with customary land institutions has been a source of
conflicts. The necessity to enforce the law, but also to keep control over land use,
and to ensure the equity in land distribution, led the local government to reallocate
lands that had already been distributed to farmers. A question explored in the article
is therefore whether these reallocations affect farmers’ trust in land institutions, and
thereby influence their incentives to adopt long term conservation technologies such
as agroforestry. Results show that the possession of a formal land title positively
influences adoption, but that the threats of land re-allocations in villages discourage
conservation practices by creating uncertainty and tenure insecurity. Further analyses
reveal that these two effects interact, and thus that the land policy and the way it
is implemented affect farmers’ conservation practices. One contribution of the article
to the literature is therefore to show that the credibility of the state matters as it
affects farmers’ anticipations and response to policies. Another important finding is
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that farmers have a fairly good knowledge about soil conservation technologies, but
that under the current institutional framework, the technologies currently available
in the area remain economically unattractive. Farmers are unlikely to bear the costs
for conservation alone. The public good character of soil conservation calls for a
greater involvement of research and government agencies to identify land use options
that are both economically attractive and environmentally sustainable, and enhance
institutional mechanism to foster their adoption, for instance through payments for
environmental services.
This article is followed by a complementary chapter, chapter 4, that investigates
whether the land reform has led to the establishment of a land market in Yen Chau.
Well-functioning land markets are expected to generate important equity and effi-
ciency gains in the agricultural sector, by enabling the transfer of land from the less
productive to the more productive, and by raising farmers’ asset value. Studies showed
that this has been the case at the national level, and that the sale and lease transac-
tions taking place in the land market lead to a greater efficiency in land use and a more
equitable distribution. Our data shows that the situation in Yen Chau is otherwise.
There, land sale transactions are very rare, and the lease market is very thin. Most
of the land transactions observed occur through intra-familial free transfers. Results
show that these transactions induce a more equal distribution than the initial land
allocation. Administrative red tape, tenure insecurity due to land reallocations and
uncertainty regarding the extension or reallocation of use rights at the end of their
term are seen as the main factors hindering land sale and lease transactions. The
credit constraint does not seem to play a major role here.
The fifth chapter of the thesis examines the credit market, and investigates the
role and impact of state interventions in inducing a more equitable and efficient allo-
cation. The functioning of credit markets plays a crucial role in the critical triangle
of sustainable development by enabling farmers to make intertemporal decisions and
better cope with risks. Yet, in rural areas the presence of transaction costs and co-
variate risks often cause credit markets to fail in providing credit to all at market
interest rate, and the poor bear the highest costs of these imperfections. Vietnam’s
intervention in the rural credit market is embodied by a state-owned ‘commercial’
bank, the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD), and a
‘policy’ bank, the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP), lending microloans to
poor households at highly subsidized interest rate. Using a rich dataset on farmers’
credit transactions and access between 2002 and 2007, we describe the credit market,
compare contract terms offered by formal, semi-formal and informal lenders, exam-
ine participation by wealth terciles and estimate a Tobit model predicting interest
rates offered by non formal lenders. Data shows that despite offering competitive
contract terms, the formal sector remains a secondary source of credit in Yen Chau,
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particularly for the poor who also face higher interest rates than other borrowers in
the informal sector. We then investigate determinants of demand and access to each
formal credit programs using two-stage Probit models with partial observability. In
the VBARD model, results indicate a selection of borrowers that results both from a
self-selection of borrowers and a selection by the bank. Estimates show no discrimi-
nation of the poor in this program. On the contrary, in the VBSP model, we find the
poor are more often denied credit access by VBSP even though its program is targeted
to them. ‘Community imperfections’ and the fact that credit’s agents incentives are
too much drawn on the repayment performance of clients are seen as two main fac-
tors explaining mistargeting. We then explore econometrically whether demands for
formal and informal credits interact so as to assess the substitutability potential be-
tween both sectors. In the literature, the question regarding substitutability between
informal and formal credit market segments in developing countries has been rarely
investigated with micro-economic data. However, most authors hypothesize weak sub-
stitutability, and our findings confirm this hypothesis. Finally, using the propensity
score matching approach, we assess quantitatively the impact of the government’s
micro-credit program on households’ livelihoods. Results do not show a significant
impact. Overall, analyses thus reveal a number of inefficiencies in the credit policy
in terms of financial sustainability, poverty outreach and welfare impact that need
to be addressed. We derive policy recommendations that may help to address these
inefficiencies. Nevertheless, results show that the credit market is relatively liquid,
since all farmers can access credit, finance agricultural input and consumption goods
through this market. This liquidity is attributed to good levels of trust which result
from the important social interactions between individuals in the area.
Finally, in chapter 6, we investigate whether the high degree of ethnic diversity
observed in the study area undermines social capital. Social capital has appeared as a
powerful concept that captures the community features, such as norms and network,
that enable members of society to act collectively and/or overcome market failure.
The literature points at ethnic heterogeneity as a factor inhibiting social interactions,
and thus hindering collective action. Dissected landscapes in mountainous areas have
caused complex settlement patterns overtime resulting in a high cultural and linguistic
diversity. In Yen Chau, heterogeneity within villages was further induced by reset-
tlement policies conducted by the government after the independence from France as
a way to integrate ethnic minorities in the nation’s political project. This particular
setting offers a unique occasion to test the exogenous effect of ethnic heterogeneity on
social capital outcomes. We develop two econometric models, the first one predicting
individual participation in local organizations, and the second analyzing households’
investment in social network capital. Results show an ambiguous effect of ethnic het-
erogeneity on participation. First, the extent and direction of this effect appear to
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depend on the type of organization considered, namely its political nature, the entry
rule, and the type of good that is managed, whether public or club goods. Second, we
do not find evidence of a direct effect of heterogeneity on households’ level of social
network capital measured by its borrowing capacity from friends and relatives. How-
ever, we find heterogeneity to have an indirect impact through its interaction with
variables capturing households’ identity and the participation of their members in
local organizations. While the place of birth appears as a significant determinant in
homogeneous settings, this effect vanishes as heterogeneity increases. On the contrary,
participation of household members has a positive effect on households’ level of social
network capital, an effect that becomes significant in heterogeneous communities and
increases along with the degree of heterogeneity. Overall, these results do not confirm
theoretical predictions of a negative relationship but show instead that heterogeneity
can induce dynamism in social relations by favoring the establishment of bridging
connections which in turn can foster innovation and cross-cultural learning, enhance
social mobility, and eventually encourage sustainable development.
The contributions of this thesis are twofold. First, it identifies sources of success
and failure in the current institutional framework to promote sustainable development
in Vietnam’s mountainous areas from which we derive important policy recommen-
dations. Evidence in this thesis highlights limitations of the top-down approach that
dominates public intervention in mountainous areas of northern Vietnam. These in-
terventions are costly and often not successful in enhancing equity, efficiency and
the environmental sustainability of resource use. This stresses the need for the Viet-
namese government to further enhance the functioning of incentive-based mechanisms
in the economy. In this perspective, the clarification of the land reform objectives,
the development of a land market, the promotion of independent and financially sus-
tainable financial institutions, the reinforcement of the legal system, and the support
of the emergence of an independent civil society are all measure that may encourage
sustainable development in Vietnam’s mountainous regions.
Beyond these policy-oriented findings, this thesis also contributes to a growing
body of the literature studying micro-economic impacts of institutions, and delivers
in this perspective several general findings. As any economic agents, farmers have
anticipations and interpret signals. Therefore, transparency and credibility of the
state in implementing a policy are two important features to ensure its success. Sec-
ond, social capital, thanks to positive externalities notably on financial markets or in
the management of natural resource, has strong implications on the economic perfor-
mance of a society. This should encourage governments to design policies aimed at
promoting social interactions particularly among people of diverse cultural and social
backgrounds.
Zusammenfassung
Vietnams wirtschaftliche Entwicklung ist eine der beeindruckensten Erfolgsgeschich-
ten der letzten zwei Jahrzehnte. Das im Jahr 1986 beschlossene Reformprgramm
”
Doi
Moi“bewirkte den allma¨hlichen u¨bergang von einer zentralen Planwirtschaft zu ei-
ner marktorientierten Wirtschaft. Die Reform zielte darauf ab, die landwirtschaftliche
Produktion zu steigern und die Armut zu beka¨mpfen, so dass die Bauern selbst wieder
im Mittelpunkt der Entscheidungsfindung stehen. Durch eine Neudefinition der Rol-
len von Staat, Markt und Gemeinden bei der Zuweisung von Ressourcen fu¨hrten die
Reformen zu einem tiefgreifenden Wandel dieser Institutionen. Agrarma¨rkte wurden
schrittweise liberalisiert, fu¨r den Großteil der landwirtschaftlichen Fla¨chen wurden die
Nutzungsrechte an Kleinbauern u¨bertragen und Programme zur Armutsbeka¨mpfung
umgesetzt. Auf nationaler Ebene hat das hohe Wirtschaftswachstum in allen Wirt-
schaftssektoren eine drastische Reduzierung der Armut ermo¨glicht. Die Erfolge wa-
ren jedoch nicht im ganzen Land zu verzeichnen. Die Bergregionen blieben in die-
sem Prozess benachteiligt. Im Jahr 2008 waren die Armutsindikatoren im no¨rdlichen
Hochland doppelt so hoch wie im Rest des Landes. Daru¨ber hinaus hat das rasan-
te Bevo¨lkerungswachstum, kombiniert mit einer Intensivierung und Ausweitung der
landwirtschaftlichen Systeme, die in empfindliche o¨kosysteme eingreifen, den Druck
auf die natu¨rlichen Ressourcen erheblich erho¨ht. Diese Tatsachen zeigen, dass fu¨r
ressourcenbasiertes Wirtschaften ein hohes Risiko besteht, in einen Teufelskreis zu ge-
raten, bei dem sich Umweltzersto¨rung und Armut gegenseitig versta¨rken und damit
die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung dauerhaft aufhalten. Die komplexen Beziehungen zwi-
schen Armut und Umweltzersto¨rung innerhalb empfindlicher o¨kosysteme lassen darauf
schließen, dass Verteilungsgerechtigkeit, wirtschaftliches Wachstum und o¨kologische
Nachhaltigkeit nicht als separate Ziele in Angriff genommen werden ko¨nnen, son-
dern gemeinsam angegangen werden mu¨ssen um eine nachhaltige Entwicklung zu
gewa¨hrleisten.
Gestu¨tzt auf ein konzeptionelles Rahmenmodell, welches die entscheidende Funk-
tion von Institutionen im Armut-Umwelt-Nexus hervorhebt, untersucht diese Doktor-
arbeit, in welchem Umfang der gegenwa¨rtige institutionelle Rahmen die Zielverein-
viii
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barungen in den Bereichen Verteilungsgerechtigkeit, wirtschaftliches Wachstum und
o¨kologische Nachhaltigkeit angeht.
Die Arbeit konzentriert sich auf drei Dimensionen, die eine kritische Rolle bei
der Betrachtung von Armut und Umwelt spielen und im Kontext der la¨ndlichen Ent-
wicklung in den Bergregionen im Norden Vietnams besonders relevant sind: Land-
Institutionen, Finanzma¨rkte und Sozialkapital. Die Arbeit befasst sich im Speziellen
mit den folgenden Fragestellungen: (i) Haben die Individualisierung von Zugang zu
Land und Landbesitzprogramme die Eigentumssicherheit und damit die Anwendung
von Bodenschutzmaßnahmen gefo¨rdert? (ii) Hat sich ein Markt fu¨r Grund und Boden
herausgebildet? (iii) Ist der Markt fu¨r Kredite gerecht und effizient? Ist der staatlich
gefu¨hrte formelle Sektor wettbewerbsfa¨hig? Fu¨hrt eine Intervention des Staates zu
einer gerechteren und effizienteren Allokation als andere Branchen? (iv) Untergra¨bt
ethnische Vielfalt kollektives Handeln und die Bildung von sozialen Netzwerken? Die
empirischen Belege in dieser Arbeit bauen auf einem umfangreichen und quantitativen
Prima¨rdatensatz auf Haushalts- und Dorfebene auf, der in den Jahren 2007 und 2008
in Yen Chau, einer Bergregion des no¨rdlichen Vietnams, erhoben wurde. Außerdem
stu¨tzt sich die Arbeit auf qualitative Informationen aus der Feldforschung, die durch
Diskussionen mit Fokusgruppen und durch zahlreiche informelle Gespra¨che mit lokalen
Interessensvertretern gesammelt wurden.
Die Dissertation ist in sieben Kapitel unterteilt. Nach einem einfu¨hrenden Ka-
pitel eins, das den Hintergrund der Problemstellung erla¨utert und die wichtigsten
Forschungsfragen und Hypothesen der Arbeit vorstellt, gibt das zweite Kapitel eine
Einfu¨hrung in das Untersuchungsgebiet und das Datenmaterial. Die Kapitel drei bis
sechs beinhalten Untersuchungen zu mikroo¨konomischen Auswirkungen von Landbe-
sitzrechten (Kapitel drei und vier), von Kreditinstituten (Kapitel funf) und zur Bil-
dung von Sozialkapital (Kapitel sechs). Kapitel sieben fasst die Forschungsergebnisse
zusammen, diskutiert diese und zieht Schlussfolgerungen.
Das dritte Kapitel untersucht die im Jahr 1993 beschlossene Landreform, die nach
vierzig Jahren der Kollektivierung auf eine Privatisierung und die Sicherung des Zu-
gangs zu Land durch die Vergabe von Zertifikaten eines langfristigen Nutzungsrechts
abzielte. Ziel dieses großen Besitzrechtprogramms ist die Steigerung der landwirt-
schaftlichen Produktion, die Fo¨rderung des Schutz von natu¨rlichen Ressourcen sowie
eine Verringerung der Armut. Nach einer geschichtlichen und inhaltlichen Analyse des
Bodenrechts beschreibt der Artikel die Umsetzung der Reform in Yen Chau.
Anhand von deskriptiven Statistiken und o¨konometrischen Modellen zur Agroforst-
wirtschaft, die Selektionsverzerrungen aufgrund unvollsta¨ndiger Exposition beru¨cksichtigen,
wird anschließend untersucht, inwieweit die Reform die Aneignung von Bodenschutz-
technologien durch Landwirte beeinflusst. Zuallererst zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass die
Umsetzung der Reform insbesondere in Bergregionen, in denen sich das Gesetz mit den
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althergebrachten Land-Institutionen u¨berschnitt und damit eine Quelle fu¨r Konflikte
darstellte, ein langes und kostspieliges Verfahren war. Die Notwendigkeit, einerseits
das Gesetz durchzusetzen und andererseits dabei die Kontrolle u¨ber die Bodennutzung
zu erhalten und eine gerechte Landverteilung zu gewa¨hrleisten, fu¨hrte die lokale Regie-
rung dazu, Land neu umzuverteilen, welches bereits an Landwirte verteilt worden war.
Der Artikel bezieht sich daher auf die Frage, ob diese Umschichtungen das Vertrauen
der Landwirte in Land-Institutionen beeinflussen und somit Einfluss auf ihre Anreize
zur langfristigen u¨bernahme von Methoden zum Umweltschutz wie Agroforstwirtschaft
haben. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der Besitz eines formalen Landrechts sich positiv
auf die Aneignung auswirkt, dass jedoch die Angst vor erneuten Umverteilungen in
den Do¨rfern die Anwendung von Erhaltungsmaßnahmen bremst, da Ungewissheit und
Unsicherheit bezu¨glich der Besitzrechte entstehen.
Weitere Analysen zeigen, dass diese beiden Effekte interagieren und somit die
Bodenpolitik und die Art der Umsetzung die Erhaltungspraktiken der Landwirte be-
einflussen. Daher leistet der Artikel einen Beitrag zur bereits bestehenden Literatur,
indem er zeigt, dass die Glaubwu¨rdigkeit des Staates von Bedeutung ist, da diese die
Erwartungen und Reaktionen der Bauern an bzw. auf die Politik betrifft. Ein weiteres
wichtiges Ergebnis ist, dass die Landwirte zwar relativ gute Kenntnisse u¨ber Boden-
schutzmaßnahmen haben; die momentan in der Region verfu¨gbaren Technologien aber
unter den derzeitigen institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen wirtschaftlich unattraktiv
bleiben. Es ist unwahrscheinlich, dass die Landwirte die Kosten fu¨r die Bodenerhal-
tung alleine tragen. Der
”
o¨ffentliche Gut“-Charakter des Bodenschutzes fordert eine
sta¨rkere Beteiligung der Forschungs- und Regierungsbeho¨rden bei der Identifikati-
on von Landnutzungsoptionen, die sowohl wirtschaftlich attraktiv als auch o¨kologisch
nachhaltig sind, sowie bei der Verbesserung von institutionellen Mechanismen und der
Fo¨rderung von deren Umsetzung, etwa durch Zahlungen fu¨r o¨kologische Leistungen.
Dem vorangegangenen Artikel folgt ein erga¨nzendes Kapitel drei, das untersucht,
ob die Bodenreform zur Etablierung eines Bodenmarktes in Yen Chau gefu¨hrt hat.
Von gut funktionierenden Bodenma¨rkten wird erwartet, dass sie wichtige Steigerun-
gen der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit und der Effizienz in der Landwirtschaft generieren,
indem sie die u¨bertragung von Grundstu¨cken von weniger produktiven zu produk-
tiveren Landwirten ermo¨glichen, und indem sie den Wert der landwirtschaftlichen
Vermo¨genswerte erho¨hen. Studien haben gezeigt, dass dies auf nationaler Ebene der
Fall ist, und die auf Bodenma¨rkten stattfindenden Verkaufs- und Pachttransaktionen
zu einer gro¨ßeren Effizienz bei der Bodennutzung und zu einer gerechteren Verteilung
fu¨hren. Unsere Daten zeigen, dass die Situation in Yen Chau anders ist. Dort sind
Grundstu¨cksverka¨ufe sehr selten und der Pachtmarkt sehr schwach. Die meisten der
beobachteten Landtransaktionen entstehen durch interfamilia¨re, kostenlose Transfers.
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass diese Transaktionen zu einer gleichma¨ßigeren Verteilung
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fu¨hren als die urspru¨ngliche Landverteilung. Bu¨rokratie, Eigentumsunsicherheit auf-
grund von Landumverteilung und die Ungewissheit bezu¨glich der Verla¨ngerung oder
Umschichtung von Nutzungsrechten nach Ablauf der Laufzeit werden als die wich-
tigsten Ursachen gesehen, die Landverkauf und Pachtvertra¨ge behindern. Die Ein-
schra¨nkungen bei Krediten scheinen keine wichtige Rolle zu spielen.
Das fu¨nfte Kapitel dieser Arbeit beleuchtet den Kreditmarkt und untersucht so-
wohl die Rolle als auch die Auswirkungen staatlicher Eingriffe bei der Herbeifu¨hrung
einer gerechteren und effizienteren Landallokation. Funktionierende Kreditma¨rkte spie-
len eine entscheidende Rolle im kritischen Dreieck der nachhaltigen Entwicklung, weil
sie es Landwirten ermo¨glichen, intertemporale Entscheidungen zu treffen und bes-
ser mit Risiken zurechtzukommen. In la¨ndlichen Regionen fu¨hrt das Bestehen von
Transaktionskosten und kovariaten Risiken jedoch oft dazu, dass Kreditma¨rkte darin
versagen, jeder Person einen Kredit zu Marktzinsraten zu gewa¨hren. Die ho¨chsten Ko-
sten dieser Fehlerhaftigkeit tragen die Armen. Vietnams Intervention in den la¨ndlichen
Kreditmarkt wird verko¨rpert durch eine staatlich gefu¨hrte
”
kommerzielle"Bank, die
”
Vietnam Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development“(VBARD) und eine
”
poli-
tische“Bank, die
”
Vietnam Bank for Sovial Policies“(VBSP), die Mikrokredite mit
stark subventioniertem Zinssatz an arme Haushalte vergibt. Anhand eines umfangrei-
chen Datensatzes zu Umfang und Zugang zu Kreditgescha¨ften von Landwirten zwi-
schen 2002 und 2007 beschreiben wir den Kreditmarkt, vergleichen die Vertragsbe-
dingungen die von formellen, semi-formellen und informellen Kreditgebern angeboten
werden, untersuchen die Beteiligung je Wohlstandsterzil und berechnen ein Tobit-
Modell, welches die von nicht-formellen Kreditgebern angebotenen Zinssa¨tze scha¨tzt.
Fu¨r Yen Chau zeigen die Daten, dass trotz wettbewerbsfa¨higer Vertragsbedingungen
der formelle Sektor vor allem fu¨r die Armen, die auch im informellen Sektor ho¨heren
Zinsen begegnen als andere Kreditnehmer, eine sekunda¨re Kreditquelle bleibt. Mit
einem zweistufigen Probit-Modell mit partieller Beobachtbarkeit werden dann die De-
terminanten der Nachfrage und des Zugangs zu jedem formellen Kredit-Programm
untersucht. Im VBARD-Modell zeigen die Ergebnisse eine Auswahl der Kreditneh-
mer, die aus einer Selbstselektion und einer Selektion durch die Bank resultieren. In
diesem Modell zeigen die Scha¨tzungen keine Diskriminierung der Armen. Im Gegen-
teil: im VBSP-Modell findet man eine ha¨ufigere Ausgrenzung der Armen zu Krediten
durch die VBSP, obwohl ihr Programm auf diese Gruppe abzielt.
”
Gemeinschaftliche
Unvollkommenheiten“und die Tatsache, dass Anreize fu¨r Kredit-Agenten zu sehr auf
die Ru¨ckzahlungsleistung der Kunden bauen, werden als zwei Hauptgru¨nde angese-
hen, die das fehlerhafte Targeting erkla¨ren. Darauf aufbauend wurde o¨konometrisch
untersucht, ob die Nachfrage nach formellen und nach informellen Krediten inter-
agieren, um so das Substitutierbarkeitspotential zwischen den beiden Sektoren zu
bewerten. In der bestehenden Literatur wurde die Frage nach der Austauschbarkeit
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zwischen formellen und informellen Kreditmarktsegmenten in Entwicklungsla¨ndern
bisher anhand mikroo¨konomischer Daten nur wenig untersucht. Allerdings vermuten
die meisten Autoren eine schwache Substituierbarkeit. Diese Hypothese wird durch
die Ergebnisse besta¨tigt. Schlussendlich wird quantitativ, durch den Propensity Score
Matching-Ansatz, die Auswirkung des Mikrokredit-Programms der Regierung auf die
Existenzgrundlagen der Haushalte bewertet. Die Ergebnisse zeigen keinen signifikan-
ten Einfluss. Insgesamt weisen die Analysen somit auf eine Reihe von Ineffizienzen in
der Kreditpolitik bezu¨glich der finanziellen Nachhaltigkeit, der Reichweite der Pro-
gramme zur Armutsbeka¨mpfung und den Auswirkungen auf die Wohlfahrt hin, die
angegangen werden mu¨ssen. Wir leiten politische Handlungsempfehlungen ab, die da-
bei helfen ko¨nnten, diese Ineffizienzen anzugehen. Dennoch zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass
der Kreditmarkt relativ liquide ist, da alle Landwirte Zugang zu Krediten haben und
landwirtschaftliche Produktionsmittel und Konsumgu¨ter finanzieren ko¨nnen. Diese Li-
quidita¨t wird einem relativ großen Maß an Vertrauen und an sozialen Interaktionen
zwischen Individuen zugeschrieben.
Schließlich wird im Kapitel sechs untersucht, ob der in der Forschungsregion be-
obachtete hohe Grad an ethnischer Vielfalt das soziale Kapital beintra¨chtigt. Soziales
Kapital tritt als ein leistungsfa¨higes Konzept auf, das die gesellschaftlichen Charak-
teristika (z. B. Normen und Netzwerke) erfasst, die es Mitgliedern der Gesellschaft
ermo¨glichen, gemeinsam zu handeln und Marktversagen zu u¨berwinden. Die Literatur
deutet auf ethnische Heterogenita¨t als hemmenden Faktor hin, der soziale Interaktio-
nen und somit kollektives Handeln behindert. Verstreute Landschaften in Bergregionen
haben u¨ber die Zeit zu komplexen Siedlungsstrukturen gefu¨hrt, die in einer hohen kul-
turellen und sprachlichen Vielfalt resultieren. Nach der Unabha¨ngigkeit von Frankreich
wurde in Yen Chau die Heterogenita¨t innerhalb der Do¨rfer durch die Umsiedlungspo-
litik der Regierung weiter verscha¨rft. Letztere galt eigentlich als eine Mo¨glichkeit, die
ethnischen Minderheiten in das nationale politische Projekt zu integrieren. Diese be-
sonderen Voraussetzungen bieten eine einzigartige Gelegenheit, den exogenen Einfluss
der ethnischen Heterogenita¨t auf das resultierende soziale Kapital zu testen. Es wurden
zwei o¨konometrische Modelle entwickelt, bei dem das erste die individuelle Beteiligung
in lokalen Organisationen vorausberechnet und das zweite die Investitionen von Haus-
halten in soziales Netzwerkkapital analysiert. Die Ergebnisse zeigen eine zweideutige
Auswirkung der ethnischen Heterogenita¨t auf die Beteiligung. Zum einen scheinen
das Ausmaß und die Richtung des Effekts von der Art der Organisation abha¨ngig
zu sein, d.h. von ihrer politischen Ausrichtung, der Beitrittsregelung und der Art des
verwalteten Gutes, ob o¨ffentliches oder intern-privates Gut. Zum anderen finden wir
keine Beweise fu¨r eine direkte Wirkung von Heterogenita¨t auf das Niveau des sozialen
Netzwerkkapitals eines Haushalts gemessen an dessen Kreditfa¨higkeit bei Freunden
und Verwandten. Allerdings zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass indirekte Auswirkungen von
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Heterogenita¨t bestehen, die durch Wechselwirkung mit Variablen entstehen, welche
die Identita¨t von Haushalten und die Beteiligung derer Haushaltsmitglieder in lokalen
Organisationen erfassen. Wa¨hrend der Geburtsort als eine signifikante Determinante
in einem homogenen Umfeld erscheint, verschwindet dieser Effekt mit zunehmender
Heterogenita¨t. Die Mitgliedschaft von Haushaltsmitgliedern hat sogar eine positive
Auswirkung auf das Niveau des sozialen Netzwerkkapitals eines Haushalts. In hete-
rogenen Gesellschaften wird der Effekt signifikant und steigt mit dem Grad an He-
terogenita¨t. Insgesamt besta¨tigen die Ergebnisse die theoretischen Vorhersagen einer
negativen Beziehung nicht, sondern zeigen vielmehr, dass Heterogenita¨t die Dyna-
mik sozialer Beziehungen induzieren kann, indem sie dazu beitra¨gt, Verbindungen zu
schaffen, welche dann wiederum Innovation und interkulturelles Lernen fo¨rdern, sozia-
le Mobilita¨t steigern und schließlich eine nachhaltige Entwicklung besta¨rken ko¨nnen.
Die Dissertation leistet einen Beitrag in zweierlei Hinsicht. Zuna¨chst identifiziert sie
Ursachen von Erfolg und Misserfolg in der aktuellen institutionellen Rahmenstruktur
fu¨r eine nachhaltige Entwicklung in Bergregionen Vietnams, aus denen wichtige politi-
sche Empfehlungen abgeleitet werden ko¨nnen. Belege in dieser Arbeit betonen Grenzen
des Top-down-Ansatzes, der die o¨ffentliche Intervention in den Bergregionen im Nor-
den von Vietnam dominiert. Diese Interventionen sind teuer und oft nicht erfolgreich
bei der Verbesserung von Verteilungsgerechtigkeit, Effizienz, und o¨kologischer Nach-
haltigkeit der Ressourcennutzung. Dadurch wird die Notwendigkeit zur Fo¨rderung der
Funktionsweise bei Anreiz-Mechanismen in der Wirtschaft durch die vietnamesische
Regierung betont. Aus dieser Perspektive sind die Kla¨rung der Ziele der Bodenre-
form, die Entwicklung eines Bodenmarktes, die Fo¨rderung von unabha¨ngigen und
finanziell nachhaltigen Finanzinstitutionen, die Sta¨rkung des Rechtssystems und die
Unterstu¨tzung der Entstehung einer unabha¨ngigen Zivilgesellschaft Maßnahmen, die
eine nachhaltige Entwicklung in den Bergregionen Vietnams fo¨rdern ko¨nnten.
u¨ber diese politisch orientierten Ergebnisse hinaus leistet die Arbeit auch einen
Beitrag zum wachsenden Bestand der Literatur in diesem Bereich der sich mit den mi-
kroo¨konomischen Auswirkungen von Institutionen befasst und liefert in dieser Hinsicht
einige allgemeine Erkenntnisse. Zuna¨chst haben Landwirte, wie jeder Wirtschafts-
teilnehmer, Erwartungen und interpretieren Signale. Daher sind Transparenz und
Glaubwu¨rdigkeit des Staates bei der Umsetzung einer politischen Linie zwei wich-
tige Merkmale um ihren Erfolg sicherzustellen. Zweitens hat soziales Kapital, dank
der positiven externen Effekte, insbesondere bei Finanzma¨rkten oder beim Manage-
ment von natu¨rlichen Ressourcen, starke Auswirkungen auf die wirtschaftliche Lei-
stungsfa¨higkeit einer Gesellschaft. Dies sollte Regierungen darin besta¨rken, Strategien
zur Fo¨rderung sozialer Interaktionen, vor allem bei Menschen unterschiedlicher kul-
tureller und sozialer Herkunft, zu entwickeln.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 General introduction
Vietnam’s economic achievement over the past twenty years constitutes one of the most
successful development stories of the last century (Glewwe et al., 2004). Classified
among the world’s poorest countries at the end of the 1980s, Vietnam is now expecting
to join the list of industrialized countries by 2020 (ADB, 2006). After a decade of
remarkable success in the 1990s1, Vietnam has continued to progress in 2000-2010,
and is ranked among the fastest growing economies of this decade (with an average
annual growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 7.3% between 2000 and
2012 (World Bank, 2011))2. Moreover, economic growth has been pro-poor. The latest
estimates from the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) indicate a
nation-wide poverty incidence in 2008 of 13.1% (share of population living with less
than 1.25 US$ in Purchasing Power Parity), a dramatic reduction from 49.7% in 1998
and 63.7% in 1993 (GSO, 2011).
The transformation of institutions has been at the heart of Vietnam’s transition
strategy, and according to many observers, is a major key to the country’s success
(Macours and Swinnen, 2002; Cornia and Popov, 2001; Montes, 2001; Rozelle and
Swinnen, 2004; Ravallion and van deWalle, 2008b). TheDoi Moi3 reform program was
enacted in 1986 at the VIth congress of the the communist party to guide the transition
from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented system. Most of the reforms
were initially undertaken in the agricultural sector, where in 1981 about 70% of the
1The edited book by Glewwe et al. (2004) provides a good overview and detailed analyses of the
results achieved during this decade
2The Vietnam Development Reports published each year by the World Bank also documents
extensively the achieved progress and remaining challenges in Vietnam. The reports of years 2003
and 2006 have focused on poverty reduction and social protection, and those of years 2004 and 2009
have examined institutional advancements.
3Doi Moi is translated in English as renovation.
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population was employed. After 28 years of collectivization (1960-1988) the objective
of the government was to transform the incentive structure and return small farmers
to the center of decision-making. With this perspective, land rights were transferred
for most agricultural land to farmers (since 1988), markets were gradually liberalized,
a state-owned agriculture and rural development bank (the VBARD) was created
in 1990, and a variety of anti-poverty programs targeted at poor rural households
were implemented through the Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction program
(HEPR, nowadays referred to as National Target Program for Poverty Reduction).
The transformations undertaken thus entailed a deep redefinition of the roles of the
state, the market and communities in rural areas in regulating resource allocation and
organizing rural life.
Achievements in the agricultural sector have been spectacular (Macours and Swin-
nen, 2002; Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004; Kirk and Tuan, 2009). As a striking example,
from a situation of extreme poverty and hunger at the start of the reform, within a
few years Vietnam became a net rice exporter (since 1988), and now ranks among
the world’s top food exporters (second exporter of rice and coffee in the world (FAO,
2011)).
Yet, this success was not experienced on an equal scale accross the country. Nation-
level figures hide important disparities between urban and rural populations, upland
and delta regions or between ethnic minorities and the Kinh majority. The Northern
Uplands region in which this thesis takes place was the poorest region of the country
in 2008. Poverty incidence was still twice as large there as in the rest of the country
in 2008, and the pace of poverty reduction has also been slower in the past years
compared with the rest of the country, as shown in Figure 1.14.
Mountain people in Vietnam and elsewhere in South East Asia regions are among
their countries’ poorest populations (Blyth et al., 2002; Zeller et al., 2010; Akramov
et al., 2010). The reasons for this development gap lie principally in disadvantageous
geographic and political conditions. Greater remoteness, lower endowments in arable
land, and ecological fragility cause mountain people limited access to markets, in-
frastructure and technologies, and subject them to more economic. Those living in
the mountains are not only put at a geographic disadvandage, but are a political
one. In these regions, the dissected landscape has caused complex settlement patterns
overtime, resulting in a rich cultural and linguistic diversity (Blyth et al., 2002, p.20).
Cultural barriers coupled with geographical remoteness cause mountain ethnic minori-
ties to be less politically organized than their urban and lowland counterparts. They
are less likely than other groups to influence public choice. As a consequence, policies
designed in faraway urban centers do not often address adequately their economic,
cultural and ecological concerns (Jamieson et al., 1998; Akramov et al., 2010). As
4This figure shows expenditure poverty rates using the World bank and GSO poverty line (280
Thousand VND/month/capita in 2008)
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stated by Platteau (2000, p.xxii), “The fact that tribal communities of Asia and Latin
America are typically embedded in national entities ruled and dominated by societies
with opposite background characteristics is bound to affect their economic and other
performances (in terms of wealth, education, etc.) in a different way from what would
obtain more homogeneous tribal societies.”.
Yet, as this introduction will show, public intervention is needed to address the
complex linkages between environmental, economic and social conditions characteriz-
ing mountainous areas in South East Asia (Zeller et al., 2010). Achieving sustainable
development in the Upland regions is important, not only from a human and economic
perspective, but also because mountain ecosystems provide invaluable services to the
rest of the country, which include clean water, food, energy, biodiversity, recreation
and protection from environmental disasters (such as floods or landslides) (Blyth et al.,
2002; Ahlheim et al., 2009)
The rapid population growth in the uplands of Vietnam over the last 15 years,
combined with the intensification and expansion of agricultural systems into fragile
areas, has contributed to accentuating the pressure on natural resources. In the north-
west region, the population increased by 34% between 1995 and 2010, while it grew
only by 20.3% in the rest of the country (18.6 % if we exclude the Central Highlands)
(GSO, 2011). The scarcity of natural resources has increased the risk that the econ-
omy get trapped in a vicious circle whereby poverty and environmental degradation
mutually reinforce each other and durably undermine economic development. The
existence of strong linkages between livelihoods and environmental protection in the
presence of resource scarcity implies that in fragile areas poverty reduction, economic
Figure 1.1: Poverty rate in Vietnam and Northern Uplands (1998-2008)
37,4
28,9
19,5
16,0 14,5
64,5
47,9
38,3
32,3 31,6
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1998 2002 2004 2006 2008
P
o
v
e
rt
y
 r
a
te
 (
%
)
Vietnam
Northern Uplands
Source: GSO (2011)
1.2. Conceptual framework: institutions, poverty and the environment 4
growth, and environmental conservation are complementary goals that must be jointly
addressed (Reardon and Vosti, 1995; Duraiappah, 1998; Holden and Binswanger, 1998;
Dasgupta et al., 2005). Economic organizations5, such as the state, markets and local
communities and the resulting institutional framework play an essential role in ad-
dressing these objectives (Dasgupta and Ma¨ler, 1995; Duraiappah, 1998; Holden and
Binswanger, 1998).
This thesis investigates to what extent the institutional framework currently in
place in mountainous areas addresses the poverty-environment nexus (PEN), that is,
the set of complex linkages between poverty and the environment. Drawing on a
conceptual framework that underlines the role of institutions and resulting incentive
structure in addressing the nexus, the thesis examines the functioning and impact of
three institutional dimensions – land institutions, financial markets, and social capital
– that play a critical role in and are particularly relevant to the current context of
Vietnam’s uplands.
The rest of the introduction is structured as follows: Section 1.2 describes the
conceptual framework used in this thesis, and is followed by Section 1.3 which pro-
vides background information on Vietnam’s land reform and the rural finance policy.
Section 1.4 details the specific objectives and reveals the research hypotheses tested
research. The outline of the thesis is detailed in Section 1.5.
1.2 Conceptual framework: institutions, poverty and the en-
vironment
This section provides the conceptual framework that has guided the elaboration of
research questions and the research hypotheses explored in this thesis. The following
subsections describe linkages between poverty (equity) and the environment in the
agricultural sector (in 1.2.1); define institutions, demonstrate their predominant role
in the PEN, and explain why they often fail to address it (in 1.2.2). Finally, the
last subsection 1.2.3 details the role of land institutions, financial markets and social
capital play in this framework shows how the state, market and communities interplay
in their definition.
1.2.1 Linkages between poverty and the environment in agriculture
Small farmers in developing countries derive most of their livelihoods from the ex-
ploitation natural resources such as soils, water and vegetation. While most of these
5The distinction between organizations and institutions is often confusing in the literature. Ac-
cording to Hayami (2001, p.221), an organization is defined as a “functional body organized by a set
of rules” while institutions are the “set of rules to organize people into the functional body”.
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resources are regenerative or renewable, an inappropriate use (or overuse) leads to
their degradation and depletion until their exhaustion.
The causal link between environmental degradation and poverty is evident. In a
context of growing population and increasing scarcity of natural resource, and when
technologies are not available, the depletion of one of farmers’ main livelihood re-
sources has a direct negative impact on their wealth. In fragile ecosystems, natural
resource degradation often causes and exacerbates the occurrence of natural disas-
ters: soil erosion and deforestation for instance increase the likelihood and accentuate
negative consequences of floods and landslides on livelihoods. Added to climatic and
market-related risks, these natural disaster reinforce risks and uncertainty in fragile
areas. When insurance mechanisms or credit markets are imperfect or missing, these
risks and uncertainties threaten livelihoods of vulnerable farmers and undermine their
decision making capacity. The potentially negative consequences of water pollution
on health constitutes a further threat on livelihoods, not only for local populations
but also at a larger scale. Finally, as the availability of essential natural resources
shrinks, competition for resources will increase raising risks of conflicts.
Poverty is also pointed as a source of environmental degradation. Farmers make
decisions intertemporarilly regarding resource use, depending on the resources avail-
able today and those that will be left tomorrow given the impact of today’s behavior.
Therefore an important element of resource-related decision making is the discount
rate, defined as the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution between the farmer’s
present and future utility (Pender, 1996). Poor farmers lacking financial and physical
capital, typically face high discount rates (Pender, 1996; Holden et al., 1998). Their
utility of future consumption is only weakly weighted compared to utility of today’s
consumption needs, inducing them to (over)exploit resources today without consid-
ering the impact on tomorrow’s resource availability. Small farmers lacking access
to capital also lack investment capacities to diversify their activity away from farm-
ing, and are doomed to rely heavily on the exploitation of low access-cost primary
resources such as natural resources. Many conservation technologies, require initial
investments or incur high opportunity costs in the short term. Farmers lacking invest-
ment capacities are unlikely to undertake such investment (Holden and Binswanger,
1998).
However, as pointed by Reardon and Vosti (1995); Duraiappah (1998) and Scherr
(2000) focusing on poverty as a main cause of environmental degradation is misleading.
Empirical evidence indeed shows that environmental degradation linked to agriculture
occurs as well in wealthy environment. The inverted U-shaped environmental Kuznets
curve, empirically documented in the 1992 World Bank development report (World
Bank, 1991), even predicts environmental degradation to increase along with the level
of economic development but to decrease beyond a certain certain level. Scherr (2000)
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cites case studies showing how small farmers have been able to adapt environmental
degradation through cheap and ingenious technologies (for instance, the contour stone
bunding in Burkina Faso (Dutilly-Diané et al., 2003)). To others, the extent to which
poverty induces environmental degradation appear to depend much on the type of
poverty considered – where “type” refers to the asset categories in which households
are poor, to the distribution of poverty across households in a society, and to the
type of environment problem that takes place (Reardon and Vosti, 1995). In the
same line, other authors have distinguish between exogenous and endogenous and
by such, argue that extent to which environment and poverty interplay depends in
fact on other factors, such as market and other institutional failure. Poverty that
results from market and institutional failure affects the environmental sustainability
(Duraiappah, 1998). These controversies imply that wealth-enhancing policies while
necessary will not be sufficient to address the nexus. Successful interventions will
thus address the sources of poverty rather than its consequences, address institutional
aspects reinforcing the linkages between poverty and the environment and will often
be context-specific.
The important synergies between households’ livelihood and environment resources
imply that poverty reduction, economic growth and environmental sustainability can
no longer be treated as separate objectives but must be jointly addressed in rural
development strategies. These three objectives constitute the critical triangle of sus-
tainable development described by Vosti and Reardon (1997).
1.2.2 The role of institutions
Institutions are defined by North (1990, p.3) as “the rules of the game or more for-
mally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”, and refer thus
to the formal (such as laws) and informal rules (such as customs) that regulate human
relationships in an economy.
Authors of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) perspective argue that the eco-
nomic importance of institutions and of organizations lie on the presence of important
transaction costs in the economy (Williamson, 1979; Bardhan, 1989). Imperfect infor-
mation has focused much attention. The occurrence of opportunistic behaviors and
bounded rationality in the economy, information asymmetries are source of important
transaction costs which impede the functioning of markets (Akerlof, 1970). Transac-
tion costs arise from the need to screen and to monitor transaction partners and from
costs needed to enforce property rights. This framework has been used to explain the
emergence and persistence of important institutional failure in rural areas of devel-
oping countries, such as credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) or sharecropping
(Stiglitz, 1989), and in general to explain why many markets fail6 or are even missing
6Markets are said to fail when they induce an allocation of resources which that is suboptimal in
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in these areas.
Market and institutional failures incur important costs for the economy. When
property rights are incompletely specified or imperfectly enforced, markets for en-
vironmental resources do not emerge. As a consequence, the negative externalities
related to the misuse of natural resources are not accounted for creating no incentives
for their user to protect them (Dasgupta and Ma¨ler, 1995). de Janvry et al. (1991)
show moreover how market failure undermine production efficiency, but also the re-
activity of farmers to economic policies – such as subsidization – and thus contribute
to increase the inefficiency of public intervention in the agricultural sector.
1.2.3 The role of land institutions, financial markets and communities
Institutional and market failures are the source of important inefficiencies in the econ-
omy and tend to reinforce the PEN in the agricultural sector. In this thesis we focus on
three institutional dimensions: land institutions, rural finance institutions, and social
capital. The following paragraphs explain below why these institutions are critical,
why they often fail in rural contexts, and how these failures can be addressed.
Land institutions
It is widely acknowledged that well-defined land property rights encourage the natural
resource management, yield positive efficiency effects and have the potential to reduce
poverty (Meinzen-Dick and Knox, 2001; Deininger and Feder, 2001).
First, well-defined and enforceable land rights, by ensuring the right-holder to reap
the future benefits of today’s investments, and letting him bear the consequences of his
mismanagements, create incentives for investment and natural resource management.
Second, well-defined property rights allow land markets to develop and enable the
transfer of land from the less productive to the more productive farmers, generating
important efficiency gains in the rural economy. Finally, land constitutes with labor
the main resource small farmers can use to ensure their livelihoods. Well-defined and
secure land rights also enhance farmers’ livelihood, by securing small farmers’ access
of small farmers to land resources, enabling them to sell this resource at market price,
or to use it as a collateral in credit transactions.
As the competition for resources increases, defining and enforcing property rights
becomes more costly. As explained by Platteau (2000, chapter 3 and 4), these costs
can be so prohibitive that they have prevented the natural emergence of efficient land
institutions in many developing countries. Public intervention is needed to assume
these important costs. Land registration and titling policies have appeared in this
perspective as the most efficient intervention and have been promoted likewise in many
the sense of Pareto, that is when the welfare of some could be improved without deteriorating the
welfare of others (Hayami, 2001, p.224).
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developing countries. The issuance of titles offer land users an incontestable mean to
claim and enforce their use rights on a defined land area, and thereby increase tenure
security, and enable land transactions. Land titles enable small farmers to use land
as a collateral in formal banks (Feder and Akihiko, 1999; Deininger and Feder, 2001;
Deininger, 2003)7.
Rural financial markets
Many decisions in farming activities require intertemporal decision making, i.e. deci-
sions that are made in the present and entail future outcomes. In ecologically fragile
and populated areas, the availability of future resources strongly depends on today’s
actions. Moreover risk and uncertainties are predominant features of economic lives.
The functioning of financial markets (which encompass markets for saving, insurance
and credit services) – sometimes referred to as ‘intertemporal markets’ – enabling
farmers to make intertemporal decisions has strong implications for the PEN.
The access to financial services enable farmers to bear risks and to smooth con-
sumptions over seasons and, as such, has direct positive effects on welfare (Zeller and
Sharma, 2000). Second, a better access to financial services, credit in particular, re-
duces opportunity costs of capital, and thereby encourage technical progress and the
use of labor-saving technologies (Diagne et al., 2000). Finally, well-functioning mar-
kets are likely to encourage environmentally sustainable practices, by enabling farmers
to make intertemporal investments and reducing their discount rates8.
In rural areas of developing countries, information asymmetries, the covariance of
income and saving behaviors, and the high level of uncertainty cause financial markets
to fail. The risks of loan default, which arise with moral hazard and adverse selection,
incur for the lender important screening, monitoring and enforcement costs. These
costs induce informal lenders to raise interest rates up to prohibitive levels, or to
ration poor borrowers based on their perceived creditworthiness (Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981). Formal banks, as a way to screen borrowers and reduce default risks, require
the deposit of collateral as guarantee causing small farmers lacking adequate collateral
to be excluded.
The negative consequences caused by failures on financial markets, in terms of eq-
uity, efficiency and environmental sustainability require external intervention. Models
of interventions have varied through time and across countries. Repressive inter-
ventions (e.g. through interest rates ceilings) and subsidization which dominated
interventions up to the 1980s have been mostly unsuccessful in addressing market
7There are nowadays important discussions in the development sphere about land titling policies,
which are on the one hand very costly, and on the other hand not always successful in creating tenure
security, particularly in Africa areas where traditional land tenure systems are very complex. On this
question, see Atwood (1990), Bromley (2009) and Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi (2009).
8The relation between poverty, credit access and discount rates has been studied and put in
evidence by Pender (1996) in India, and by (Holden et al., 1998) in Ethiopia and Zambia.
1.2. Conceptual framework: institutions, poverty and the environment 9
failure and rural poverty (Conning and Udry, 2005). This lead to the emergence of a
new paradigm advocating for institutional innovations enabling lenders to overcome
information asymmetry and enforcement problems (Zeller, 2003). The success of the
microfinance ‘revolution’ demonstrated that through institutional innovations, the ac-
cess of poor households to financial services can be enhanced, while ensuring financial
sustainability of institutions. The role of government in this paradigm is subject to
different interpretations. Some advocate who see the financial sector mostly as a pri-
vate sector recommend minimal implication of the governments, while other highlight
the public good character of financial innovations and the necessity for the state to
support emerging institutions (Lapenu, 2000).
The role of communities and social capital
As seen above, imperfect information, and the lack of enforcement mechanisms are
two major factors causing institutional and market failures in developing countries.
Public intervention is then required, for instance to define formal rules that will reduce
transaction costs and enhance the functioning of markets, or, in the case of public
goods to substitute the market. Yet, the government may not always succeed to
address market failure, in particular when imperfect information and enforcement
problems are the main factors causing markets to fail. In other words, remote public
agents may not do better than the local traders (or lenders) in accessing information
or enforcing a rule.
Communities, in comparison, have a comparative advantage both in information
access and in their capacity to enforce rule through social sanctions. For these reasons,
they provide according to Hayami (2001, p.286), “a principle of organization critically
needed to correct the failures of the market and the state, and, thereby, to support
modern economic development.”. This observation have led many development orga-
nizations and government to allocate an increasing role to communities in the design
and implementation of development projects – particularly in the field of natural re-
source management projects – through the so-called community-driven development
projects.
Yet, considering that communities are all uniform in their ability to enforce rules
and to share information is misleading. Social capital, defined by Putnam (1995,
p.664) “features of social life – networks, norms and trust – that enable participants to
act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives” has appeared in this perspec-
tive as a powerful concept to capture the features that enable community members to
exchange information, enforce rules and to act collectively.
Theoretical work and empirical evidence suggest that the level of social capital in
a given community is – at least partly – endogenously determined. Individuals decide
whether to join a group, to cooperate, based on the economic, social or institutional
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conditions they face (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). Community feature, such as
income inequality, ethnic diversity, geography, the pre-existence of clear cooperation
rules are all potentially important factors to explain why people cooperate better in
some areas, or form social networks faster. Empirical research on the formation of
social capital remains, up to date, very scarce. Theoretical evidence however suggests
ethnicity and identity to play an important role on social capital formation. In par-
ticular, ethnic heterogeneity is seen as a factor inhibiting social interactions due to
linguistic and cultural barrier, social sanction effects, and preference mechanisms9.
Figure 1.2: The poverty-environment nexus and structure of the thesis
Source: Own figure
To sum up, this section showed that institutions define the incentive structure
in the economy and, as such, play a critical role in the poverty-environment nexus in
mountainous areas, by inducing small farmers to choose (or not) sustainable livelihood
strategies. Drawing on the sustainable livelihood conceptual framework (Scoones,
1998), and based on theories detailed above, Figure 1.2 summarizes the conceptual
framework of this thesis and presents its outline.
9A review of the literature on this issue is provided in chapter 6, section 6.2.
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1.3 Background information
This section briefly describes the land reform and rural credit policy of Vietnam’s
government. Both policies are described in more details within the chapters of this
thesis, in sections 3.2 for the land reform, and 5.1 for the credit policy.
1.3.1 The land reform
Vietnam’s land reform has induced a quasi-privatization of land access. In this system,
the land officially belongs to the Vietnamese people and is managed by the state on
its behalf, land users are transferred income and control rights for a delimited time
period. The reform began officially in 1988, year at which the resolution 10 enacted
the end of collective farming, and transferred use and control rights to individual
farm households. The 1993 land law granted users with five rights: the right to
exchange, transfer, mortgage, inherit, and lease out the land. Land users received
land use right certificates (LURC, sometimes referred to as Red Book), which entitle
them to claim and use these rights for a period varying between 20 years for annual
crop land to 50 years for perennial crop land, and to an unlimited time period for
residential land. In the law, the state, through local authorities, maintained heavy
control over transactions, rental contracts, and more importantly over general land
use plans. A new law was voted in 2003 to complement the previous one, and was
aimed at facilitating land transactions, extending the rights of both household spouses
(by registering titles under both spouses names), and including the right to sublease
land to the previous bundle.
This policy represents one of the largest land titling programs ever implemented
throughout the developing world with around 11 million titles issued in 2000 (Do and
Iyer, 2008) and was assessed by observers and researchers as egalitarian (Ravallion
and van de Walle, 2004, 2008a). In mountainous regions, the enforcement of the land
law has been contested by some ethnic groups who returned instead to traditional
land management systems when collective farming ended (Corlin, 2004; Sikor, 2004).
Uncertainty persists on whether these rights will be reallocated at the end of the use
right term (which will occur already in 2013 in most areas).
1.3.2 The rural credit policy
Vietnam’s rural credit policy is embodied by two state-owned banks (World Bank,
2008). The Vietnamese Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD) was
created in 1990 and acts as a profit-oriented commercial bank supporting the develop-
ment of rural areas by providing loans to agricultural and non-agricultural enterprises.
VBARD’s interest rates remain however partly controlled by the state (Duong and
Izumida, 2002; Dufhues, 2007).
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The other bank is the Vietnamese Bank for Social Policies (VBSP), former Viet-
nam Bank for the Poor (VBP). Its mandate is to offer microcredits at preferential
interest rates to a targeted population, mainly the poor. The bank transfers its lend-
ing activities to village-based mass organizations (MO), and is a hybrid institutions
between village fund and a microfinance institution (MFI). The bank does not collect
savings and its program remains heavily subsidized by the government.
As highlighted by Dufhues (2007), both banks constitute in most provinces the sole
formal credit supply available to farmers. Unfair competition conditions due to high
levels subsidies in the VBSP, and political constraints have prevented other organiza-
tions to establish. As a consequence, rural areas have not yet seen the development
of a competitive microfinance sector that is independent from state intervention.
1.4 Specific objectives and research hypotheses
The economic transition in Vietnam has entailed, in rural areas, a deep redefinition
of the role of the state, the market and the communities in allocating resources and
organizing rural life. As seen above, upland areas in Vietnam are characterized by
dissected landscapes, low infrastructure development, high poverty rates and ethnic
diversity, features that have altered both the implementation of the reforms as well as
their outcomes.
Based on the conceptual framework detailed above, this thesis examines the per-
formance of the current institutional framework in Vietnam’s mountainous region in
addressing the poverty-environment nexus. Its overall objective is to identify sources
of successes and failures, so as to derive policy recommendations likely to support
sustainable development in the region.
While the political and institutional economy of sustainable development in Viet-
nam’s mountain is a broad and complex questions due to the complex linkages, this
thesis concentrates on selected research issues that have appeared to the author, dur-
ing field work and in view of the literature particularly relevant. As such this thesis
offers a partial but substantial insight into this question.
This research, as already mentioned is organized around three research areas inves-
tigating the impact of Vietnam’s land reform, the functioning of the credit market and
the impact of the state policy, and the formation of social capital within communities.
The specific questions addressed in each the four chapters following this introductions
are listed below:
Research question 1 – Impact of the land titling policy.
a. Has the land titling policy induced more tenure security?
b. Does the reform encourage the adoption of soil conservation practices?
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c. Has the reform lead to the emergence of a land market?
d. What is the distributional outcome of the reform and, if any, of the land market?
Research hypothesis 1 – Following the conceptual framework in section 1.2.3, the
issuance of land titles, by offering land users an incontestable mean to claim and en-
force their use rights on a defined land area is expected to increase tenure security, and
thereby to create incentives for conservation investments. Moreover, by granting land
users with transfer rights, it is expected that the policy creates necessary conditions
for a land market to establish. Following the literature on Vietnam’s land policy, it is
hypothesized that the policy has been implemented in an egalitarian way. However,
the distributional impact of the land market is ambiguous as it is conditioned by other
factors, such as credit access.
Research question 2 – Functioning of the credit market and impact of the state
policy.
a. How well does the credit market functions? who participates? and what are the
market shares of the different sectors?
b. Does the State intervention induce a more equitable and efficient credit alloca-
tion than other sectors?
c. Can the state-governed formal sector substitute the informal sector?
d. Is the government micro-credit program positive impacts on household welfare?
Research hypothesis 2 – Following the conceptual framework in section 1.2.3, it is
hypothesized that the dissected landscape, in addition to the ethno-linguistic diversity,
and the covariant risks are the source of important transaction costs and information
asymmetries, and cause credit market to fail. Thus the intervention of the government
through a commercial and a policy bank, by expanding formal credit supply, and by
providing micro-loans at low interest rates to poor farmers is expected to yield positive
impacts on farmers’ welfare.
Research question 3 – The formation of Social capital.
a. Does ethnic heterogeneity undermine social interactions and the participation
in local organizations?
b. Does ethnic heterogeneity have an impact on the formation of social networks?
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Research hypothesis 3 – In view of the theoretical literature on the role of identity
and ethnic heterogeneity on the formation of social capital, it is hypothesized that the
high level of ethno-linguistic diversity in Vietnam’s mountainous areas inhibit social
interactions and the formation of social networks.
Beyond the primary policy-oriented objective, a second and not less important
objective is to contribute to the growing body of literature studying micro-economic
impacts of rural institutions. There is now a large consensus in the economic literature
that institutions greatly matter for development. Yet, according to Pande and Udry
(2006), the recent empirical literature establishing a link between well-defined insti-
tutions and economic performance has mostly focused on demonstrating a positive
effect on economic growth through cross-country data analyses. The microeconomic
literature establishing causal links between institutions and economic behavior on the
other hand remains mostly theoretical. As stated by these authors, there is a need
to expand our knowledge and understanding of how institutions work at the micro-
economic level, and to assess mechanisms at place. This evidence will help to identify
the policy options and institutional arrangements likely to enhance the functioning of
the economy in an equitable and efficient manner. The institutional transformation
that have taken place in Vietnam during the transition and its implication in the PEN
offers in this perspective an interesting case study.
1.5 Outline of the thesis
This thesis is organized around seven chapters. After this introduction, chapter 2
presents the study area, and the quantitative and qualitative data collection. Chapter
3 presents an article addressing questions 1a and 1b, e. g. on the impact of the land
reform. This chapter is completed by chapter 4 which investigates empirically research
questions 1c and 1d, relative to the establishment of a land market, and the distribu-
tional impact of the reform. The research question 2, relative to the functioning of the
land market is addressed in chapter 5, while the last research research area relative to
the formation of social capital is investigated in chapter 6. Finally, in chapter 7, we
discuss the results and derive policy recommendations that are potentially relevant to
enhance sustainable development in Vietnam’s mountainous regions.
Chapter 2
Presentation of the study area and
data collection
The research conducted in this thesis takes place in Yen Chau, a rural district located
in the North Western region, Son La province. The area is situated 300 km west of
Hanoi, along the National 6 road linking Hanoi with the West of the country (see
map in figure 2.1). The district shares typical agroecological and socio-economic
characteristics with other mountainous areas in South East Asia and for this reason
it has been chosen as a focus research area by the Uplands Program, SFB 564 the
collaborative research program on sustainable land use systems in South East Asia
under which this research was conducted. The population grew by 2.4% annually
between 1988 and 2006 according to the district’ statistical department. This is twice
as high as recorded in the rest of the country.
A household survey was conducted between 2007 and 2008 in Yen Chau, within
the subproject F2.3 of the Uplands Program. In addition to the author, two PhD
students were part of the project in addition to the project leaders. The sampling
procedure used to select households is described extensively different sections of the
thesis (section 3.4, 5.2 and 6.3.2)1, therefore it is not being detailed here. The sam-
ple is composed of three hundred households, equally spread in twenty villages (fif-
teen households randomly selected in each village), randomly selected among all farm
households inhabiting the district2. A map of Yen Chau and location of the sample
villages are shown in figure 2.1. Five ethnic groups are represented in our sample, the
Thai (75%), the H’Mong (15%), and the Kinh (9%). Other groups (the Sinh Mun an
Kho Mu) represent only a small fraction of the population (<1%). Table 2.1 describes
1The three papers presented in this thesis use data collected during the same survey.
2Except for villages and households located in the four communes bordering Laos for which
research permits were difficult to obtain.
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Figure 2.1: Yen Chau district and sample villages
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the twenty sample villages, their size, ethnicity, elevation and economic classification.
Household- and village-level questionnaires were used to gather data on a wide
range of issue, including among other detailed modules on household food and non food
expenditure, credit access and transactions, land access and agricultural practices,
social capital, etc. 3. Questionnaires from round 1 and 3 are presented in the appendix.
The questionnaires were developed together with other members of the research team
in the section Rural Development Theory and Policy of the Institute of Agricultural
Economics and Social Sciences in the Tropics and Subtropics of the University of
Hohenheim. Both questionnaires contain most of the data that have been used for
this research.
The questionnaires were administered within four rounds: round 1 and 2 were
collected in March-May 2007, round 3 in July-August 2008 and round 4 in December
2007-January 2008. A team of interviewers composed mostly of local citizens (native
or living in the district) and of students from Hanoi University of Agriculture was hired
for this purpose. Most of the local interviewers were familiar with the local language
spoken in the area (Thai) and a large share of interviews could be conducted in this
language. In remote H’mong villages, the resort to local translators was sometimes
needed. Most interviewers had experience working as agricultural extension officers
prior to work for the project, and helped to adjust the questionnaire to local conditions.
Careful pre-tests were also conducted. Enumerators were trained extensively prior to
the start of the survey to ensure that misinterpretation or misunderstanding would
not affect the quality of data collected. Cross-check questions were included in the
different questionnaires to verify accuracy of information provided by respondents.
Once filled, questionnaires were checked on site by a team leader (usually one of three
PhD researchers involved in that project), and rechecked by a data entry operator.
All questionnaires were entered twice (using SPSS Data entry double entry mode) to
avoid errors. Finally, the data were carefully cleaned by the PhD students. This way,
researchers ensured a good quality of the database.
Questionnaires from round 1 and 3 are presented in the appendix. Both question-
naires contain most of the data that have been used for this research.
The method of inference in this thesis is mostly quantitative. Research hypotheses
are tested by means of econometric models, that are designed and estimated for this
purpose. The objective is to provide quantitative evidence on research questions
enumerated in section 1.4, and by such, to identify causal, systematic and quantifiable
relationships.
The advantage of quantitative approaches is that they enable a large-scale analysis
and generate results that are representative in a given area. Limitations are never-
theless important. Beyond the risk of measurement errors – which may still remain
3This survey covered three PhD topics including this one which explain the variety of topics
discussed.
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Table 2.1: Description of sample villages
Main Elevation
Commune Map Village Pop.a Ethnicityb (m.a.s.l.) Zonec Class.d
Yen Son
1 Cho Long 676 Thai 943 II A
2 Ban Dan 657 Thai (70%), 682 II A
Kinh (30%)
3 Chieng Hung 542 Kinh 673 II A
Sap Vat 4 Ban Dong 260 Thai 311 I A
Vieng Lan
5 Na Va 246 Thai 295 I A
6 Kho Vang 424 Thai 286 I R
Tu Nang
7 Na Ten 343 Thai 470 II A
8 Na Khoang 395 Thai 440 II P
9 Ta Lang Thap 631 Thai 303 II R
Muong Lum
10 Ban Dao 247 H’mong 964 III P
11 Khau Khoang 315 H’mong 821 III P
Chieng Sang
12 Mai Ngap 568 Thai (53%), 367 II R
Kinh (47%)
13 Ban Dan 1030 Thai 349 II R
14 Chieng Sang 892 Thai 369 II A
Chieng Pan
15 Na Xanh 228 Thai 315 II R
16 To Pang 470 Thai 355 II A
Chieng Dong
17 Luong Me 860 Thai 410 I A
18 Then Luong 505 Thai 448 I R
19 Dong Tau 930 Thai 404 I A
20 Keo Bo C 142 H’mong 995 I P
aNumber inhabitants in 2006/2007.
bHere we indicate the main ethnicity, and do not indicate other ethnic group when those constitutes only
a small fraction (<30%) of the village population. As explained in chapter 6 however, many villages are
in fact mixed.
cCommunes are officially classified in three economic zones according to infrastructure development and
poverty rates. I indicates the richest zone, and III the poorest. The poor communes are targeted in some
infrastructure and poverty reduction program such as program 135.
dSubjective classification by village heads of their village within their commune. P=Poorer, A=Average
and R=Richer
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despite careful checks – many information and relationships are difficult to capture
quantitatively and through structured interviews conducted by a third person. This
problem is particularly acute in studies that cover social and institutional dimensions.
To analyze the impact of institutional arrangements, a sound understanding their def-
inition and functioning is required. While information on formal rules such as law
texts may be easy to access (because kept in a written form), informal rules exist
mostly in unspoken and unwritten form.
Moreover, institutions in place (or the de facto rules) are often a combination
of informal and formal rules. It is indeed common that the de jure formal rules
are interpreted locally and adjusted to local norms, and eventually differ from the
observed de facto institutions. The sole investigation of the legal literature provides
only partial and incomplete information, and a sound exploration on-site is needed to
complement these sources. Likewise, a strong divergence between de jure and de facto
rules was observed in Yen Chau, particularly in land institutions.
Hence, in addition to quantitative data, focus group discussions were conducted
within each sample villages, with a group of elderly and/or knowledgeable members
to trace back the land allocation and settlement history in each village. In addition,
informal interviews were conducted with key informants. Land officers at the district
and commune level were interviewed several times, the local branches of the VBARD
and VBSP were visited, and their directors interviewed. Discussions with the district,
commune and village leaders of the women, farmer and other mass organizations were
conducted. This was complemented by household-level informal interviews conducted
in single households that were identified either as special or representative cases, re-
garding credit access or land use. In some cases, semi-structured questionnaire was
complemented with the use of participatory rural appraisal (PRA) tools. Likewise,
visual timelines were drawn during the focus group discussions, and also during some
household interviews to collect chronological data.
Although qualitative data analysis is not performed in this research, the qualitative
information collected has influenced much of its outcomes. First, this information
helped in the formulation of research questions and in designing the questionnaire,
particularly on land issues. It was also used to triangulate research findings, and as
complement the quantitative analyses in each chapters of this thesis.
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Land titling policy and soil
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Abstract
In Vietnam, a quasi-private property regime has been established in 1993 with
the issuance of exchangeable and mortgageable long-term land use right certifi-
cates. Using primary qualitative and quantitative data collected in a mountainous
district of Northern Vietnam, this paper investigates the role of the land policy in
the adoption of soil conservation technologies by farmers. This issue is of crucial
importance in the region where population growth and growing market demands
have induced farmers to intensify agricultural production. While poverty has
been reduced, environmental problems such as soil erosion, landslides, and de-
clining soil fertility have become more severe over the past years. Our findings
suggest that despite farmers’ awareness of erosion, soil conservation technologies
1The Appendix section is not part of the published article
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are perceived as being economically unattractive; therefore, most upland farmers
continue to practice the prevailing erosion-prone cultivation system. Focusing on
agroforestry as one major soil conservation option, we estimate household and
plot level econometric models to empirically assess the determinants of adoption.
We find that the possession of a formal land title positively influences adoption,
but that the threat of land re-allocations in villages discourages adoption by cre-
ating uncertainty and tenure insecurity. The analyses reveal that these two effects
interact with each other but are of small magnitude. We conclude that the is-
suance of land titles is a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite to encouraging
the adoption of soil conservation practices. However, current practices remain
economically unattractive to farmers. This deficiency needs to be addressed by
interdisciplinary research and complemented by strong efforts by local authorities
to promote sustainable land use.
3.1 Introduction
Beginning with the Doi Moi policies in 1986, Vietnam has engaged in important
institutional reforms in order to lead its economy from a centrally planned to a market
oriented system. In rural areas, reforms were designed to strengthen farmer’s decision-
making capacity as a way to boost production and encourage the protection of natural
resources. In this perspective, the land allocation policy and the issuance of long-term
land use right certificates to households have been among the most important measures
taken by the state.
Our research focused focuses on the Northern Mountain Region (NMR), an area
inhabited predominantly by ethnic minorities2. Rapid population growth over the
past 20 years has led to an increasing scarcity of arable land driving agricultural pro-
duction up onto the steep slopes. Moreover, the increasing demand for food and feed
from urban areas has induced farmers to further intensify the production of maize, an
erosion-prone crop, on the hillsides. Soil erosion and landslides have become important
issues as they have lead to reduced soil fertility in the uplands, sedimentation of low-
land water reservoirs, irrigation channels and paddy fields as well as severely damaged
road infrastructure. Unchecked, these practices could affect the greater population as
they threaten the sustainability of agricultural production in the mountainous areas as
well as local infrastructure and, at a larger scale, the quality of drinking water in the
lowlands. Soil conservation technologies (SCT) are thus a major tool for sustaining
livelihoods and agricultural production at the individual farm level and ensuring food
security for coming generations.
2The Vietnamese ethnic, the Kinh, represent about 82% of the country’s population. The rest
of the population is composed of 53 other ethnic groups located for most of them in mountainous
regions.
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The determinants of soil degradation and the adoption of conservation practices
have been widely investigated in the literature. While techniques to limit erosion on
cropped fields are numerous and diverse, most of them share two common features:
first, they incur opportunity costs in terms of land and labour that are not available
for cropping activities any longer; these costs may be rather high, especially if SCT
compete with profitable cash crops. And, second, SCT enhance soil fertility in the
medium to long run only (Lutz et al., 1994). Hence, the adoption decision of SCT
involves intra- and intertemporal utility tradeoffs (McConnell, 1983; Grepperud, 1997).
Poor farmers living in an environment of incomplete credit markets, insecure land
tenure, and short planning horizons are unlikely to invest in such technologies, notably
because of potential risks for present or future consumption (Pender, 1996; Shively,
2001).
Thus, state interventions that secure land tenure, provide safety nets to rural
households, and relax constraints on liquidity via credits to farmers are expected
to reduce poverty and encourage natural resource conservation and protection (Lutz
et al., 1994). In particular, it is expected that by securing land tenure, improving
access to formal credit, and increasing land transactions, land titling policies increase
investment incentives and foster rural development (Deininger and Feder, 2001). The
formalization of property rights is, according de de Soto (2000), a major step towards
development and poverty alleviation as it enables poor households to transform their
assets into productive capital. Notwithstanding this consensus, empirical studies con-
ducted in different countries do not find that property rights have large and positive
effects as investment incentives including formal land titles in particular (see Brom-
ley, 2009 for a review). Rather, it seems that the issuance of formal land titles has
not necessarily led to increased tenure security and to higher investments on land.
Legal pluralism and the co-existence of formal and informal land institutions have
been identified as one cause of inefficiency of land institutions, causing in addition
high enforcement costs (Platteau, 1996; Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2003). Absent
or imperfect labour or credit markets may as well limit investment capacities and the
efficient allocation of land among farmers, making land institutions inefficient. Recent
empirical studies have found that land titles may favor certain types of households
more than others, for example the richest households in Paraguay (Carter and Olinto,
2003) or the powerful ones in Ghana (Goldstein and Udry, 2008).
Regarding soil conservation practices, Soule et al. (2000) find that land owners
in the United States have a higher propensity to adopt such technologies than cash
or share-renters. Shively (2001) also concludes that land tenure is a significant de-
terminant of SCT adoption in the Philippines. Lutz et al. (1994) and Holden et al.
(1998) both conclude that policies aimed at securing land tenure are necessary but
not sufficient prerequisites to encouraging the adoption of soil conservation practices.
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In Vietnam, using national living standard survey data, Do and Iyer (2008) find
that the 1993 land law has significantly increased the allocation of land to perennial
crops, although the effect is only of small magnitude. In contrast to most of the
existing literature on Vietnam’s land titling policy, this paper presents a small-scale
and detailed study which allows to control for local factors potentially relevant for
explaining the impact of land titles on investment incentives.
The objectives of the paper are (1) to describe how the land titling policy has been
implemented in the NMR, (2) to assess upland farmers’ knowledge and adoption of soil
conservation technologies, and (3) to identify the influencing factors of the adoption
of such measures by household and plot level econometric models and controlling for
knowledge. We focus in particular on the role of the land titling policy on fostering
such investments.
After outlining the land reform and its implementation in Vietnam in Section 3.2,
we describe the research area in Section 3.3 and present our data and sampling proce-
dure in Section 3.4. The estimation strategy for our regression models is described in
Section 3.5, results are presented in Section 3.6. In Section 3.7 we discuss the results
and draw conclusions.
3.2 Land reform and implementation in the NMR
Prior to 1981, agricultural land, means of production, and production output were
fully managed by the collectives, namely the village cooperatives. The first reform of
tenurial contracts was implemented by Directive 100 in 1981, which allowed farmers to
keep the surplus produced in excess of the contracted output for home consumption.
The series of directives that followed were designed to increase the flexibility of the land
management and taxation systems in order to raise investment incentives, increase
production levels, and overcome food insecurity (Que, 2005). The collective farming
system officially ended with the 1988 land law (Resolution 10) and the allocation of
collective land to private households according to family size. The land is still owned
by the Vietnamese people (and managed by the state); farmers initially received land
use rights for a period of fifteen years.
Pursuing the decollectivization effort further, the 1993 land law granted five rights
to land users: the right to exchange, transfer, mortgage, inherit, and lease out the land.
Land use certificates (known as Red Books) were issued to users for a period of 20 years
for annual crops and of 50 years for perennial crops. The law confirms that the land
is publicly owned, it is therefore a quasi-private land management system. Through
local authorities the state maintains control over transactions, rental contracts, and
more importantly over general land use plans.
This policy represents one of the largest land titling programs ever implemented
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throughout the developing world with around 11 million titles issued in 2000 (Do and
Iyer, 2008) and was assessed by observers and researchers as egalitarian (Ravallion
and van de Walle, 2004, 2008a). Its implementation however has been a costly pro-
cess, and has not been evenly achieved in the regions. In 1998 less than half of the
total area in NMR had been allocated with a certificate (Do and Iyer, 2003). The
considerable administrative costs involved for measuring land, issuing and register-
ing the certificates and the lack of qualified personnel were the main reasons for this
slowness (Haque and Montesi, 1996). Secondly, in mountainous regions, the enforce-
ment of the land law has been contested by some ethnic groups who returned instead
to traditional land management systems when collective farming ended (see Corlin
(2004) on H’mong villages; Mellac (2006) and Sikor (2004) on Thai communities).
Sikor (2004) reports cases of conflicts in Thai communities in Yen Chau district where
village heads refused at first to allocate paddy fields as directed by the Red Book,
preferring instead the traditional allocation system in which the village head regularly
reallocates paddy fields to villagers. Corlin (2004) reports the same types of conflicts
over rights allocation and the conflict with ancestral rights in H’mong communities.
In some regions, as in Yen Chau, these conflicts have been solved by reallocations
accompanied by strict enforcement through the provincial government (cf. Section
3.6.1). Uncertainty persists on whether these rights will be reallocated at the end
of the use right term (20 years). Despite repeated interventions of the ministry of
agriculture stipulating that no reallocation will occur, an important share of farmers
still expects the contrary and is reluctant to engage in land transactions3.
3.3 The research area
The study region is Yen Chau district, a mountainous area inhabited primarily by
ethnic minorities (85%). The largest ethnic groups are the Thai (Black Thai) with
about 55% of the district’s population, followed by the H’mong who account for 20%,
and the Kinh, "ethnic Vietnamese" who represent 13% of the district’s population.
The Thai and the Kinh were the first settlers in the area and occupied the lowlands,
while later arrivals, such as the H’mong, settled mainly in the highlands (Neef et al.,
2002). Lowland villages along the highway benefit from greater access to infrastructure
(i.e. markets, paved roads, and irrigation systems) and are relatively better off than
villages located in higher altitudes. Between 1988 and 2006 the districts’ population
rose by 50% at a growth rate of 2.4% annually.
Farmers nowadays cultivate two main crops: rice as a subsistence crop grown in
irrigated paddy fields of the lowlands and maize as a cash crop in the uplands. The
3cf. Interview of Mr. Dang Hung Vo, Vice Minister of Natural Resources and Environment
(28/08/2007) [ONLINE (in Vietnamese)]:
http://www.agro.gov.vn/news/newsDetail.asp?targetID=2128, [last accessed, 27/11/2008].
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rapid development of the livestock sector accompanied by rising maize prices and the
shortage of rainfall have pushed farmers to intensify maize production and abandon
rice cultivation in the uplands. Thus, the area allocated to maize cultivation has more
than tripled over the last twenty years while the area allocated to upland rice has
decreased by 27%, according to the district statistical office. In 2007, on average 86%
of farmers’ upland area was cropped with maize from April to September and left
uncovered the rest of the year, exposed to wind and rainfall. As a consequence, the
area is susceptible to erosion leading to an increasing incidence of sedimentation and
landslides during the rainy seasons over the past years.
3.4 Sampling and data collection
A household survey was conducted in 2007/2008 in Yen Chau district. In selecting the
households, a cluster sampling procedure was followed where a village-level sampling
frame was constructed encompassing all villages of the district4, including information
on the number of resident households. First, 20 villages were randomly selected us-
ing the Probability Proportionate to Size (PPS) method (Carletto and Morris, 1999).
Next, 15 households were randomly selected in each of these villages using updated
village-level household lists. Since the PPS method accounts for differences in the
number of resident households between villages in the first stage, this sampling pro-
cedure results in a self-weighing sample (Carletto and Morris, 1999). In total the
database consists of 300 households and 2279 agricultural plots, of which 2059 are
operated by farmers and 1190 are upland plots, i.e., rain-fed plots dedicated to crop
production other than paddy rice. Both the household and plot samples are repre-
sentative at the district and village levels. The survey covered a wide range of topics,
including questions on quantitative and qualitative features and on the effect and
perceptions of soil conservation technologies.
In addition, we conducted focus group discussions using semi-structured interview
guidelines to collect information on village history and composition and to reconstruct
the chronology of the land allocation process. A visual timeline was elaborated with
respondents in order to facilitate these recall questions, and a standardized question-
naire gathered the necessary background data. The respondents were part of the
current and former village boards.
4Except for villages in four communes bordering Laos, for which research permits were difficult
to obtain.
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3.5 Estimation strategy
3.5.1 The household-level model
We estimate the determinants of farmers’ decision to invest in agroforesty5, and in
particular the effect of the land titling policy on adoption incentives. Since aggre-
gating different technologies that imply different costs and benefits over time may be
misleading, we focus on agroforestry which is one of the most widely known measures
against soil erosion in the study area and is also perceived to be one of the most
effective (cf. Section 3.6.2).
The investigation of adoption determinants in a population where the diffusion of
innovation is incomplete may lead to biased estimates (Diagne and Demont, 2007).
Selection bias arises when exposed and unexposed farmers differ in their propensity to
adopt the technology6. This may be the case for at least two reasons. First, knowledge
acquisition is part of the farmers’ adoption decision and therefore endogenous and,
second, for efficiency reasons agricultural extension may especially target farmers or
communities with a high innovative capacity. In Section 3.6.2 we show that knowl-
edge diffusion for agroforestry is incomplete in the study area suggesting the use of a
selection bias correction model. Our problem can be written as follows:
y1i =
{
1
[
βX1i + ui > 0
]
if y2i = 1
0 otherwise
(3.1)
y2i = 1
[
γX2i + vi > 0
]
∀i ∈ [1, N ] (3.2)
where N is the total population; y1i and y2i are binary dependent variables indi-
cating the adoption and knowledge status of the ith household respectively; X1i and
X2i are vectors of regressors; ui and vi are the error terms, we assume that they are
jointly bivariate normally distributed. The covariance matrix is:
cov(ui, vi) =
(
σ2u ρ
ρ σ2v
)
We use a Heckman full maximum likelihood procedure to jointly estimate the
probability of knowing and adopting the technology and control for selection bias
(Heckman, 1979). The model predicts household’s probability to adopt and maintain
5“Agroforestry is a collective name for land-use systems in which woody perennials are deliberately
grown on the same piece of land as agricultural crops and/or animals”(Lundgren, 1982). By agro-
forestry, we refer to a cultivation technique consisting in planting trees and/or shrubs on a cultivated
land as a way to limit soil erosion and improve soil fertility. The plants mostly used in the study area
are wild tamarind (leucaena leucocephola), teak trees and pine trees.
6In this context selection bias is also termed exposure bias in the literature, e.g. by Diagne and
Demont (2007)
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agroforestry on at least one of its plots conditional on variables X1i and on knowing
agroforestry7 (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1 summarizes the explanatory variables (contained in X1i and X2i). Fol-
lowing literature on knowledge acquisition and learning (Feder and Slade, 1984; Foster
and Rosenzweig, 1995; Conley and Udry, 2001), we expect that information access is
closely linked to education, social capital, the possession of communication assets,
access to the agricultural extension service, and income. The social capital variable
measures how well the household is connected with mass organizations8 in its village
by assessing how easily help is obtained if necessary, which is referred to as vertical
connections in the following. In addition, we include a variable on households’ par-
ticipation in the farmer union as a measure of horizontal social capital. The daily
per-capita expenditure variable is used as a proxy for wealth9. Other variables control
for access to agricultural extension, human capital, and possession of communication
assets.
Among the regressors of adoption, control variables account for major household
characteristics (the number of active members, education, age of the household head,
and wealth level), soil, and farm characteristics, as well as geographic location. In
addition, we include a regressor indicating whether material support was received by
the household to implement agroforestry. Material support includes labour, in-kind
inputs (seeds, seedlings or fertilizer, for instance) or cash support. Such support
has been provided either by governmental or non-governmental organizations to en-
courage certain farmers to adopt agroforestry. Hereby, several goals may have been
pursued, and different types of households targeted: firstly, the focus may have been
on farmers with a low investment capacity; secondly, extension organizations may
have targeted influential or exemplary farmers as a way to disseminate a technology
(using a demonstration plot); finally, it may also have been intended to enforce adop-
tion in areas of strategic importance, such as easily visible locations close to the main
road10. However, statistical tests show no systematic differences between supported
and unsupported households regarding potential influencing factors of adoption (hu-
man, social, and financial capital). We therefore conclude that the attribution of
support was random regarding characteristics that also influence adoption and that,
consequently, we do not face an endogeneity problem.
7The probability P (y1i = 1|y2i = 1, X1i) is derived in Wooldridge (2002a, pp.477-78 and 570-71).
8In Vietnam, the mass organizations play a crucial role and are present at all administrative
levels (from the village to the state). They are composed of six unions representing women, farmers,
veteran, elderly, youth and the fatherland front union. In addition to participating in major village
decisions, these organizations carry out multiple tasks: from extension agents to rural bank staffs.
9The survey contained an extensive module on households’ food and non-food expenditures, asset
values, and remittances received, from which this variable is calculated.
10It was mentioned that some farmers having their plot located close to the National road had
been strongly encouraged to implement hedgerows on their field so as to create positive impressions
on officials and visitors passing by the area.
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We hypothesize that improved access to credit is conducive to the adoption of
agroforestry based SCT because it relaxes liquidity and/or consumption constraints,
and reduces farmers discount rates. This will lead to a higher value being attached to
benefits from reduced soil erosion that accrue in the future Pender (1996); Holden et al.
(1998). We use a binary variable indicating whether a household is credit constrained
on the formal credit market. Following Zeller (1994) we consider farmers to be credit
constrained if they did not apply for credit for fear of rejection or if they applied for
a loan but were partially or fully rejected by the lenders11.
The effect of the land titling policy on adoption incentives is captured by five
variables. A first variable measures households’ share of upland area operated under
a land title. A positive and significant coefficient would indicate that land title is
perceived as a guarantee of tenure security thus encouraging farmers to engage in soil
conservation. Apart from being registered and operated under a title, the land can be
(i) leased from private households for a defined period of time and/or a fixed payment;
(ii) lent or given by private households with no payment and for an undefined time
period; (iii) leased or borrowed from the village fund land; or (iv) cultivated without
agreement or informally purchased (Table 3.2). With this variable on land title, we test
our main hypothesis - that tenure is perceived to be more secure when land is operated
under a title than under any of the other tenurial arrangements. Several empirical
studies have found evidence that tenure security may be endogenous to investment,
as farmers may undertake certain investments to secure tenure and obtain land titles
(Besley, 1995; Place and Swallow, 2000; Brasselle et al., 2002). In our case, the fact
that land titles have been distributed to all households at a certain point in time (cf.
Section 3.6.1 and Table 3.2) excludes this risk of endogeneity, but the correlation of
the land title variable with unobserved factors of adoption is might be a source of
endogeneity. We conduct some test, presented in the Appendix of this paper12.
As outlined in Section 3.6.1, the implementation of the land policy in the study
area has resulted in successive reallocations, and a majority of farmers expect further
reallocations to take place before the end of the use right term. While the issuance
of a land title was supposed to empower farmers as decision makers over the use of
their land, the successive reallocations may have sent the contradictory signal that the
state remains the primary decision maker over land issues. We include four variables
to capture these effects: (i) a dummy variable indicating whether the household has
experienced a reallocation on its upland plots, (ii) the share of households in the vil-
lage (excluding the respondent household) that have experienced upland reallocations,
(iii) a dummy variable indicating whether the household believes that a reallocation
11The literature on credit and technology adoption suggests that this variable is endogenous (i.e.
correlated with unobserved factors of adoption such as entrepreneurial capacity). The test of endo-
geneity conducted on this variable does not reject exogeneity, with various specifications and various
measures of credit access. We therefore treat this variable as exogenous in the model.
12The Appendix Section is not part of the published articles, because of space constraints.
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is likely to occur before the end of the use right term, and (iv) the share of villagers
(excluding the respondent household) expecting such a reallocation. These variables
are only very weakly correlated13 giving no cause for concern regarding multicollinear-
ity. We include both household and village variables since decisions regarding land
use are partly made at the village level. As a post-socialist country, Vietnam has a
long tradition of collective decision making. This is particularly true in the rural ar-
eas, especially regarding land use. Villages in the study area are mostly homogenous
in ethnicity and even often constituted by households from the same clan. Conse-
quently, the ties among villagers are usually strong, and the social life within a village
is very intense, providing good information circulation within a village. Historically
and nowadays, the ‘Vietnamese village’ is considered a strong entity in itself. Both the
colonial administration and the communist party have later tried to instrumentalize
the villages in order to impose political projects (see Bergeret (2003, p.30-33) for a
detailed historical review of the “Vietnamese village myth”). After the decollectivisa-
tion these structures have remained or even been reinforced. Sikor (2004) and Wirth
et al. (2004) show for Yen Chau how the organisation of villages has challenged the
implementation of the land law. At a larger scale, Kerkvliet (1995, 2005) shows how
’everyday politics’ within Vietnamese villages have contributed to transform the na-
tional policy at the time of the decollectivisation. Based on this evidence, we believe
that it is plausible that villagers’ experiences and opinions significantly matter in a
household’s decision regarding the adoption of agroforestry.
3.5.2 The plot-level model
Apart from investigating which factors influence a household’s decision to adopt agro-
forestry, we are also interested to know where within a farm agroforestry is adopted.
Indeed, as shown in Table 3.2, a significant share of households in our sample operates
both titled and untitled land (households cultivate on average four upland plots). A
household-level model is unable to capture the effects of tenure, soil characteristics,
and other plot-specific variables on adoption. Hence, we also estimate a plot-level
model for the adoption decision. This approach has been widely applied in the lit-
erature to estimate the impact of land tenure on adoption incentives (Besley, 1995;
Hayes et al., 1997; Pender and Fafchamps, 2001; Hagos and Holden, 2006).
In the plot-level model we are not able to correct for exposure bias, as the selection
regarding knowledge occurs at the household level. However, the test of independence
of equations (Wald test) applied to the household-level model does not indicate any
selection bias (cf. Section 3.6.3). Therefore, we run the plot-level model based on
13The highest correlation among these four variables (0.2) is found between the household and
village-level variables regarding experiences of reallocations.
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Table 3.1: Description and summary statistics of household-level variables
Variable Description Mean S.D.
Knows agroforestry+ HH knows agroforestry as SCT 0.42 0.5
Age* Age of the household head 43.16 12.66
Education*+ Highest educated member has high school cer-
tificate
0.05 0.23
Actives* Number of actives (non disable, aged between
18 - 60)
2.54 1.26
Vertical connections Number of problems for which it is easy to get
help from Unionb
2.01 2
Radio+ HH possesses a radio 0.18 0.38
Extension service Subjective score on access to extension service
(1= lowest, 5= highest)
3.1 1.06
Farmer union+ HH participates in the farmer union 0.79 0.41
Expenditure* Daily expenditure per capita in Thousand
VNDc
15.4 6.48
Elevation* Elevation of the house in meter above the sea
level (m.a.s.l.)
520.33 241.87
Adoption+ HH has adopted and uses agroforestry on at
least one plot
0.12 0.32
Poor soil Share of area with poor soil (%) 30.89 33.61
Medium soil Share of area with medium soil (%) 56.11 36.57
Relative upland size+ Area operated per capita > village average 0.61 0.49
Support+ HH received support to implement agro-
forestry
0.07 0.26
Credit constraint+ HH is credit constrained in the formal sector 0.27 0.45
Titled land Share of titled area on total area operated (%) 70.64 39.07
HH exp. real.+ HH experienced at least one reallocation 0.09 0.28
Villagers exp. real. Share of villagers who experienced
reallocationd (%)
8.32 10.51
HH expects real.+ HH believes reallocation is likely to occur 0.79 0.4
Villagers expecting real. Share of household in village expecting
reallocationd (%)
79.01 13.54
292 Obs.
*these variables are present both in the main and the selection equations.
+indicate dummy variables.
aRespondents were asked to assess the easiness in receiving help from village mass organization and village
head to (i) borrow money for education; (ii) borrow money for health expenses; (iii) borrow money for any
positive event; (iv) borrow money for any negative event; (v) borrow a water buffaloe; (vi) ask for labour.
bVariable logged in the regression.
cExcludes the household himself.
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Table 3.2: Tenurial arrangement and year of land acquisition
% Plotsa % Householdb Year acquired
(mean)
Operated under title 74.9 81.5 1989
Operated without title 25.1 50.5 2002
Leased in from private household 6.8 19.5 2006
Borrowed to private household 10.1 19.9 2002
Village land fund 4.8 13 2000
No agreement 2.3 8.2 1997
Non registered purchase 1 2.1 2002
aUpland plots operated in 2007 (T=1190).
bHouseholds using at least one plot under such arrangement (N=292).
the households knowing the technology only. The plot-level model can be written as
follows:
y3ij = 1
[
αX3ij + βX1i+ εij > 0
]
, ∀j ∈ [1, Ti], j ∈ [1, Nk], Nk < N (3.3)
where y3ij indicates the adoption status of agroforestry by farmer i on plot j, T is
the number of upland plots operated by household i and the sub-sample of households
knowing agroforestry as a SCT. We cluster the standard error at the household level
in order to account for heteroskedasticity and for non-independence of observations
within a household (Wooldridge, 2006). The plot-specific variables X3ij included in
the model are described in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Description and summary statistics of Plot-level variables
Full Restricted
sample (N) sample (Nk)
Variable Description Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Adopt+ Agroforestry is adopted 0.04 0.19 0.08 0.27
Poor soil+ Soil is of poor quality 0.3 0.46 0.3 0.46
Medium soil+ Soil is of medium quality 0.55 0.5 0.54 0.5
Area share Area divided by HH farm size 0.23 0.2 0.21 0.19
Steepness+ The slope is very steepa 0.37 0.48 0.38 0.48
Land title+ Operated under land title 0.75 0.43 0.8 0.4
1190 Obs. 567 Obs.
+indicates dummy variables (yes=1, no=0)
aThe slope was assessed by respondents on a scale from one (=level) to five, using a graph for
illustration.
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3.6 Results and discussion
3.6.1 Land allocation in Yen Chau district
Due to the region’s formerly low population density and ethnic diversity, land man-
agement in the NMR has proceeded differently from the rest of the country. During
the period of cooperative farming informal permission was given to individuals to cul-
tivate the uplands bordering the common land as long as collective goals were met.
With the passing of the first land law in 1988 farmers were encouraged to clear forest
and upland areas as only the common land was distributed following official criteria.
The application of the 1993 law and the issuance of land use right certificates (LURC)
followed a long process: some of the households received a title in 1991 while others,
few kilometers away and usually on higher altitudes, received a first title only in 1999.
We summarize the issuance of process in the study area in three phases:
• From 1991 to 1996 : a first allocation was achieved in part of the lowland
villages. The allocation was carried out by commune and village officials, with
some supervision by provincial-level staff. Respondents reported that despite
the official criteria established (family size, soil quality), land was generally
allocated to the actual users, without being properly measured. In some Thai
villages only upland areas were registered on the certificate and the allocation
of paddy land remained under the authority of the village heads.
• After 1998, the provincial administration implemented a second wave of land
allocation. Upland villages, where allocation had not yet taken place, were
issued the first certificates. In other villages land was reallocated and land titles
reissued. During this second wave, provincial officials were actively involved to
enforce the law. Agricultural and residential plots, including paddy fields, were
allocated following the official criteria, formally measured, and the lands were
titled and recorded in cadastral maps. A share of non-allocated land (paddy
and upland) was kept as a village fund and controlled by the village board for
allocation to newly established households.
• Since 2003 a third allocation wave has been taking place. In villages where
reallocation occurred (five out of our twenty sample villages), land titles had
yet to be reissued in 2007. The official rationale for this reallocation was firstly
to provide land to newly established and landless households and secondly to
combine scattered small plots as a way to increase farm productivity, following
the land use plan established by the Province14.
14However, in light with the current situation, it appears that this reallocation is linked to a larger
scale plan to introduce rubber plantations in the district.
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Despite the existence of long-term use right certificates originally issued for twenty
to fifty years, some households have seen their land reallocated two times at five
year intervals. Whereas only a minority of farmers have been directly affected by
reallocations of either paddy fields or upland plots (35% of our sample), 65% live in
villages in which a reallocation has occurred. As a consequence, 80% of the sample
farmers believe that a reallocation will take place in their village before the end of
their 20-year use right, indicating the low level of trust households currently have in
land institutions.
3.6.2 Knowledge and adoption of soil conservation technologies
We report in Table 4 descriptive qualitative and quantitative results on farmers’ knowl-
edge on soil conservation technologies and adoption behaviour. Farmers were first
asked to enumerate the methods they know to limit erosion. Most farmers - three
quarters - know at least one SCT and are therefore aware of problems related to
erosion. When looking separately at different technologies, the diffusion rates15 vary
widely. Knowledge on terraces, contour ploughing, or ditch16 techniques has been
spread mostly through social networks, whereas other technologies have been diffused
by more formal communication channels such as media and external organizations.
With the exception of the hedgerow technique, the governmental agricultural exten-
sion service and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) appear as secondary sources
of information on SCT.
Table 3.4 reports adoption rates, defined as the share of household knowing a
technology and currently using the technology on at least one of their plot. An ef-
fectiveness score based on adopters’ perception is also reported. It appears clearly
that the methods requiring a relatively high input of labor or take up a consider-
able portion of land (terraces, vegetative contour strips, agroforestry and cover crops)
are adopted the least although they are found to be effective. Short-term and low
extra-input technologies (contour ploughing or ditches) are more attractive to farm-
ers but are deemed to be less effective. Among adoption constraints (i.e. the main
reason given by respondents for not adopting a known technique), the lack of land is
frequently cited in the case of vegetative strips, cover crop, or agroforestry. Lack of
labour was identified by farmers as an important constraint for building terraces and
planting cover crops. Respondents emphasized lacking access to seedlings as a major
reason for not adopting agroforestry and, with regard to ditches, their ineffectiveness
against erosion. The differentiated answers given by respondents show that farmers’
15The term diffusion refers to knowledge in this paper.
16The ditch technique consists of channels oriented diagonally to the slope of the land so that rain
water is captured and channeled off the field. This technique is used for soil conservation rather than
water conservation as the channels are rarely connected to the paddy fields.
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perception of costs and benefits over time differ significantly between SCT, so does
their adoption decision.
The dynamics of the adoption of selected SCT over time (at the plot level) are
shown in Figure 3.1. In 1990, agroforestry was practiced on 1.8% of all the plots oper-
ated at that period and ditches were used on 2%. Note that the graph does not account
for a cohort effect due to the under-representation of older generations. Nonetheless,
one can observe that changes in adoption rates follow institutional changes. The
adoption of ditches has clearly accelerated following the first land law in 1988 (decol-
lectivization), while agroforestry has slowed down. The issuance of Red Books in the
study area has been clearly followed by a considerable acceleration of adoption of the
two technologies, although the increase in the case of agroforestry is less pronounced.
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R
esu
lts
an
d
d
iscu
ssion
35
Table 3.4: Knowledge about and adoption of SCT
Knowing
SCT
(Nk)
Knowledge
sourceb
Currently
using SCT
Perceived
effectivenessc
Adoption
constraintsd
(% of N)a (% of Nk)
Ditches or channel 56.2 Relative/Neighbor – Own initiative 61 5.7 No effective – Labour
Agroforestry 42.5 Extension – Relative/Neighbor – Media 27.4 6.7 Seedlings – Land
Terrace 20.9 Relative/Neighbor – Other area – Media 9.8 7 Labour – Too expensive
Contour ploughing 20.2 Relative/Neighbor – Own initiative 88.1 6.1 No erosion – Equipment
Cover crop 12.7 Media – Extension 10.8 7.3 Land – Labour
Vegetative strips 5.8 Media – Own initiative 11.8 6 Land – Labour
Mulching 3.4 Media – Relative/Neighbor 20 5.7 Labour
Other SCT 5.1 Own initiative – Relative/Neighbor – NGO 66.7 5.8
TOTAL (at least one) 74.7 53.4e
aN=292: non farmers and farmers growing paddy rice only are excluded
bRanked by frequency of answers.
cUsers only – Subjective score, from 0 (no effect) to 10 (very effective).
dSample of farmers knowing but not using only. Ranked by frequency of answers.
eShare of total households using at least one SCT.
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Figure 3.1: Land reforms and SCT adoption rates (plot level)
3.6.3 Determinants of knowledge and adoption of soil conservation – the
household-level model
Table 3.5 presents results of the household-level probit model with sample selection. In
the last column we report the marginal effects on the probability to adopt agroforestry.
The model has a good predictive quality with 82% of adopters correctly predicted.
The upper part of Table 3.5 shows that vertical connections, the possession of a radio,
access to the extension service, participation in the farmer union, and the wealth
level are positive and statistically significant determinants of farmers’ knowledge of
agroforestry.
We find that the decision to adopt agroforestry is positively influenced by education
and income levels. The farms’ soil characteristics, and the size of farmers’ upland
area relative to the village average are also significant factors. The model predicts
that, ceteris paribus, material support received increases the probability of practicing
agroforestry by 67 percentage points, while access to formal credit is insignificant.
In combination, these two findings indicate a low initial motivation of farmers to
undertake such an investment on their own17, but this interpretation must be nuanced
17An illustrative example is given by a qualitative case study conducted in one of the H’mong
sample villages by social scientists: there, farmers were given seeds and a lump sum of 300,000 VND
(around 20 US$) to test hedgerows on their upland fields. In spite of this initial support, only a
small fraction of these farmers still maintain these hedgerows nowadays; and if they do so this mostly
happens out of fear to be punished otherwise by the administrative office which supported them.
Farmers mentioned the lack of profitability of this technique and the competition with their primary
cash crop, maize, for land, sunlight, and nutrients as major disadvantages. The findings of this
case study are however not fully representative of the situation in the whole of Yen Chau district
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by the fact that the income level is found to be a significant factor.
The share of titled land positively influences households’ adoption decision. An
increase of this share by one percentage point increases the probability of adopting
agroforestry by 0.2 percentage points. Whether the farmer or his neighbour experi-
enced a reallocation of upland plots does not appear to influence adoption, neither does
the household’s own expectation regarding such a reallocation. The villagers expecta-
tion, however, is found to negatively affect farmers’ propensity to adopt. An increase
by one percentage point of the share of villagers believing that a reallocation is likely
to occur reduces the adoption probability by 0.6 percentage points. This is an indica-
tion that, because of the tight social organisation of the villages, the general opinion
prevails over individual expectations regarding this decision. More importantly, it
shows that the reallocation threats, as perceived by the villagers, may discourage the
adoption of agroforestry.
In order to further investigate how this perceived reallocation threat may inter-
fere with the titling policy, we include in a second step the same variable interacted
with the variable on titled land18. Results are shown in model (2) in Table 3.6. The
interacted term is insignificant. The coefficient of the land title variable becomes
insignificant, but the coefficient on the villagers’ expectation remains negative and
significant and more than doubles in magnitude. In accordance with Ai and Norton
(2003) we interpret these two coefficient as the effect of the variable when the other
variable is equal to zero. On the one hand, this indicates that in absence of a realloca-
tion threat the land title does not influence the adoption decision. But, on the other
hand, the impact of a perceived reallocation threat is stronger when the household
does not hold a land title. The impact is ambiguous when both variables are different
from zero.
In model (3) in the last column of Table 3.6 we introduce the household expecta-
tion variable interacted with the land title variable. None of the three coefficients is
significant, but the coefficient of the village-level variable remains unchanged.
3.6.4 Determinants of adoption of soil conservation – the plot-level model
Results from the probit estimates of the plot-level model are shown in Table 3.7. The
predictive power of the model is rather limited, which can be explained both by the
presence of numerous household-level regressors and the low plot-level adoption rate.
However, apart from two coefficients (on wealth level and relative upland size), the
results are very similar to the ones produced by the household-level model, which
indicates that the results are robust.
as indicated by statistical tests: a Hausman specification test concludes that the full sample and
the restricted sample (excluding this village) estimates differ systematically. A likelihood ratio test
concludes that the restricted sample model fits the data better.
18We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
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Table 3.5: Household-level model of adoption of agroforestry, probit with sample
selection estimates.
Coefficient estimates Marginal effects
P (y2i = 1) and P (y1i = 1)
P (y1i = 1|y2i = 1)
(1)
dy/dx
Coeff. z-stata (x100) z-stata
y2i: Household knows agroforestry as a SCT (yes=1)
Age household head -0.007 (1.22) -
Education+ 0.550 (1.61) -
Actives -0.041 (0.67) -
Vertical connections 0.083** (2.18) -
Radio+ 0.641*** (3.18) -
Extension service 0.160** (2.22) -
Farmer union+ 0.540*** (2.64) -
Expenditure per capita (log) 0.346*** (1.97) -
Elevation -0.0004 (1.23) -
Constant -1.695*** (2.57) -
y1i: Household uses agroforestry on at least one plot (yes=1)
Age household head -0.010 (0.81) -0.320 (0.85)
Education+ 1.306** (2.39) 48.420*** (2.73)
Actives -0.106 (0.77) -3.355 (0.77)
Expenditure per capita (log) 0.740* (1.74) 23.430** (2.33)
Poor soil (share) 0.030** (2.48) 0.945*** (3.26)
Medium soil (share) 0.027** (2.46) 0.852*** (3.15)
Relative upland size+ 0.562** (2.01) 16.939* (1.91)
Support+ 1.956*** (3.95) 66.619*** (5.05)
Credit constraint+ 0.411 (1.42) 13.727 (1.46)
Titled land (share) 0.008* (1.86) 0.261** (2.10)
HH experienced reall.+ -0.349 (0.97) -9.887 (1.10)
Villagers experienced reall. 0.026 (1.55) 0.836 (1.54)
HH expects reall.+ -0.212 (0.60) -6.711 (0.59)
Villagers expecting reall. -0.019* (1.85) -0.610** (2.04)
Elevation -0.001 (1.42) -0.038 (1.45)
Constant -3.490*ỡỉí (1.74) -
Observation 292
Censored 168
Log likelihood -224.3
Estimated ρ (P-value of Wald-test independence equation(ρ=0)) 2.45 (0.12)
Correctly predicted (%, cut-off 0.5) 77.3
Adopters correctly predicted (%, cut-off 0.5) 82.3
Adopters correctly predicted (%, cut-off 0.25) 94.1
aRobust z-statistics in parentheses: *,(**),[***] significant at 10%, (5%) and [1%] level of error probability.
+ indicate dummy variables.
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Table 3.6: Household-level model of adoption of agroforestry, probit with sample
selection estimates – Interaction tests.
Interaction 1 Interaction 2
(2) (3)
dy/dx dy/dx
x100 z-stata x100 z-stata
y3ij: Household uses agroforestry on at least one plot (yes=1)
Age household head -0.285 (0.77) -0.32 (0.85)
Education+ 45.355*** (2.51) 47.364*** (2.66)
Actives -2.954 (0.68) -3.194 (0.73)
Expenditure per capita (log) 23.934** (2.46) 23.53** (2.39)
Poor soil (share) 0.967*** (3.38) 0.953*** (3.32)
Medium soil (share) 0.879*** (3.30) 0.857*** (3.18)
Relative upland size+ 17.256* (1.94) 16.705* (1.90)
Support+ 67.599*** (5.06) 67.387*** (5.04)
Credit constraint+ 14.195 (1.51) 13.909 (1.48)
Titled land (share) -48.408 (0.74) 14.901 (0.68)
HH experienced reallocation+ -9.712 (1.08) -9.969 (1.13)
Villagers experienced realloc. (share) 0.830 (1.53) 0.811 (1.48)
HH expects reallocation+ -5.006 (0.44) -19.418 (0.89)
Villagers expecting reallocation (share) -1.417* (1.94) -0.581* (1.87)
Elevation -0.039 (1.48) -0.040 (1.51)
Villagers expecting realloc. x Titled land 0.009 (1.10) -
HH expects realloc. x Titled land - 0.148 (0.55)
Observation 292 292
Censored 168 168
Log likelihood -224.0ỡỉí -224.3
Estimated ρ (P-value of Wald-test) 2.54(0.11) 2.45 (0.12)
Correctly predicted (%, cut-off 0.5) 76.7 77
Adopters correctly predicted (%, cut-off 0.5) 82.3 79.4
Adopters correctly predicted (%, cut-off 0.25) 94.1 94.1
aRobust z-statistics in parentheses: *,(**),[***] significant at 10%, (5%) and [1%] level of error probability.
+ indicates dummy variables.
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Table 3.7: Plot-level model of adoption of agroforestry, probit estimates and interaction tests
Marginal effects Marginal effects Marginal effects
Interaction 1 Interaction 2
(1) (2) (3)
dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx
(x 100) z-stata (x 100) z-stata (x 100) z-stata
Age household head -0.677 (1.30) -0.064 (1.33) -0.068 (1.38)
Education (dummy) 7.847* (1.87) 7.101* (1.78) 7.619* (1.86)
Actives 0.424 (0.71) 0.405 (0.70) 0.416 (0.72)
Expenditure per capita (log) 0.791 (0.63) 0.735 (0.62) 0.747 (0.62)
Poor soil+ 18.808*** (4.30) 18.796*** (4.28) 19.272*** (4.29)
Medium soil+ 8.339*** (3.57) 7.835*** (3.54) 8.000*** (3.55)
Area share 8.91*** (4.06) 8.521*** (4.04) 8.636*** (4.08)
Steepness+ 1.503 (1.47) 1.461 (1.49) 1.486 (1.52)
Relative upland size+ 1.601 (1.38) 1.537 (1.39) 1.598 (1.45)
Support+ 14.812*** (4.91) 14.432*** (4.93) 14.614*** (4.93)
Credit constraint+ 0.714 (0.52) 0.708 (0.53) 0.792 (0.59)
Land title+ 2.621*** (2.62) -1.093 (0.14) 1.029 (0.46)
HH expects realloc.+ -2.043 (1.18) -1.857 (1.11) -10.277 (1.56)
Villagers expecting realloc. -0.136*** (3.03) -0.189** (2.16) -0.128*** (2.95)
Elevation -0.004 (1.42) -0.004 (1.43) -0.004 (1.46)
Vill. exp. real. x Title - 6.489 (0.73) -
HH exp. real. x Title - - 2.691 (1.08)
Observations 567 567 567
Log likelihood -105.2 -105.0 -104.8
Pseudo R-squared 0.33 0.33 0.33
Correctly predicted (%, cut-off 0.5) 92.9 92.6 92.7
Adopters correctly predicted (%, cut-off 0.5) 24.4 22.2 22.2
Adopters correctly predicted (%, cut-off 0.25) 49.0 55.6 55.6
az-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by household.
*,(**),[***] significant at 10%, (5%) and [1%] level of error probability.
+ indicates dummy variables.
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As in the household-level model, we find soil characteristics to be very important
determinants of farmers’ decision. Agroforestry is used on poor and medium soils
rather than on fertile ones. Farmers’ propensity to establish agroforestry on a plot of
poor soil fertility is 19 percentage points higher than on a fertile plot. In conformance
with the qualitative results, the relative size of the plots also influences the adoption
decision at the plot level. We find that 62% of adopters chose the first or the second
largest of their plots to implement the technology. Regarding agroforestry, space is
a constraining factor as both trees and hedgerows occupy part of the plot, lead to
shading of the crop, and compete for nutrients.
As already observed in the household-level model, support is found to be an impor-
tant determinant of the adoption decision (although the measured effect is of smaller
magnitude) while access to credit is insignificant. According to the plot-level model,
receiving outside support increases the probability of establishing agroforestry by 5 to
24 percentage points (95% confidence interval).
Finally, variables capturing land policy have a significant effect. In this model
we omit the variables regarding experiences of land reallocations as their coefficients
were found to be insignificant, and their inclusion reduced the predictive quality of
the model19. We find that plots operated under a land title are more likely to be
covered by agroforestry than other plots. The marginal effect, significantly different
from zero at the 1% level, ranges from 0.7 to 4.6 percentage points (95% confidence
interval). Similarly to the household-level model, we find that the household’s personal
expectation does not influence adoption at the plot level, but that the same variable
measured at the village level does have a significant negative impact (P < 0.01),
the marginal effect amounting to a 0.13 percentage-point decrease in the adoption
probability for a one percentage-point increase in the share of villagers expecting a
reallocation.
In models (2) and (3) we include again the two variables on expected reallocation
interacted with the land title dummy variables. The results are in line with the
conclusions drawn from the household model. Note further that in model (3) the
variable on household’s expectation becomes significant with a negative coefficient at
the 12% level.
3.7 Conclusion
The reforms of land institutions by the state in the 1990s were intended to increase
tenure security, establish a land market, thereby increase investment incentives and
boost agricultural production while fostering natural resource conservation. Empirical
evidence shows that overall the reform has been a success in this respect. However,
19Results of the models including these variables are available upon request.
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the implementation of the reforms has been a long and complicated process due to
the intention of the authorities to satisfy both equity and efficiency objectives. In
the mountainous regions, the enforcement of the law has been partly opposed by
ethnic minority communities. Moreover, we find that in Yen Chau the state maintains
substantial control over land resources by periodically carrying out land reallocations,
thus sending contradictory signals to farmers and contributing to a perception of
tenure insecurity despite the existence of land use right certificates.
We developed household and plot-level econometric models to investigate the role
of the land policy in farmers’ decision to invest in soil conservation technologies, in
particular agroforestry. Confirming previous empirical findings we find that tenure
security does influence farmers’ decisions regarding such investments. Firstly, the
presence of a land title positively influences adoption both at the household and plot
level. Secondly, the reallocation threat perceived at the village level is a discourag-
ing factor for the adoption of soil conservation practices. This effect is even stronger
when land is operated without a title. However, the positive land title effect disap-
pears when no reallocation threat is perceived, indicating that the latter factor is a
substantial one in explaining farmers’ behaviour. These effects remain small in mag-
nitude, however. Land tenure policy therefore appears as a necessary but limited tool
to foster environmental protection. In our study area, a better clarification of the land
use objectives may help to secure land tenure and to promote a more sustainable land
use than the environmentally damaging practices that currently prevail.
Using qualitative and quantitative data, this paper investigated also other determi-
nants of investments in soil conservation practices. Although the majority of farmers
are aware of soil erosion and know methods to mitigate the problem, adoption rates
of these methods remain low. Farmers perceive these techniques to be economically
unattractive as they compete with the main cropping activities for scarce land and
labour resources. In the case of agroforestry, we find that adoption is influenced by
education and the wealth level of the households, but more strongly by attributes of
farmers’ land, such as plot size and soil characteristics. While credit access is found
not to affect adoption, material support by external agents strongly influences farm-
ers’ decision, which may indicate a low initial motivation by land users to undertake
such investments on their own.
Soil conservation is a public good as long as its benefits extend not only to the
farmers but to the society as a whole, and land degradation needs to be addressed as a
societal issue. Therefore, improving the economic attractiveness of recommended SCT
needs to be addressed by interdisciplinary research to combine land use options with
SCT that are competitive with the prevailing cropping activities. Our results reveal
that farmers face important knowledge, institutional, and economic constraints to
the adoption of soil conservation practices. This may encourage decision-makers and
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development organizations in fragile areas not only to promote these new technologies,
but also to actively support their adoption by farmers in order to address societal issues
of water safety, food security, and sustainable rural development.
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3.8 Appendix: Endogeneity of the land title variable: a test
based on Instrumental Variable method20
In the paper presented in this chapter, we studied the impact of land titling on adop-
tion incentives for agroforestry, with household- and plot-level econometric models of
adoption (cf. Section 3.5.1 and Section 3.5.2). We found in both models a positive
effect of the land title variable on the probability of agroforestry adoption. We treated
the land title variable as exogenous in both models. This choice was motivated by
endogeneity tests, not shown in the paper but presented in this section.
There are indeed many reasons to suspect endogeneity of land tenure security in
investment models (Place and Swallow, 2000). (i)The first reason is that farmers may
undertake investments as a way to secure their property. Farmers may plant fences,
trees or undertake other investment on their land as a way to enforce their rights
in the eyes of officials or neighbors and limit risks of land grabbing. (ii) A second
argument hinges on the fact that land registered may differ in characteristics with
the non-registered land which may also explain higher investment rates. The presence
of unobserved differences in attributes between land of different tenure regime, if
correlated with the investment decision will produce biased estimates in the adoption
model. Take for instance areas where a lease market has been established; endogeneity
bias would occur if landlords were to lease out in priority land on which some type
of investment is unsuitable. As a second example, take the case of regions in which
arable land was not fully exploited at the time of land registration. Land cleared after
the registration process will not be formally registered. Access may not be less secured
but land quality will differ, and will lead to divergent investment strategies which are
not directly linked to the tenure property. The identification of the land tenure effect
is blurred by the presence of unobserved differences, which may bias and overestimate
our results.
Studies such as Besley (1995) in Ghana or Brasselle et al. (2002) in Burkina Faso
find evidence of endogenous property rights in land investment models. In addition,
both studies find that once this bias is controlled, the estimated effect of property
right on investment incentives vanishes to become insignificant, or weakly significant,
a result in line with findings from those of Chapter 3.
Are there reasons to suspect endogeneity of the title variable in the household-
and plot-level models of adoption of agroforestry? As explained in Section 3.6.1, all
households present in the area at the time of the second registration wave received a
land title partly. Most agricultural land was allocated to farmers with land titles, the
rest was kept under community management as a village fund. The land allocation
policy, during this second allocation wave was strongly enforced by provincial offi-
20This section was not part of the published article
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cials. Qualitative interviews with farmers, community leaders and other local officials
revealed that neither farmers nor communities had much say in this process. There
is therefore little reason to suspect that farmers may have undertaken certain types
of investments to increase their probability to receive a title, or that those who re-
ceived a title differed from those who did not in characteristics that may as well affect
adoption. The reverse causality effect, i.e. argument (i) enunciated above therefore
is unlikely to hold here. This phenomenon was observed mostly in African contexts,
characterized by low population density. However, the second source of bias (ii) aris-
ing from unobserved differences in land attributes between titled land and other land,
however, cannot be disregarded here. It motivates the following analysis.
We test for endogeneity using the Instrumental Variable (IV) method suggested
by (Wooldridge, 2002a, p.477-478). IV method is commonly used in econometrics as
a solution to the endogeneity problem (Wooldridge (2002b, Chapter 15); Wooldridge
(2002a, Chapter 5)). In presence of endogeneity, bias arises due to the correlation
of one or several regressors with the error term of the structural equation, and can
be assimilated to an omitted variable problem. The IV method extracts the exoge-
nous component of the endogenous variable so as to obtain unbiased estimates in the
structural model:
y1 = α0 + α1x1 + α2x2 + ε (3.4)
x2 = β0 + β1x1 + β2z + u (3.5)
where equation 3.4 is the structural equation, y1 is the dependent variable and x2 is an
endogenous regressor, x1 are exogenous explanatory variables, and z is the instrument.
A good instrument (i.e. which successfully corrects estimates) is a variable that is
correlated with the endogenous variable, but is not correlated with the error term of
the structural equation, ε. The correlation between ε and u is noted ρ.
As explained by (Wooldridge, 2002a, p.477-478) the estimation of an IV model for
a binary response model in which the endogenous variable is also binary is nontrivial.
The two-step estimates are not efficient in this case, and a full-maximum likelihood
estimation procedure must be followed. The author also suggests a simpler test of
endogeneity based on the work of Rivers and Vuong (1988). We apply the test by
estimating the instrumental Equation 3.5 in a first stage, where the dependent variable
is the variable title and the exogenous regressors are X3ij , X1i and z, the dummy
variable indicating whether the household was established in 1998. The derive uˆ, the
estimated residual, and estimate the structural probit model y3ij on X3ij , X1i, title
and uˆ. The coefficient on uˆ provides a test of endogeneity for the title variable.
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In Section 3.6.4 we estimated a plot-level model of adoption of agroforestry, ex-
pressed by Equation 3.6:
y3ij = 1
[
α1X3ij +α2title+βX1i+εij > 0
]
, ∀j ∈ [1, Ti], j ∈ [1, Nk], Nk < N
(3.6)
where y3ij indicates the adoption status of agroforestry by farmer i on plot j, T is the
number of upland plots operated by household i and the sub-sample of households
knowing agroforestry as a SCT. We suspect the variable title, a dummy variable to
be endogenous in this model.
The instrument selected to test for the presence of endogeneity is a dummy variable
indicating if the household was already established in 1998, the year during which the
land registration process was carried out in Yen Chau. Households established before
this date have thus a much greater probability to have received a title than households
established after this date. The variable is arguably not related to adoption incentives,
especially once we control for farming experience, captured here by the variable ‘age
of household head’.
The estimates of the instrumental equation and structural equation with the en-
dogeneity test are presented in Table 3.8:
In the instrumental equation, the selected instrument is strongly significant, indi-
cating that the instrument is valid. The residuals from the instrumental equation is
insignificant in the structural equation of agroforestry adoption. As explained above,
this leads us not to reject exogeneity of the land title variable in the adoption model,
and confirms in turn the validity of estimates in Chapter 3. The same method and in-
strument were used to test endogeneity of the land title variable in the household-level
model and also leads to the same conclusion.
3.8. Appendix 47
Table 3.8: Instrumental equation and endogeneity test of the land title variable, plot-
level probit estimates
(1) (2)
Land title Adopted agroforestry
Coef. z-stat Coef. z-stat
Age household head -0.011 (1.51) -0.014 (1.31)
Education+ 0.075 (0.30) 0.778∗ (1.78)
Actives 0.086 (1.14) 0.105 (0.81)
Expenditure per capita (log) 0.464** (2.06) 0.238 (0.88)
Poor soil+ 0.845*** (4.04) 1.816*** (4.08)
Medium soil+ 0.665*** (3.76) 1.550*** (3.46)
Area share -0.009 (0.02) 1.843*** (4.06)
Steepness+ 0.097 (0.70) 0.295 (1.51)
Relative upland size+ -0.165 (0.93) 0.345 (1.30)
Support+ -0.055 (0.31) 1.304*** (4.77)
Credit constraint+ 0.106 (0.53) 0.249 (0.94)
HH expects reallocation+ 0.299 (0.97) -0.266 (0.97)
Share villagers expecting reallocation -0.382 (0.72) -2.849*** (3.01)
Elevation 0.001∗ (1.88) -0.001 (1.24)
Established 1998+ 1.172*** (3.95)
Land title+ 0.410 (0.44)
uˆ 0.187 (0.53)
Observations 567 567
Pseudo R2 0.132 0.334
Log likelihood -245.8 -104.6
χ2 41.4*** 95.6***
z -statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered at the household level.
*p < 0.10,**p < 0.05,***p < 0.01.
Chapter 4
Has the reform permitted the
emergence of a land market?
complementary analyses on the
distributional impact of the reform
4.1 Introduction: efficiency and equity effects of land mar-
kets
One expected benefit of land registration and titling policies is that it enables the
emergence of a land market Deininger and Feder (2001). A land market is said to
have been established when in a given area land is exchanged on a rental or purchase
basis, a a market price that equates demand and supply. Both equity and efficiency
gains in agricultural production are expected to arise from land markets when those are
functioning well (Otsuka, 2007). Land transactions are expected to lead to efficiency
gains in the agricultural sector by enabling the transfer of land from less productive to
more productive farmers. It also strengthens the labor market by freeing labor force.
The emergence of land market as well favors the establishment of an off-farm sector,
by allowing farmers to sell land and join profitable activities in this sector. The land
market may as well have a positive equity effect by ‘correcting’ initial inequalities and
allowing the transfer of land from those that were allocated ‘too much’ land to those
that received little land. Finally, a functioning land market may strongly contribute
to reduce poverty reduction. Land and labor are indeed the two main assets owned by
rural poor households; enabling them to value these resources on a market will have a
positive impact on their wealth, raising the value of their assets, and increasing their
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credit worthiness and risk bearing capacity (de Soto, 2000; Deininger, 2003).
The allocative efficiency and equity outcomes of the land sale and lease markets
is nevertheless strongly discussed in the literature, and empirical evidence are very
mixed across countries (Otsuka, 2007). The extent and size of such positive effects
are in fact strongly dependent on the functioning of other markets, and the credit
market in particular as well as on the initial land distribution. In the presence of
credit market failure, the liberalization of a land market may as well lead to increased
inequality due to distress land sales from the poor to the rich for instance (Ray, 1998,
Chapter 12). According to Otsuka (2007) finally land markets are unlikely to rectify
inequity of land allocations when distribution is initially unequal.
4.2 Land titling and the land market in Vietnam
The question whether a land market has arisen, and the study of transactions that
have taken place in the area after the land reform is thus an important question which
we explore in this section.
The 1993 land law, as explained in Section 3.2, granted land users with the right
to exchange, transfer, lease, or mortgage or inherit the land, and land users were
issued land titles. One primary motive of the land law was to establish a land market,
as a way to induce a more efficient resource allocation, reduce poverty and boost
agricultural production (Que, 2005; Ravallion and van de Walle, 2008b, p.20-34).
Several institutional arrangements impeded the establishment of a free land market
however: the limitation of lease contract to a three year period, the obligation to
register all transactions to local officials, and the resulting administrative red tape.
These restrictions were partly motivated by the fear of a rise in rural landlessness
(Ravallion and van de Walle, 2008b, Chapter 2, Chapter 6). In the Northern Uplands
in particular, the first land allocation gave rise to some tension between ethnic minority
communities and officials, and to local interpretation of the law which also prevented
the establishment of a land market (Sikor, 2004). The 2003 land law, in response,
sought to “[encourage] civil transactions on land use rights [...] limiting unnecessary
administrative interventions during the implementation of exchanging, transferring,
leasing subleasing donating land use rights and real property” (Socialist Republic of
Vietnam, 2004, p.6). It also “recognizes that land needs to be evaluated by market
economic forces” (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2004, p.6).
National-level studies show that a land market slowly emerged after the 1993 land
law. Deininger and Jin (2008) shows that the land sales and rentals that took place
after the implementation of the law led to both efficiency and equity gains in the
agricultural sector, and that land was transferred from the less productive to the
more productive farmers. Ravallion and van de Walle (2008b) find evidence that the
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establishment of a land market after the law gave rise to land transactions, which led
to reduced inefficiencies induced by the initial land distribution. In other words, they
find evidence that the land poor benefited from the land market.
4.3 Land transactions in Yen Chau
In Yen Chau however, the situation observed contrasts with the above mentioned
national level findings. In 2007, farmers and local officials still complained about
administrative red tape in land transactions, which still had to be registered and ap-
proved by local officials (at the village, commune and district level). More strikingly,
most households and village heads interviewed in 2007 still believed that land sales
were forbidden. Our data show that the land sale market remains thin. We recorded
only 16 cases of land sales by households. Interestingly however, the number of plots
acquired through purchases recorded in the database was much higher (70 cases out of
2410 plots). This imbalance between land sales and purchase is most likely due to an
under-reporting of land sales in the data. The small number of plots purchased, never-
theless, confirms that this practice remains anecdotal in the district. Table 4.1 reports
summary statistics on the mode of acquisition of plots recorded in the database. The
first part of the table displays acquisition mode of titled plot, and the acquisition
mode of plots cultivated without title. A further distinction is made between paddy
fields, fishponds, and upland plots as both customary rights and allocation mode differ
between the three plot types. Paddy fields are more ancient than upland fields, most
of these fields are indeed cleared during the collectivization (1960-1988) while terrace
paddy fields were already cultivated prior to this period. Thai societies, for instance,
used to allocate paddy fields in a rotational mode, each field being reallocated after a
period of about five years following some hierarchical societal structure (Sikor, 2004;
Mellac, 2006). Second, while upland fields are reserved for cash cropping activities
(maize), paddy fields and fishponds are used mostly to produce rice and grow fish,
mostly used as a subsistence food crop (while 86.3% of sample household produce rice,
only 11.6% of those derive cash income from this activity). For all these reasons, the
mode of acquisition and property rights are likely to differ between those three plot
types, justifying the following distinction.
The first part of the table shows that most of paddy fields were allocated by the
state at the time of decollectivization in 1988, and that a large share of these plots
were kept by tenants at the time of land registration (in 1993 and 1998). Only a small
share of paddy fields was in fact reallocated by the state during land registration, and
this also true for upland fields. The registration process of land did not result in a
complete redistribution of land. Upland fields and fishponds were mostly acquired
by farmers by converting wild land into agricultural plots. According to interviewees,
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Table 4.1: Acquisition modes and contracts of Paddy, Fishpond and Upland plots in
Yen Chau
Paddy Fishpond Upland
Operated with title (Number of plots) 558 214 1,158
Allocated without land title (%) 44.62 5.61 14.34
Allocated with land title (%) 9.86 1.87 8.38
Inherited (%) 19.35 33.18 23.58
Legal purchase (%) 2.15 5.61 1.9
Converted wild land into agricultural land (%) 17.74 43.46 45.42
Given by parents (%) 5.91 9.81 6.39
Exchanged (%) 0.36 0.47 0
Operated without title (Number of plots) 121 26 333
Leased in private (%) 2.48 0 21.92
Borrowed private (%) 39.67 50 40.24
Given (%) 9.09 0 5.71
Leased/borrowed from village fund (%) 38.02 11.54 20.12
Unregistered purchase (%) 0 26.92 3.9
Started cultivation without permission (%) 10.74 11.54 8.11
aLand has been allocated by the government to the household prior to the registra-
tion process, at the time of decollectivization in 1988, the land titled was delivered
afterwards.
the decollectivization in 1988 was followed by a land rush in the uplands, leading to
massive deforestation. This trend is well observed here, with 45.5% of upland land
which was acquired through conversion. The same holds true for fishponds. This
share amounts to 18% for paddy fields, confirming that these plots are more ancient
than the other two types.
As said above, land purchases are rare in Yen Chau. Fishponds are more frequently
bought than the other two land types. This is supposedly due to stronger tenure rights
on these land and lower reallocation probabilities. Fishponds are often attached to
residential plots, or located very close to households’ homestead. These plots are also
not part of government’s land use plan (data on fish production are rarely collected by
commune and district offices since harvest is used essentially for home consumption)
and the risk of reallocation is presumably lower than for paddy and upland fields.
The second panel of Table 4.1 reports descriptive statistics on contracts under
which untitled plots were operated at the time of interview. We classify contract
arrangements as follows: land is considered to be leased from a private household if
the use right belonged to a different household than the operating household, if the
tenant was paying a rent and/or if a duration of lease was stipulated. In case the
land was without the duration of contract being fixed, or rent being paid, the land is
recorded as “borrowed” from private. The distinction between “borrowed” and “given”
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categories is rather thin, but for the sake of clarity here, we differentiate between
these two contracts, although in the following graph the two categories are merged
into “given”. A fourth category separates the plots that are part of the village land
fund (that is the land which that was kept under village control after the reallocation
in order to newly established household), which are lent or leased to the household.
This land can be rented out or simply lent to the households. Practices differ across
villages, and across households: those having no land title are usually not required
to pay rents, while farmers renting this land to increase their production capacity
are often required to pay). The last category finally indicates land that is cultivated
“illegally”1, i.e. operated without land title and without agreement of the landlord,
or land that is cultivated but not registered as agricultural land (forest land). We see
that a substantial share of land is still cultivated in this way.
4.4 Distributional effect of the land market
Figure 4.1 displays the reallocation of land that resulted from land transaction in Yen
Chau district. The choice of this method was inspired by a paper from Boucher et al.
(2005), analyzing distributional impact of land reforms in Honduras and Nicaragua.
The x-axis in Figure 4.1 indicates initial land distribution, i.e. the distribution of
land under title in 1999. Frequencies are reported on the left y-axis while the right
y-axis indicates the area land operated by the household at the time of survey in
2007. All figures are displayed in hectare per capita. The gray histogram displays
initial frequency distribution of initial land allocation, i.e. distribution under land
title. The thick black line is the 45ặ line, and represents the hypothetical farm size
(operated land) if no transactions had taken place in Yen Chau. The thick red line
displays the observed farm size. The gap between the black and the red line indicates
that land transaction has taken place, i.e. that land was either given away (i.e. leased
out or lent away) or that land was accumulated (i.e. leased in or received). In regions
where the red line is above the black one, farmers received more land than they gave
away (net land “buyer”), and in regions where the red line is located below, farmers
gave more land away than they received (net land “seller”). The intermediary blue
lines show under which contracts were these lands were transacted, whether leased
in or out (i.e. with fixed rent or duration), given away or received (i.e. no duration
and no rent stipulated). As in Boucher et al. (2005), the lines display non-parametric
locally-weighted regression estimates (lowess) with a bandwidth set at 0.8 enabling a
descriptive and visual assessment (see Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p.307-311) for a
methodological description).
1The appellation “illegal” is our, and derived from our interpretation of the data. The term was
not used as such during interviews
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Figure 4.1: Land allocation and land transactions in Yen Chau
Locally weighted regression estimates, figures are in hectar per capita
Figure 4.1 shows several findings. First, regarding the initial land distribution in
the area. The average size of land allocated is equal to 0.297 hectare per capita. The
estimated Gini coefficient of initial land distribution in Yen Chau is equal to 0.4452,
thus indicating a rather unequal distribution. A substantial share of households,
16.9%, did not receive land under title. Most of these households were established
after 1999, the second wave of land registration in Yen Chau. Referring now to the
area of land actually operated by the household at the time of interview, figures are
somewhat different. The average farm size is equal to 0.345 hectare per capita, and the
Gini coefficient is equal to 0.339, slightly lower therefore than the estimated coefficient
of initial distribution. Therefore, since 1999 and 2007, land transactions have led to
a more equal distribution of land among households. This can clearly be seen in
Figure 4.1; households initially less endowed in land resource (left side) are net land
“buyer” indicating that they have received more land than initially received. As we
move towards the right, and as the initial land endowment increases, we see that the
relation is inverted, and well endowed households are net land “sellers” (they gave land
away more than they received). Land exchange and transactions have thus permitted
the rectification of the inequity of land distribution towards a more equal distribution.
2Considering only household established before 1999, thus eligible to the land titling program, the
estimated Gini coefficient is 0.380, and 0.344 if we consider only households holding a title.
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Note also that in 2007, our data base contained only six landless households.
The intermediary blue lines indicate under which arrangement these land ex-
changes were made. Figure 4.1 and the thin dashed blue line indicate that most
of these exchanges occurred through ‘free’ contracts, corresponding to land that was
lent or given away without a fixed rent or a duration being specified between the
two parties. These transfers correspond for a large majority to intra-family transfers.
The thin plain blue line indicates that land leasing has been taking place, but that
the lease market remains very thin in comparison. Finally, readjustment of land size
through the village fund land is anecdotal. We see in addition that these village lands
are not specifically allocated to initially land poor households, but to all categories of
households. The overall impact on land distribution is anecdotal.
The distributional impact of the reform is further investigated in Figure 4.2, that
display the average land holdings of households established before and after the reform
implementation in Yen Chau (1999) and details tenure contracts.
Figure 4.2: Average land holding by tenure contract and year of establishment in
hectare per capita
As Figure 4.2 shows, household established after 1999 have smaller farm size than
those established earlier, their average farm size was 0.31 ha/capita against 0.35 for
the other group. This difference, however, is not significant (Wilcoxon-ranksum test
yields a p-value of 0.266). Looking, however, at the different contract terms, we
observe many differences, the younger group holds 0.14 ha per capita of land under
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land title, against 0.33 for the other group (difference significant at 0.1% of error
probability, Wilcoxon-ranksum test). Almost half of land holdings in the younger
group comes from free transfers (denoted as given, 0.11 ha/capita on average), and
a small share of this land is leased in (0.03 ha/capita, the difference from the first
group is however not significant). Land from village funds account for a minor share
of households’ land holding 0.014 ha/capita in the younger group, against 0.013 for
the elder group. The difference between both groups is not significant, showing that
village fund land is not allocated to preferentially the households established after
1999. Hence, Figure 4.2 shows that younger households are able to access land mostly
through intra-familial transfers, but hold this land under weaker tenure rights than
older households.
4.5 Conclusion
One objective of the land reforms in Vietnam was to establish a land market as a way
to boost agricultural production and reduce poverty. While at the national level a
land market has emerged and yielded positive distributional and production effects,
our data show a contrasting situation in Yen Chau. There, land sale transactions
remain anecdotal, and the lease market is very thin. Reasons for this situation are
multiple. First, the little knowledge that many farm households have on the law and
granted rights hampers land sale transactions. Second, insecurity raised by realloca-
tions described in Section 3.6.1 may also limit farmers’ willingness to engage in sale
transactions. The uncertainty regarding the extension of land use rights at the end of
farmers’ use right terms also add to this effect. As we shall see in Chapter 5, the credit
market in Yen Chau is functioning relatively well, although it serves non-poor house-
holds better than the poor. Credit market failure is unlikely to play a determinant
role here.
We see nevertheless that land transfers have taken place since the land registration.
These land transfers resulted in a more equal land distribution than initially induced
during the land registration. This adjustment was permitted mostly through intra-
familial land transfer, and to lesser extent through transactions on the lease market.
The redistribution through the village land fund is insignificant. If the current system
ensures a relatively good equity of land distribution, the efficiency outcomes and
poverty reduction effects of the reform could be greater with the establishment of a
land market.
Therefore, one important drawback of the reform is that it deprives the local
economy of potentially important efficiency and equity gains. The current system
nevertheless enable almost all farmers in the area to access and cultivate land, and
limits inequalities in the short run. In the long run however, negative consequences
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might arise. The newly established households that have not received land and titles
through the reform have only a few possibilities to acquire long-term and secure land
rights as long as the market does not function well. Young households face higher
capital constraints than their older neighbors and in the current system are doomed
to wait for intra-familial transfers or for village fund land. As population contin-
ues to increase these possibilities will shrink. A number of villages in our sample
have already allocated all land of the village fund, making further expansion impos-
sible. Furthermore, as long as farmers will not be able to sell their use rights on the
market, voluntary migrations from the crowded areas to other places offering better
employment possibilities will remain limited. If nothing changes, the young generation
however is doomed to abandon farming and look for other possibilities. Policies are
thus needed to accompany the young generation through this transition, to support
the development of an off-farm sector, and to help farmers to diversify away from
farming.
Chapter 5
Rural Credit Policy in the
Mountains of Northern Vietnam:
Sustainability, Outreach and Impact
Camille Saint-Macary, Manfred Zeller
Abstract
This paper examines the efficiency and equity outcome of Vietnam’s rural
credit policy in a mountainous district. Using a rich dataset on credit transactions
and access from farmers in northern Vietnam, we analyze the credit market, the
role played by the two state-owned lenders, and the interaction between the formal
and informal sectors. We then assess the impact of the subsidized microcredit
program on the welfare of its participants using a propensity score matching
approach. Our results reveal a number of inefficiencies that need to be addressed
in order to further reduce poverty and support agricultural growth.
5.1 Introduction
Since the decollectivization and the vote of Doi Moi program in 1986 leading the
transition of the economy from a centrally-planned to a market-oriented system, Viet-
nam has undertaken a series of reforms aimed at transforming the incentive structure
in the rural economy and return farmers to the center of decision making. To this
aim, agricultural markets were gradually liberalized, user rights were transferred to
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smallholder farmers for most of the agricultural land and some of the forest land. As
a result, agricultural production and rural economic growth led to a large reduction in
poverty throughout the country. These improvements have not been evenly dispersed
throughout the country, and mountainous regions, specifically the Central Highland
and the Northern Uplands, have lagged behind and experienced lower economic growth
and poverty reduction rates in that period. In these mountainous areas, poverty is
tightly interlinked with the environmental conditions; the rarefaction and degradation
of land resources in particular caused by demographic pressure among other factors
remain a major concern and a driver of the poverty trap. Many decisions, in rural
areas and ecologically fragile environments in particular, require intertemporal de-
cision making and long horizon planning. Credit access by increasing farmers’ risk
bearing capacity, and enabling long term investments play a particular role in this
perspective (Pender, 1996). Further growth and diversification of the rural economy,
the establishment of more valuable pro-poor agrifood value chains and the promo-
tion of environmentally-friendly economic growth in mountainous regions require the
development a competitive rural financial sector.
In rural areas, information asymmetries combined with high levels of uncertainty
are the sources of failures in financial markets, leading to regressive credit rationing
and thereby creating economic inefficiencies as well as increasing income inequality
(Petrick, 2005). These failures and resulting inefficiencies constitute the main rationale
for government interventions in the credit sector (Besley, 1994).
Models of intervention have varied over time and across countries. Repressive in-
terventions and subsidization which dominated in developing countries from the 1950s
to 1980s have been mostly unsuccessful in addressing market failure and rural poverty
and have consequently been abandoned in many countries (Conning and Robinson,
2005). The microfinance ‘revolution’ in the same period demonstrated that institu-
tional innovations in the sector can successfully enable rural finance institutions to
address rural poverty while ensuring their financial sustainability. A new paradigm
in rural finance development emerged in the 1980s and advocates for institutional
innovations enabling lenders to overcome information asymmetry and enforcement
problems as a way to achieve greater outreach and impact, notably among the poor.
Under this new paradigm, the role of the state is reviewed, i.e. more focused on
promoting of emerging institutions that also serve the poor, rather than on repressive
interventions (Lapenu, 2000). Financial sustainability, outreach and impact constitute
in this paradigm the three overarching objectives of rural finance institutions (Zeller
and Meyer, 2002).
Vietnam, against the dominant trend, has maintained a highly interventionist
approach whereby the state continues to control most formal credit supply in rural
areas (the totality in our study area). There, government intervention is embodied
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by two state-owned banks. One is the Vietnamese Bank for Agriculture and Rural
Development (VBARD), created in 1990 which acts as a profit-oriented commercial
bank supporting the development of rural areas by providing loans to agricultural and
non-agricultural enterprises. VBARD’s interest rates remain however partly controlled
by the state (Duong and Izumida, 2002). The other bank is the Vietnamese Bank for
Social Policies (VBSP), which in Vietnam is abbreviated as ‘policy bank’. Its mandate
is to offer microcredits at preferential interest rates to a targeted population, mainly
the poor. The bank transfers its lending activities to party-controlled village-based
mass organizations (MO), enabling it to maintain interest rates set below the inflation
rate1. From an institutional point of view, VBSP’s lending system is quite innovative.
It makes it a hybrid institution between usual rural micro-banks and village credit
funds institutions such as those operating in Thailand (Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn,
2011). Yet, the bank does not collect savings and is not financially sustainable; its
program remains heavily subsidized by the government. Many rural areas have not
yet seen the development of a competitive microfinance sector that is independent
from state intervention albeit the socio-economic conditions for the establishment of
a vibrant microfinance sector are quite good in comparison.
The objective of the present article is to evaluate Vietnam’s rural finance policy
performance, by exploring its outreach and impact, and analyzing its role in the
existing market. Indeed, one stated rationale of interventions is to offer an attractive
formal credit supply as a way to compensate for the inefficiencies of the (private)
informal credit market considered unstable, insecure, and unreasonably expensive.
This task has proven difficult in many countries including Vietnam. The informal
sector remains there a primary credit source for many farmers (Tra Pham and Lensink,
2007; Dufhues and Buchenrieder, 2005; Barslund and Tarp, 2008), an observation that
is commonly made in developing countries (Siamwalla et al., 1990; Bell et al., 1997;
Kochar, 1997; Mohieldin and Wright, 2000; Guirkinger, 2008; Giné, 2011).
The coexistence of formal and informal lenders in areas where competitive formal
contracts are available has raised much interest in the literature in the last decades.
Understanding the reasons which underly this phenomenon is essential to identifying
sources of policy failure, or preference mechanisms which call for different policy re-
sponses. Various explanations have been proposed. First, the persistence of informal
lenders is due to an excess demand and credit rationing in the formal sector creating a
spillover demand in the informal sector (Bell et al., 1997). This view, however, is chal-
1The rankings of 1,158 microfinance institutions (MFIs) worldwide in the MIX database (www.
mixmarket.org) highlights the peculiarity of the VBSP lending system in the microfinance sector.
First, with 7.5 million households in 2009 (about a third of Vietnam’s population) VBSP was the
largest MFI that year in terms of outreach. Second, the bank operates with low lending costs, US$35.5
per borrower against US$132 on average for other MFIs. These low operating costs are permitted by
the reliance on local organizations. Finally, unlike most MFIs, VBSP’s real interest rate is negative,
so the bank exhibits negative profit margins.
5.1. Introduction 60
lenged by studies such as Kochar (1997) in India showing that conditional on demand,
credit rationing in the formal sector is less than usually assumed. In her view, some
borrowers face high transaction costs in the formal sector which exceeds borrowing
costs in the informal sector, and rationally turn to the second sector. Boucher and
Guirkinger (2007) propose a third explanation based on the risk aversion of poor bor-
rowers. Formal lenders compensate for low information access by requiring borrowers
to mortgage collateral, usually their land titles while informal lenders, facing lower
information costs are able to substitute collateral through information intensive ar-
rangements. In rural areas, land together with labor constitute the main assets owned
by poor farmers, and the risk of losing such crucial assets may convince farmers to
turn to more expensive informal lenders2. In our view, a fourth explanation lies in
the imperfect substitutability between loans of both sectors. Diagne and Zeller (2001)
in Malawi, find for instance that demand for credit in a given sector (formal or infor-
mal) is only moderately affected by access in the other sector; Mohieldin and Wright
(2000) in Egypt find that demand and participation in one sector is independent from
participation in the other. Lenders in both sectors differ in their ability to overcome
information asymmetries, but also in the nature of contracts offered. Informal loans
for instance are more often given in-kind, many transactions are realized within so-
cial networks or through existing relationships, and are attached to social or other
types of compensations (as in the case of interlinked transactions). Both features
may be of greater convenience to the borrower, and not substitutable by formal cash
loans. Finally, farmers may seek to diversify their loan portfolio as a way to minimize
default risks as well as dependence on any one lender. While even when risk is con-
sidered, diversification may not be cost-efficient., Diversification of contracts (with
different maturations for instance) can effectively mitigate farmers’ default risks in
environments with high uncertainty, i.e. when decision-makers are unable to assign
subjective probabilities to future risk events3.
Empirical studies on Vietnam’s rural credit policy remain relatively scarce. Duong
and Izumida (2002) study the determinants of credit rationing by VBARD, and find
positive impact of credit access on household production decisions. Cuong (2008)
uses national level data to evaluate the outreach and impact of the government’s
microcredit program. His results, like those of Dufhues and Buchenrieder (2005),
point to the low outreach of the program among the poor. Cuong (2008) finds the
program has a positive impact on household income levels and poverty rates at the
national level.
This article contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it adds to the existing
literature on Vietnam’s credit policy by describing and analyzing its implementation
2In an empirical application using panel data from Peru, Guirkinger (2008) finds that transaction
costs and risks are factors which prevent farmers from applying for formal loans
3Farmers may for instance, borrow from one sector to payback a debt in the other sector
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and impact in a marginal mountainous area. Unlike many existing studies, this paper
analyzes Vietnam’s policy by studying the credit market in its entirety and not only
the formal state-owned lenders. Using a rich primary data set on credit access and
transactions described in section 5.2 and combining them with case-study findings,
this paper offers a comprehensive overview of the credit market and the performance
of different lenders. Such detailed analysis does also carry out more general lessons.
Despite several decades of extensive research on rural financial markets in developing
countries, many questions remain unanswered, notably on the mechanisms of financial
institutions that enable them to reach their objectives, on the functioning of the
informal sector and its interaction with the formal sector, and detailed microeconomic
evidence is needed to identify policy options likely to resolve market failure and thereby
further reduce poverty (Karlan and Morduch, 2010).
Our empirical approach is threefold. First, in section 5.3, we investigate the credit
market and its actors. We examine contract terms, participation of borrowers by
wealth category, and estimate the determinants of informal interest rates. In section
5.4 we focus on the formal sector and investigate the outreach of both banks. We also
investigate in this section interaction between the formal and the non-formal sectors,
by estimating the determinants of participation in one sector conditional on participa-
tion in the other sector. Finally, in section 5.5, we estimate the impact of the VBSP
credit program on participants’ welfare using the propensity score matching approach.
We discuss the results in section 5.6 and derive important policy recommendations po-
tentially relevant for increasing the outreach, impact and sustainability of the formal
sector. We conclude in section 5.7.
5.2 The data
This study takes place in Yen Chau, a mountainous district located in the Northern
Uplands region. Despite tremendous economic success in the country over the last
thirty years, mountainous areas have lagged behind in the process, and poverty rates
among ethnic minorities are significantly higher than in the rest of the country (van de
Walle and Gunewardena, 2001; Baulch et al., 2007). Three ethnic groups live in the
study area. The Thai were the first settlers and mainly occupy the lowland. They
represent 75% of our sample households. The H’mong (14.7%) are late-comers and
occupy the uplands. The Kinh (9.3%), the country’s main ethnic group (82% of
the country’s population) settled after the independence from France in 1954. Other
ethnic groups account for less than 1% of our sample.
The district is relatively well-off in the province. According to our calculations
based on a household expenditure survey using the Living Standard Measurement
Method (Grosh and Glewwe, 2000), the poverty rate in 2007 was 16.7% (using the
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national poverty line and our estimate of per capita expenditure). The majority of
the population lives from land cropping. Off-farm opportunities are limited, and
livestock production is not well developed. The two main crops are hybrid maize,
a cash crop cultivated on rainfed upland, and paddy rice, a food crop cultivated on
usually irrigated lowland. Since the paving of the national road crossing the district in
2003, the population benefits from good connections to markets, and maize cultivation
remains by far the most profitable activity in the area (Keil et al., 2008).
Land redistribution and titling took place in the 1990s (Saint-Macary et al., 2010).
Farmers do not own land but have long term use rights for twenty to fifty years. These
land use rights are accepted as collateral by VBARD. Most households established af-
ter 1999 were not granted titles from the government but received land from the
village or through intra-familial transfer. Consequently, a substantial share of house-
holds, 15%, operates on land without land title. A land market has not really emerged,
sales transactions are often considered illegal (although officially authorized by law),
and the lease market exists but remains very thin. Off-farm opportunities are limited,
and the livestock sector was only a complementary income source at the time of study.
Land holdings in the area average 0.3 ha/capita, indicating a high land scarcity in
this agrarian economy.
Data were collected between 2007 and 2008. A representative sample of 300 house-
holds was selected following a two-stage cluster sampling procedure. A village-level
sampling frame was constructed encompassing all villages of the district4, including
information on the number of resident households. First, 20 villages were randomly
selected using the Probability Proportionate to Size (PPS) method. Next, 15 house-
holds were randomly selected in each of these villages using updated village-level
household lists. Since the PPS method accounts for differences in the number of resi-
dent households between villages in the first stage, this sampling procedure results in
a self-weighing sample (Carletto and Morris, 1999).
The survey covered a wide range of issues, including land holding, food and non-
food expenditure, income sources and diversification, among others, and a detailed
module on households’ credit history and access. Data on credit history include in-
formation on households’ application and complete rejections for large loans in the
five years preceding the survey, and the different credit obtained by household mem-
bers over different recall periods. The use of different recall periods ranging from
two months for very small loans to five years for the larger ones enabled us to obtain
detailed and accurate information of households borrowing practices. We could record
even the very small loans contracted by households to finance daily food consumption
in 2007. Farmers were interviewed between May and June, at the end of the lean
season, before the first rice harvest and again in December, a few weeks after the
4The urban center and four communes located along the border with Laos for which research
permits were difficult to obtain at the time of interview were excluded from the sampling frame.
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maize harvest. The database thus contains detailed information on small and large
loans contracted by farmers in 2007, and on larger loans contracted by farmers in the
five years preceding the survey. Data was additionally collected on households’ credit
access, independently from their participation in the market. We use the credit limit
approach developed by Diagne et al. (2000). Respondents were asked to estimate the
maximum amount the household would be able to borrow from a particular lender,
given their own characteristics, current debt level from different lenders. Credit limits
were collected separately for each lender type.
5.3 The credit market in Yen Chau
Rural credit markets are known for not functioning like other competitive markets.
Transaction costs and information asymmetries in particular are important factors
hindering the functioning of this market, resulting in an inefficient allocation in the
sense of Pareto (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Conning and Robinson, 2005). We focus on a
mountainous region where transaction costs are important and where the fragility of
the ecosystem renders climatic hazards particularly severe and frequent (soil erosion
notably accentuates the incidence of landslides and floods, Ahlheim et al. (2009)).
On the other hand, good intra- and inter-community relationships, whether due to
communist or cultural legacies, and the resulting high level of trust in the society
create favorable conditions for trust-based transactions such as credit. The literature
has indeed established a strong link between social capital (i.e. level of trust, social
networks), social cohesion and the performance of rural credit institutions (Zeller,
1998; Cassar and Wydick, 2010; Dufhues et al., 2011).
A conspicuous trend in the data is the high heterogeneity of actors in this market,
and the large number of transactions contracted by farmers from all wealth categories.
We divide lenders into three sectors and five lender types. The formal sector is com-
posed of the two state-owned banks, the VBARD and the VBSP. The Semi-Formal
sector is composed of private or state-owned companies or agencies (Mass Organiza-
tion, agricultural extension office). The last sector, the informal sector, is comprised
of all other lenders. We make a distinction between private lenders (shopkeepers, mon-
eylenders, or any lender without a family relationship or friendship with the borrower)
and households’ friends and relatives.
5.3.1 Contract terms
Table 5.1 describes the five lender types and the main characteristics of contracts
offered in 2007 (Panel A). In Panel B, we report the participation of farmers by
wealth tercile, and in Panel C, the market share of each sector measured by the share
in households’ total debt is shown. In Panels A and B we distinguish three loan
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types. ‘Small’ loans are distinguished from the large ones, and the in-kind input
loans are separated out. This distinction enables us to directly compare contracts
from the formal and informal sectors, the former offering loans of amounts starting
at 2 million VND on (' 125 US$). We are also able to observe the participation of
households in each market segment. In Panel B, households are separated into wealth
groups defined over a wealth index, obtained from the principal component analysis
of variables denoting household’s wealth status in 2006. We prefer such an index over
a measure of per capita expenditure as it is less volatile and less likely to be affected
by households’ participation in the credit market in 2007. Descriptive statistics of the
variables included in the wealth index and their component loadings are described in
the appendix of this paper, Table 5.9.
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Table 5.1: Loan characteristics by lender type and participation by wealth tercile (2007).
VBARD VBSP Semi-Formal Private lenders Friends & Relatives
Loan category > 2Ma > 2Ma < 2Ma > 2Ma Inp.a < 2Ma > 2Ma Inp.a < 2Ma > 2Ma Inp.a
Nb loans in 2007 31 74 14 3 114 1,114 87 216 207 54 21
Amount (Million VND)b Mean 37.6 7.8 0.34 2.7 2.7 0.13 9.0 2.3 0.20 6.6 2.8
S.D. 48.1 3.8 0.48 0.6 2.1 0.26 32.1 2.5 0.26 13.5 2.6
Interest rate (% p.a.) Mean 16.1 6.63 13.6 12.9 20.1 6.1 23.8 25.9 0.62 11 11.8
S.D. 1.3 2.57 13.9 7.21 15.3 16.1 14 19.4 3.35 12.6 9.97
Duration (nb months) Mean 22.9 35 6.3 23.7 7.76 4.6 9.6 6.9 4.48 11.2 7.33
S.D. 10.4 7.37 3.5 12.5 2.01 1.89 5.9 3.32 2.75 8.6 1.28
% Collateral 90.3 1.4 0 33.3 0.9 0.9 5.8 0.9 1.0 0 0
% In Kind 0 0 28.6 0 100 92.5 48.3 100 39.6 3.7 100
% Same village 0 0 0 0 0 64.1 32.2 43.2 72.3 64.8 81.0
Borrowers in 2007 by
wealth tercile
Lower 8 22 4 1 24 68 33 66 19 15 1
Middle 11 23 3 0 38 40 21 48 21 17 8
Upper 12 26 1 2 32 35 15 37 19 12 10
Pearson’s χ2 test n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. *** *** *** n.s. n.s. n.s.
% Total current debt Mean 16.6 22.3 11.6 39.6 10.0
S.D. 29.8 30.5 22.3 38.3 22.0
aLoans are classified into three categories: <2M designate small loans below 2 Million VND, >2M designates large loans above 2 Million VND, and Inp.
Designates in-kind input loans
bIn 2007, 1 million VND ' 62,5 US$
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The number of loans contracted by farmers in 2007 was very large; only 7% of
households did not take out a loan. In particular, we recorded a very large number of
small loans, six on average per borrower. These loans are mostly in-kind consumption
loans from shopkeepers, or small cash loans from friends and relatives. About two-
thirds of households obtain these small loans. All wealth terciles are concerned, but
on average households from the lowest wealth tercile recourse more on these loans.
Interest rates reported by respondents are low (6% on average), and most transactions
are done within the village where information availability is apparently good.
For larger loans of more than 2 million VND, the informal sector is again more
popular, with 141 loans, while the formal sector only recorded 105 loans. The largest
loans are borrowed from VBARD, other lenders do not differ. Interest rates are
significantly lower in the formal sector, as compared with those offered by private
lenders. VBSP offers the cheapest loans with a yearly interest rate set at 6.6% well
below the inflation rate (12.6% in 2007, according to the General Statistical Office of
Vietnam). Loan maturation is longer in the formal sector. In the VBSP case, loan
duration is fixed between two and three years, and this period is flexible for VBARD
loans, while in the informal sector the maturation does not usually exceed one year.
Officially, a formal client is not allowed to contract another formal loan during the
borrowing period, but in practice the rule is not always applied. VBARD is the only
lender requiring collateral on almost all loans. Other lenders including VBSP, use the
information intensive selection to substitute collateral.
Large loans are borrowed by households from all wealth categories, but again,
we find a larger share of households from the first wealth tercile among borrowers
(64% against 49% of households from the richest wealth tercile). Households from the
wealthier tercile group get these loans mostly from the formal sector, while those from
the first tercile get such loans mostly from private lenders. The amounts of loans also
differ by wealth categories, the richer accessing larger loans, and the poorer accessing
more but smaller loans.
5.3.2 Wealth and participation in the credit market
Table 5.2 details participation in the market by wealth terciles. Households from the
poorest tercile borrow significantly less than those from the wealthiest one, the first
and the second groups however do not differ. The source of credit in both terciles is
more diversified than in the third. Households from these two groups borrowed from
2.5 different lenders on average, versus 2.2 in the wealthier tercile. Looking at the
leverage ratio, defined here as the ratio of household total debt on their total asset
value, we find that the poor borrow more than the other two groups relative to their
assets, and thus take greater risks.
We also find differences in credit use by wealth tercile. The poor use a smaller
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share of credit for financing agricultural activity, and this is also true for agricultural
input which constitutes the first borrowing purpose in all groups, they spend however a
larger share of credit for financing transportation assets, food and emergency expenses
(the absolute value is also significantly larger).
Looking now at how households within each category finance their agricultural
input, we find that while the purchase of agricultural input is the first borrowing
purpose, only a few households finance these purchases with formal loans. The semi-
formal and informal sectors are the first financial source, and the poor use the latter
more than the semi-formal on average compared with the two other groups. Finally,
looking at contract terms obtained by households in each category, i.e. the interest
rate paid for an average loan, we find that the poor pay higher interest rates than
others. This holds true when taking into account only non-formal loans, agricultural
input loans, or consumption loans.
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Table 5.2: Participation in the credit market by wealth tercile (2007).
Lowest Middle Highest
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Participation
Share of borrowers 0.96 0.20 0.93 0.26 0.90 0.30
Amount borrowed in 2007d 9.03 7.18 11.30 12.20 22.30 54.80
VBARD 0.87 2.93 2.56 8.82 9.4* 33.00
VBSP 1.54 2.98 2.45 5.09 2.20 3.90
Semi-Formal 0.73 1.41 1.37 2.21 1.3* 2.18
Private lenders 4.82 5.28 3.48 4.09 6.95 32.10
Friends and Relatives 1.08 2.88 1.41 3.24 2.46 10.90
Number of different credit source 2.56 1.10 2.48 1.25 2.23* 1.11
Value of assetsa (Million VND) 25.6 19.00 38.5* 22.70 50.7* 43.90
Leverage ratio (debt/asset) 0.57 0.83 0.32* 0.32 0.35* 0.53
Credit use, % amount used on
Agricultural production 48.7 33.40 66.0* 32.50 62.2* 38.90
Agricultural input 41.9 32.10 57.7* 34.20 55.0* 39.70
Non-Farm business 4.5 17.03 3.7 16.75 7.7 24.21
Transportation 8.8 22.29 3.3* 14.03 2.7* 15.21
Durables or housing 4.4 13.60 2.6 10.60 1.41 7.59
Food, social event or other emergency 25.1 26.50 11.2* 20.60 11.2* 22.90
Credit source for agricultural input loans (%)
Formal 9.85 26.50 5.56 19.40 8.53 24.50
Semi-Formal 20.60 37.90 37.7* 46.10 33.4* 44.60
Informal 69.50 43.90 56.70 46.30 58.00 46.60
Interest rate paid (% p.a.)c
All loans 20.8 12.92 16.7* 10.72 15.5* 14.55
Non Formal loans 23.5 12.49 17.7* 11.63 18.0* 16.38
Agricultural input loans 24.6 18.04 19.6* 12.27 19.4* 17.39
Consumption loansb 43.5 53.00 25.3 78.20 8.0* 21.46
Credit access
Credit limit VBARDd 4.6 6.37 11.0* 12.69 22.9* 33.17
% borrowed 27.7 45.20 38.4 49.00 38.2 48.90
Credit limit VBSP 4.4 4.01 7.3* 6.41 7.6* 6.28
% borrowed 45.3 49.40 54.0 48.50 55.2 49.10
Credit limit Semi-Formal 1.5 2.25 4.7 20.39 3.2* 4.18
% borrowed 41.7 44.00 38.2 40.70 34.2 40.70
Credit limit Private lenders 8.6 6.93 13.0* 11.35 19.6* 38.66
% borrowed 52.2 33.10 29.0* 30.30 21.6* 28.30
Credit limit Friends and relatives 3.2 4.21 10.4* 15.52 11.9* 19.87
% borrowed 26.6 32.70 11.0* 20.50 10.9* 23.90
aIncludes house value, durables possessed and value of livestock
bincludes loans for the purchase durables, housing, food and other emergency expenditure
cWeighted mean of interest rates paid on loan. Weight accounts for loan size within each category.
dIn Million VND. In 2007, 1 Million VND 62.5US$
*Indicates a significant difference to 1st tercile at 5% level of error probability
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In the last part of the Table we display credit limits reported by respondents from
each lender types. The concept of credit limit was introduced by Diagne et al. (2000)
and tested empirically by Diagne and Zeller (2001). It approximates the maximum
amount a household is able to borrow from a particular lender according to its own
characteristics. Households decide how much to borrow depending on their need and
their credit limit in different sectors Diagne and Zeller (2001). Note that the credit
constrained households are not necessarily those borrowing the totality of this limit.
A farmer is constrained if his credit limit is not sufficient to cover his need. Credit
constrained households, may thus have a positive unused credit limit. The decision on
how much to borrow is also part of farmers’ risk coping strategy. Indeed, the amount
that is not borrowed today will be available in the future in case a shock occurs. We
report the share credit limit that was borrowed at the time of interviews.
We find that for all lender types poorer households have lower borrowing capacities,
including VBSP. These amounts are, except for VBSP, between two and three times
smaller in the first group than in the last one. Looking now at the share of credit
limit borrowed, we find no differences among households in the formal and semi-formal
sector. We find however that the poor use a larger share of their credit limit from
both private lenders and from friends and relatives. Additionally, data shows that
many farmers do not borrow from the formal sector while they have positive access,
despite lower interest rates in this sector. In the case of VBSP, as we shall see in the
next section, it is unclear to which extent households can decide to borrow (loans are
disbursed in a top-down approach, and the ability of farmers to borrow depends on
the amount allocated by the bank to their village, and their ability to get votes from
their neighbors, see section 5.4.1). In the case of VBARD, such restrictions do not
exist, and farmers can freely decide whether to borrow or not, depending conditional
on their access.
The market appears to be rather fluid: most households are able to borrow in order
to finance consumption or agricultural inputs. We observe a high heterogeneity of
lenders and contracts. Informal lenders, compared with both banks are able to provide
a variety of contracts to farmers from all wealth categories. The ability of informal
lenders to use local information enables them to adapt contracts to household demand
better than formal lenders can. Comparatively, VBSP offers very standardized loans.
VBARD loans are more flexible, but partly restrained by political restriction (capped
interest rate).
Institutional heterogeneity is considered a likable feature of credit markets, raising
competition among lenders and increasing credit access (Zeller, 2003). The market
however suffers imperfections that seem most detrimental to the poorest. Like in
many developing countries5 rich households borrow more and pay lower interest rates
5(Banerjee (2003) reviews the literature and enumerates six common salient features: 1. impor-
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than the poor. This is also true considering only the non-formal market. The poor
on the other hand are forced to take higher risks to cover their need for agricultural
input and consumption, and face higher interest rates.
We explore this issue further by running a loan-level model estimating the deter-
minants of interest rates in the semi-formal and informal sectors. We use a Tobit
model to account for the many zeros contained in the database. We find that interest
rates increase with the loan size and decrease above a certain level (6.7 million VND).
As expected, loans for which collateral is provided have lower interest rates. In-kind
loans are cheaper than cash loans presumably because of lower transaction costs, and
the weak probability of moral hazard in in-kind transactions, unless when those con-
cern agricultural input transactions. For the latter, transportation costs of input into
villages might explain these higher costs.
The interest rate is set higher when it is the first transaction between a particular
lender and a borrower, indicating as predicted by theory (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Hoff
and Stiglitz, 1990) that information and trust play an important role. Everything else
being unchanged, we find that interest rates decrease the higher a household’s wealth
level and labor capacity, and the larger the area of paddy per capita held by the house-
hold. Indicators of wealth and productive capacity are used by a lender as indicators of
households’ creditworthiness. Lenders may compensate for the greater default risks in
transactions with poorer farmers by charging higher interest rates. Wealthier house-
holds may also have greater information access and richer social networks that enable
them to borrow at cheaper rate. Finally as expected, we find that ceteris paribus
friends and relatives charge lower interest rates, but that shopkeepers charge more.
Higher level of trust and the possibility to exert social pressure on borrowers enable
family members to lend at lower rate.
5.4 Formal lending in Yen Chau
In the previous section, we have seen that the formal sector remains a secondary
source of credit, despite offering advantageous contracts. A large share of farmers
having access to such loans continues to rely on the informal sector where they bor-
row at higher interest rate. As mentioned in the introduction, this phenomenon has
tant gap between the deposit and lending rate; 2. high variability of interest rates for similar loan
transactions; 3. low default rates; 4. production and trade are the first borrowing purposes even when
interest rates are very high; 5. richer people borrow more and pay lower interest rates; 6. bigger loans
are associated with lower interest rates. Most of these features apply to the credit market of Yen
Chau. Formal deposit interest rate in VBARD varies between 0.25 to 0.74% monthly (3-9% yearly),
thus a gap of 7-13% with the bank’s lending rates. We do not find a negative relationship between
loan size and interest rate in the formal sector, but a quadratic relationship as shown in Table 5.3.
Finally, the default rates, only three households lost their collateral through loan transaction in the
past five years. Overdue debt is more important, we find a rate of overdue loans (from six months
overdue) of 6.6% in and 7.7% for VBSP loans. Rates are lower for the informal sector, but also more
difficult to estimate.
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Table 5.3: Tobit estimates of loan interest rates in the non formal sector (2007).
Mean S.D. Coef. z-stat
Interest rate (% p.a.) 10.43 17.80
Loan characteristics
Amount (log) -1.98 1.98 10.427*** (3.84)
Amount squared 67.94 2275.78 -0.001*** (4.27)
Duration (months) 5.50 3.39 0.469 (0.80)
Collateral+ 0.01 0.11 -21.065*** (2.80)
Guarantor+ 0.04 0.19 -5.943 (1.35)
In-kind input loans+ 0.19 0.40 12.671*** (2.92)
In-kind food+ 0.57 0.50 1.534 (0.25)
Other in-kind+ 0.09 0.29 -24.685*** (3.47)
In village+ 0.58 0.49 3.549 (0.71)
First transaction+ 0.15 0.35 6.357* (1.80)
Borrower characteristics
Wealth index -0.04 1.00 -4.554* (1.86)
Number of actives 2.53 1.24 -3.559** (2.07)
Paddy area 2007 3.56 3.30 -1.819*** (2.74)
Upland area 2007 29.61 19.05 -0.073 (0.67)
Land title+ 0.84 0.37 9.44 (1.25)
Lender characteristics
Semi-formal lender+ 0.07 0.26 5.82 (0.85)
Friend & Relative+ 0.11 0.32 -24.519*** (4.87)
Shopkeeper+ 0.71 0.45 8.057 (1.34)
Moneylender+ 0.01 0.08 1.175 (0.18)
Trader+ 0.06 0.23 3.415 (0.34)
Constant 6.59 (0.75)
σ 28.900***
Observations 1583
pseudo-R2 0.112
+ indicates dummy variables (yes=1,no=0)
t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered at the household level
Frequency weights account for the different recall periods by loan types
* p>0.1, ** p>0.05, *** p>0.01
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been commonly observed, but the explanations diverge. We analyze in this section
the lending policies and outreach of both banks. We estimate econometrically the
determinants of demand and access to each program and thus the outreach of both
banks. Finally, we explore the interaction between the formal and non-formal sectors
by jointly estimating determinants of participation in each sector.
5.4.1 Lending procedure
The Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD) is one of Viet-
nam’s four commercial banks created in 1988 after the first financial reform. Apart
from a few subsidized programs targeted at poor households, most of its activity fo-
cuses on commercial banking. Nowadays, it is the largest commercial bank operating
in the country, but remains a secondary source in Yen Chau, as seen above. The
Bank’s interest rates are partly determined by the State Bank of Vietnam (Duong
and Izumida, 2002). Local banks adjust interest rates within this defined range. Most
VBARD loans require the provision of collateral, which in most cases is a household’s
land title, and in rare cases some other valuable good. The bank is located in the dis-
trict’s town and all operations are done there, loan application, delivery, repayment,
etc. In rare cases the bank’s staff may travel to the very remote villages to carry
out transactions. Applicants fill an application form where they detail their income,
projects and other information. The form has then to be signed by the village head
to confirm borrowers’ residence and liability.
The Vietnamese Bank for Social Policy (VBSP)’s lending procedure is relatively
complex, and follows a top-down approach summarized below (Kim Anh, 2010). In
a first stage, the bank decides, in line with policy objectives, to which commune, un-
der which program and which amount to allocate. The commune’s poverty reduction
board composed of village heads, and the commune leaders of four mass organiza-
tions (MO) (Women Union, Farmer Union, the Youth Union and the Veteran Union),
receive the bank’s instructions and select villages and the MO in charge of arrang-
ing the transactions6. At the village level, the selected village MO form a group of
borrowers. Borrowers are usually selected during a VMO meeting, during which can-
didate households expose their projects and needs. Borrowers are selected sometimes
through votes or directly by the village MO leader. The list of selected borrowers
is then submitted for approval to the VBSP. Once approved, the VBSP staff travels
to the village and carries out the transaction. The village MO in most cases is the
6Districts encompass communes which are composed of villages. The mass organizations are
associations created by the state during the communist era to engage civil society in the country’s
political project. Twenty years after the decollectivization, mass organizations continue to play a
major role. The six unions are present at all levels of the society, from the national to the village
level, and accompany the implementation of state policies
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lending group lender, and the village head acts as guarantor by signing a statement
that the selected borrower is liable.
The bank lends under various programs all serving different objectives. The ‘poor
program’ is the main one, and captures 87% of bank’s resources, according to the
local branch. Other programs aim to foster employment opportunities or to encourage
education programs. Farmers eligible for the first program are those that have been
identified as poor by the commune. The classification of households into wealth classes
is done every year, following the method designed by the Ministry of Labor, Invalids
and Social Affairs (MOLISA). Data on household income level are collected every two
years. Those with a per capita income level below the rural poverty line (200,000
VND, ' 12.5US$ at the time of interview) and with low asset value, are classified as
poor and are thus eligible for VBSP’s program.
As in many MFIs, group-lending is used to substitute collateral requirement by
transferring monitoring and enforcement tasks to the group. However in the VBSP
case, borrowers from the same village are not liable for the repayment by their neigh-
bors, but a high default rate in the village compromises the ability of other villagers to
obtain future loans, giving the village MO a strong incentive to ensure the repayment
of each borrower.
5.4.2 Demand and participation in the formal sector
We estimate the determinants of participation in one or the other program conditional
on demand, using a bivariate approach with partial observability. All households may
not have a demand for a formal loan, and those that have a positive demand may not
be similar in their probability of receiving a loan. We apply a two-stage procedure to
address this selectivity issue, using a Heckman specification for binary response model
(Wooldridge, 2002a, p.477-78 and p.570-71). This two-stage approach enables us to
disentangle determinants of households’ demand for a certain program, from factors
influencing a bank’s response. A household has a demand for a loan if he applied for
a loan, or did not apply for fear of being rejected. As positive demand, we also count
cases of households that obtained a formal loan that was not borrowed in their name.
The second dependent variable, granted is equal to 1 if the household received a loan
from the bank during the period considered. The model is written as follows:
yd
i
= 1
[
β1X1i + β2X2i + ui > 0
]
∀i ∈ [1, N ] (demand) (5.1)
yg
i
=
{
1
[
γX1i + vi > 0
]
if yd
i
= 1
0 otherwise (granted)
(5.2)
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where yd
i
denotes demand status of household i in a credit program, yg
i
denotes a bank’s
decision to allocate a loan to a household i. X1i is a vector of household characteristics
that influence both demand and a bank’s response andX2i are characteristics expected
to influence demand without affecting a bank’s response. We assume the error terms,
ui and vi to be jointly normally distributed. The correlation between ui and vi is
noted ρ.
We use data from demand and participation between 2005 and 2007. As explained
above, VBSP loans have a duration of three years, and officially no other formal loans
can be obtained by the household during that period (in practice however, this is not
always the case). In theory at least, each household has the possibility to participate
in the VBSP program once every three years, and this is the period considered in the
model.
Regressors account for household demographics, education level, asset and land
holdings before 2005 in addition to household poverty classification7, and the pos-
session of land title. A dummy variable indicates whether the household’s main oc-
cupation is farming. Two variables measure participation of household members in
village organizations. Variables are weighted household level mean, in which weight
accounts for the degree of participation of each member (with the highest weight set
for leaders, and the lowest for the non-actives). We distinguish between ‘political’ and
‘non-political’ organization, the first one referring to state-created associations, such
as mass organizations and the communist party, and the second refers to all other
types of associations (civic associations, cultural and leisure groups, professional or-
ganizations, etc.). These variables are likely to affect participation and credit access
for two reasons. First, households may gather information on credit programs and the
application procedure in both banks. Second, as explained above, the VBSP lending
program largely depends on the village MO to select borrowers. Membership, and the
degree of participation in a village MO are thus likely to affect the probability of access
to a VBSP loan, through information access and bargaining position. The ability of
household members to speak Kinh, the language in which VBARD transactions are
done is expected to affect both demand and access in the VBARD case.
Village level variables and geographic attributes are expected to affect both de-
mand and access to credit through the availability of other credit sources and through
transaction costs. We include a variable measuring the traveling distance to the city,
the distance to the closest market. In the VBSP model, we control for classification
of communes into economic zones, and for villages’ relative wealth within communes8.
7Households are classified into five wealth categories every year. The classification method elab-
orated by MOLISA is based on the biannual calculation of households’ income, and the inclusion of
other asset-based indicators.
8The economic classification of communes into Zones I, II and III is a formal classification used
by the state to target poor areas with anti-poverty programs. Communes in Zone III are the poorest.
This classification is based on several indicators, such as infrastructure, poverty incidence, etc. The
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Village and commune classification may enter into account in VBSP’s definition of
objectives and thereby affect its targeting strategy. Second, the availability of credit
in one’s village results from negotiations taking place between communes and villages
to attract VBSP funds every year. A household is able to apply for a VBSP loan
only when funds are available in its village. The demand for liquidity is expected
to depend on a households’ income source. We control for the share of farm income
and the share of wage income in households’ total cash income. We use lagged values
denoting households’ situation in 2002 to avoid endogeneity issues. Finally a dummy
variable indicates whether the household experienced a serious and negative income
shock in the five years preceding the survey. The variable accounts for complete crop
failures, the loss of a cow or buffalo, the death or departure of a working adult, or
the occurrence of a wedding for which the household had to pay dowry. See Table
5.10 in the appendix of this paper for a description of all household and village level
variables.
A check of the correlation matrix between all regressors and of the variance in-
flation factors indicates no cause for concern regarding multicollinearity. Estima-
tion results are reported in Tables 5.4 (VBARD) and 5.5 (VBSP). In both Tables,
columns (1) and (2) display two-stage estimation results, while column (3) presents
the marginal effects on the joint probability to demand and receive a formal loan, that
is, the estimated effect of an incremental deviation in the explanatory variable from
its mean value on the probability for a sample household to participate in one credit
program. Marginal effects are reported in percentages.
Demand and access to VBARD credit program
The overall model is significant, and the Wald test on the significance of ρ indicate that
both stages are independents. Hence, those who have no demand for VBARD loans do
not differ from others in their probability of receiving a loan. The older the household
head, the less likely the household is to be granted a VBARD loan conditional on
demand. While female-headed households are more likely to demand VBARD loans,
male headed households are more likely to get a VBARD loan. Overall, the age of
the household head appears to have no impact on household participation. Household
demand increases with its paddy and upland farm size, but decreases beyond a certain
level (4.5 and 43.8 acre per capita, respectively, corresponding to the 76th and the
87th percentile, i.e. the relation is positive for the majority of the sample). The value
of durables, and household poverty status affect neither the demand nor one’s access
to VBARD loans. Participation in a village organization, which captures information
access positively affects households’ probability of receiving a loan conditional on
demand, but the marginal effect on the probability of becoming a client is insignificant.
relative classification of villages is a self-assessment by village head
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Households whose members are able to speak Kinh tend to demand more credit; we
find a positive impact of the variable on the probability of becoming a client.
We find that demand for VBARD loans decreases with the degree of specialization
into farming, and with the share of wage income in households’ total cash income.
Consequently, the probability for households specialized into farming and engaged in
wage activities to receive a VBARD loan is also lower. This is an indication, as already
observed in section5.3.2 that VBARD loans are directed more towards financing non-
agricultural activities than agricultural investment9.
To summarize, results indicate a selection of borrowers into the VBARD program
that results both from a self-selection and a selection by the bank itself. Everything
else being equal, we do not find that poorer households are less likely to participate,
but that households with a larger farm size have a higher probability of becoming
clients. Households which hold a land title are much more likely to take part in
VBARD’s credit program than others. Finally households that are more engaged in
the non-agricultural sector are more likely to participate in the program.
Demand and outreach of VBSP credit program
We turn now to the estimation results of demand and participation into the VBSP
credit program (Table 5.5). As explained earlier, the objective of this credit program
is to increase credit access to the poor by offering low-risk credit to those identified
as poor. We suspect that the complexity of the lending procedure, and notably the
involvement of community undermine the bank’s capacity to achieve a good poverty
outreach.
As in the previous model, the significance level of the model is satisfactory. A
Wald-test on ρ leads us to conclude that both stages are independent of each other. We
find that the probability of having a positive demand for a VBSP loan increases with
education level and the number of active males in the households. It decreases with the
presence of active females. The probability to receive a loan conditional on demand
increases with the number of dependents in the household, but decreases with the
age of the household. It increases with a household’s upland farm size, but decreases
beyond the level of 82 acre per capita (99th percentile), the relation is thus positive
for most of the population. Households located in a poorer economic zone (Zone III)
have a lower demand, and also a lower probability of being granted a loan conditional
9Although the two explanatory variables are measured with lagged values, a risk of endogeneity
bias persists. Household participation in the off-farm sector and wage employment could be correlated
with uncontrolled factors present in the error term, for instance here the extent of past transactions
between the bank and the farmer. The likelihood that one receives a VBARD loan today also likely to
be positively influenced by the extent of past transactions. This is checked for by including a control
dummy variable indicating whether past transactions occurred between the bank and the farmer. This
operation leaves the results unchanged, we conclude that the effects estimated here are not affected
by past transactions
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Table 5.4: Determinants of demand and participation in VBARD credit program
(2005-2007). Probit with selection.
VBARD
P(demand>0) P(granted=1) Marginal effect
P(demand>0,
granted=1)
(1) (2) (3)
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat dydx x 100 z-stat
head 0.0039 (0.46) -0.0368* (1.77) -0.073 (0.36)
Male head+ -0.5394 (1.45) 1.9031*** (3.41) -4.991 (0.50)
Education 0.0507 (1.27) 0.0081 (0.09) 1.363 (1.33)
Active females 0.0237 (0.18) 0.0565 (0.20) 0.888 (0.24)
Active males -0.0173 (0.14) 0.217 (0.70) 0.584 (0.19)
Dependants 0.0861 (1.21) -0.0121 (0.08) 2.188 (1.18)
Paddy area 0.1542 (1.62) -0.3238 (1.49) 2.477 (0.95)
Paddy area squared -0.0180** (2.11) 0.0206 (1.27) -0.371* (1.72)
Upland area 0.0276** (2.01) 0.0731* (1.88) 1.070** (2.41)
Upland area squared -0.0003** (2.12) -0.0010** (2.07) -0.013** (2.39)
Durables (log) -0.0345 (0.23) -0.2453 (0.92) -2.072 (0.50)
Poor 2004-2006+ -0.0345 (0.15) -0.138 (0.27) -1.558 (0.26)
Land title+ 0.367 (1.12) 2.5823* (1.86) 21.901** (2.31)
Participation – P 0.1027 (0.57) 0.3682 (0.87) 4.436 (0.88)
Participation – NFP 0.2091 (0.92) 1.6560** (2.41) 13.360* (1.89)
Kinh language 0.0165** (2.43) -0.0184 (1.58) 0.342** (2.18)
Distance to city 0.0004 (0.14) -0.0036 (0.37) -0.006 (0.08)
Distance to market 0.0238* (1.65) 0.001 (0.03) 0.627 (1.63)
Wage income (share) -0.0267*** (3.41) -0.696*** (2.97)
Farm income (share) -0.0291*** (4.60) -0.758*** (4.08)
Income shock+ 0.5561* (1.85) 14.510* (1.65)
Observation 288
Censored 188
Log-likelihood -181.62
χ2 102.3***
p-value Wald test (ρ=0) 0.617
z-statistics are based on robust standard errors
+ indicates dummy variables
* p>0.1, ** p>0.05, *** p>0.01
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on demand. This result is surprising, as poor communes are officially targeted in the
implementation of anti-poverty programs. Two villages in the sample belong to this
poor zone, two particularly remote and poor H’mong villages. In the current VBSP
procedure these villages may face difficulties attracting public funds, while richer
villages in poor communes, not represented in this sample may benefit from greater
access. We find that conditional on demand, villagers from poorer communities have
a higher probability of getting a loan, indicating a certain form of targeting at the
commune level.
Looking at the last column and at the estimation of marginal effects, we see that
better educated households are more likely to become clients. This probability de-
creases with the number of women in the household, but increases as the number of
active male increases. We would expect a positive effect on both variables, as they are
both indicators of household labor availability. We find that the more active females
in the household the lower the probability of having a positive demand for VBSP. One
possible interpretation is that females have access to additional credit sources, through
the women’s union or through social networks, which reduces their demand for VBSP
loans and thus their participation in the program. This indicates, nevertheless, that
the microcredit program of VBSP is not gender-sensitive and does not, as many other
MFIs do, seek to target women as a way to reduce gender inequality, increase welfare
impact and repayment. Our data show nevertheless a much higher share of women
among VBSP clients (33.8%) than among VBARD clients (11.6%). If participation
decreases with households’ wealth level (proxied by the value of durables owned in
2004), those classified as poor during that period, had a significantly lower chance of
becoming a client, an indication that the bank may be mistargeting.
We explore the targeting performance of VBSP further, by looking at the probabil-
ity of a household classified as poor in period t−1 applying for and obtaining a VBSP
loan in time t, using this time all information available on participation between 2002
and 2007. We expect to find over the time period a bias in loan allocation towards
households classified as poor in the previous period. Results are reported in Table 5.6,
and indicate otherwise. The poor have a lower probability than non-poor of obtaining
a VBSP loan in the year following their classification. We find furthermore that this
is not due to a lower probability of application, but to the fact that the poor are more
likely to see their application rejected by VBSP. Results also indicate a low depth of
outreach, the poor are less likely than non-poor to access VBSP loans, and the share
of poor that received such loans is also low (less than 10% of poor households on aver-
age per year). In addition, we find that VBSP loans do not reach households without
alternative access to formal credit. In 2007, 40.9% of VBSP clients had already bor-
rowed a loan from VBARD between 2002 and 2006, and 71.8% had a positive credit
limit from VBARD, meaning that they could have accessed a VBARD loan instead.
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Table 5.5: Determinants of demand and participation in VBSP credit program (2005-
2007). Probit with selection
VBSP
P(demand>0) P(granted=1) Marginal effect
P(demand>0,
granted=1)
(1) (2) (3)
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat dydx x 100 z-stat
Age head -0.0017 (0.25) -0.0460* (1.93) -0.344 (1.51)
Male head+ 0.2515 (0.81) 0.9167 (1.35) 13.605 (1.39)
Education 0.0756** (2.00) 0.1206 (1.40) 3.114** (2.52)
Active females -0.2783** (2.07) -0.3859 (0.82) -11.096** (2.42)
Active males 0.3111** (2.50) 0.8328 (1.52) 14.933 (3.68)
Dependants 0.0086 (0.15) 0.3874** (2.01) 2.711 (1.32)
Paddy area -0.0100 (0.28) -0.1722 (0.70) -1.396 (0.84)
Paddy area squared 0.0004 (0.67) 0.0042 (0.25) 0.040 (0.39)
Upland area 0.0007 (0.06) 0.0698*** (2.69) 0.462 (1.15)
Upland area squared 0.0000 (0.23) -0.0004** (2.25) -0.002 (0.36)
Durables (log) -0.1859 (1.43) -0.3681 (1.07) -8.107* (1.89)
Poor 2004-2006+ -0.2053 (1.01) -0.8085 (1.44) -11.488* (1.85)
Land title+ 0.2329 (0.89) 0.0454 (0.10) 7.535 (0.92)
Participation – P -0.1258 (0.75) 0.6554* (1.82) 0.216 (0.04)
Participation – NFP 0.0781 (0.37) 0.1221 (0.32) 3.200 (0.46)
Zone I+ -0.2319 (1.18) -0.2155 (0.52) -8.575 (1.37)
Zone III+ -0.7597** (2.02) -6.5217** (2.12) -64.760*** (4.15)
Richer village+ 0.2374 (1.27) 0.0845 (0.19) 7.922 (1.30)
Poorer village+ 0.4095 (1.41) 5.8789** (2.52) 49.807*** (3.80)
Distance village center -0.1900 (0.77) -0.5080 (1.23) -9.116 (1.31)
Wage income (share) -0.0058 (0.83) -0.181 (0.80)
Farm income (share) -0.0079 (1.28) -0.247 (1.26)
Income shock+ 0.0494 (0.20) 1.539 (0.20)
Observation 288
Censored 144
Log-likelihood -216.35
χ2 883.4***
p-value Wald test (ρ=0) 0.664
z-statistics are based on robust standard errors
+ indicates dummy variables
* p>0.1, ** p>0.05, *** p>0.01
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Table 5.6: Poverty outreach of VBSP (2002-2007)
χ2-test for
Classification equal
in t− 1 distribution
Poor Non-Poor p-value
Obtained a VBSP loan in t n 31 157
% within class 9.75 15.05 0.016
Applied for VBSP loan in t n 45 174
% within class 14.15 15.43 0.575
Obtained a loan while applied in t n 31 157
% within class 68.89 90.23 0.000
The current loan allocation results in a distribution of VBSP loans that is worse
for the poor than what would be produced by a random allocation of loans in the
population. This poor targeting performance of VBSP results in a major leakage of
state resources as well as a strong undercoverage of the targeted population. Based
on the data, we calculate a leakage rate10 of 54.1% and an undercoverage rate11 of
90.2%.
These results point to the limits of the community-based targeting system used in
Vietnam for the implementation of many anti-poverty programs.
Theoretically however, advantages are numerous (Conning and Kevane, 2002).
First, it enables the programmer (here the VBSP) to make use of rich information
available at the community level to identify at a low cost the population in need and
to achieve a better targeting. This enables VBSP to partly overcome information
asymmetry and risks of adverse selection (i.e. the selection of ‘bad’ borrowers with
low repayment capacity) which is critical in credit transactions. Second, borrowers are
selected during village meetings, selection is eventually relatively transparent. This
may limit risks of corruption, and thus of leakage of the bank’s resources. Finally, as
many community-based programs, benefits for the community itself can be important.
Such programs contribute to empowering communities, particularly in a country like
Vietnam which is recovering from centrally planned decision making. They may con-
tribute to creating social capital within the village by intensifying information flows
among villagers. It finally helps in mobilizing local forces such as social networks and
traditional social structure to participate in the design and implementation of policies
which can improve their efficiency.
The community-based targeting system does not perform well. Even though in-
10Expressed as the share of non-targeted recipients (non-poor clients) in the total targeted popu-
lation (the poor)
11expressed as the share of targeted non-recipient (poor non-clients) over the total targeted popu-
lation (poor)
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formation may be fairly complete in the village and the targeted population well
identified, the existing social structure may act against the intended allocation. This
is especially true for programs targeting a sub-population, such as the poor, who oc-
cupy a weaker social position within villages. In the VBSP lending scheme described
above, candidate borrowers first have to convince other villagers in order to get their
votes. In contexts where wealth level is strongly correlated with social status and
education level, the poor are not well equipped to make their way through such sys-
tems. Moreover, the fact that VBSP is highly subsidized reinforces the public good
character of its service. Subsidies render loans particularly attractive, and are likely
to raise claims of non-targeted villagers over these loans, and community members
may not have sufficient power and/or will to deny them access.
Mistargeting in rural credit programs is relatively common in developing countries,
even in programs that do not involve community-based targeting. A second explana-
tion to the ‘community failure’ described above is proposed and explored theoretically
by Aubert et al. (2009). The strong correlation between wealth and repayment capac-
ity pushes credit agents whose incentives are drawn on the repayment performance of
their clients, to select wealthier household. That such mechanism is at place in the
present case is also well conceivable. In the case of VBSP, the ‘credit agents’ are in
fact village MO trained by VBSP to ensure high repayment, and their ability to do so
is sanctioned each following year with the delivery (or not) of new loans in the village.
Not only village MO but also villagers under this system face the incentive to target
households with high repayment capacity and thus the wealthier.
The subsidization of the loans and the participatory nature of the village-based
political negotiations of who gets credit and how much is likely to increase credit
rationing at the expense of the poor, and to raise uncertainty about credit access,
especially among the poorest.
5.4.3 Is there an interaction between the formal and informal sectors?
We now examine the interaction between participation in the formal sector and in the
informal sector. A justification for government intervention on rural credit markets
is the expansion of formal credit supply in order to reduce dependence of farmers on
the informal sector, which is considered insecure and too expensive. In section 5.3,
we saw that objectives from this perspective are far from being reached in the area,
since the informal sector remains the first lending sector, despite advantageous formal
contracts. We saw in addition that many farmers continue to rely on more expensive
and risky contracts to finance agricultural input and consumption although they could
obtain cheaper formal loans.
As seen in the introduction, this phenomenon is commonly observed in developing
countries. Yet reasons behind it differ, and might vary from one context to another.
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Understanding how both sectors interact provides valuable information on the ability
of the formal sector to respond farmers’ needs, to substitute for the informal market,
and to reach its objective. Whether the persistence of the informal sector has to
be imputed to borrowers’ preference or to institutional constraints calls for different
policy responses. Possible interventions range from adapting formal supply to farmers’
needs (i.e. by offering more short term loans, small loans, or saving facilities), to
transforming the lending procedure so as to better reach the poor, or to reinforcing
the legal system to secure informal transactions (Ray, 1998, chapter 14).
The empirical approach is as follows, we jointly estimate determinants of partici-
pation in the formal and informal sector using a bivariate binary estimation approach: y
F
i
= 1
[
βFXi + u
F
i > 0
]
yI
i
= 1
[
βIXi + u
I
i > 0
] (5.3)
where yF
i
and yI
i
denote participation of household i in the formal and informal
sector in 2007, Xi is a vector of household and lender characteristics, u
F
i and u
I
i are
the error terms, which we assume to be jointly normally distributed. The correlation
between both error terms accounts for the non-independence between both equations
and is written ρ. βF and βI are parameters to estimate.
We focus on credit market participation for the year 2007, a year in which our data
is the most complete. The semi-formal and the informal sector are grouped into one
‘non-formal’ sector. Formal loans are all disbursed in cash and are fully fungible, they
can theoretically substitute any other loan types from all sectors. If products from
both sectors were perfect substitutes, we would find that participation in one sector
reduces participation in the other. When both sectors are perfectly independent,
participation in one sector does not affect participation in the other. A test on the
parameter ρ is thus a test of independence and/or substitutability or complementarity
between both sectors.
Variables contained in Xi are described in the appendix of this paper, Table 5.10.
Starting from the same set of explanatory variables explaining demand and access
for formal loans above, we proceed to some adjustments. Land area is now the area
managed by the household in 2007. We include a dummy variable indicating whether
the household had a running debt from one of the formal banks at the beginning of
2007, and a variable measuring households’ liquidity position at the beginning of the
year. This variable is the sum of ‘liquid’ assets held by the household in value. An
asset is ‘liquid’ if it can be sold easily and rapidly on the market, this includes both
durable goods and livestock. We expect this value to affect participation in one or the
other sector, both as a determinant of demand and of access (if being perceived as an
index of creditworthiness).
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Results are presented in Table 5.7. We report in columns (3) to (6) the marginal
effect of each variable in predicting the four joint probabilities (i.e. participation in for-
mal sector only, in both sectors, in the non-formal sector only, and non-participation).
Marginal effects express the effect of an incremental increase of a variable from its
mean value on each probability. The overall significance of the model is good (the sin-
gle probit models not reported here also exhibit good significance and goodness-of-fit
estimates).
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Table 5.7: Joint determinants of participation in the formal and non-formal sector, 2007. Bivariate probit estimates and marginal effects
Formal sector Non formal sector Marginal effects predicting
P(F=1) P(NF=1) P(F=1, NF=0) P(F=1, NF=1) P(F=0, NF=1) P(F=0, NF=0)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dydx dydx dydx dydx
coef. z-stat coef. z-stat x 100 z-stat x 100 z-stat x 100 z-stat x 100 z-stat
Age head -0.119*** (3.14) 0.049 (1.14) 0.710 (2.01) -2.327 (1.72) -0.822 (0.55) 2.440 (2.85)
Age head squared 0.001*** (2.77) -0.001 (1.48) -0.006 (1.83) 0.019 (1.39) -0.822 (0.52) -0.021 (2.56)
Male head+ 0.693* (1.85) 0.004 (0.01) 2.775 (1.55) 23.756 (1.97) -25.763 (2.12) -0.768 (0.18)
Education 0.032 (0.73) -0.112* (1.77) 0.241 (1.10) 0.282 (0.24) -1.016 (0.86) 0.493 (0.83)
Active females -0.132 (0.85) 0.144 (0.72) -1.196 (1.69) -2.475 (0.59) 5.777 (1.45) -2.105 (1.14)
Active males 0.285** (2.08) -0.093 (0.65) 0.577 (1.10) 5.657 (1.56) -5.848 (1.62) -0.386 (0.31)
Dependants 0.114 (1.51) -0.010 (0.09) 0.563 (1.41) 2.994 (1.56) -3.975 (1.93) 0.417 (0.47)
Paddy 0.145 (1.22) 0.034 (0.55) 0.231 (0.72) 3.954 (1.30) -3.503 (1.17) -0.683 (1.05)
Paddy squared -0.022* (1.74) 0.000 (0.22) -0.052 (1.73) -0.582 (1.87) 0.578 (1.86) 0.056 (1.72)
Upland 0.021 (1.43) 0.001 (0.04) 0.048 (0.80) 0.562 (1.37) -0.548 (1.50) -0.061 (0.35)
Upland squared 0.000 (0.92) 0.000 (0.29) 0.000 (0.60) -0.004 (0.99) 0.004 (1.13) 0.001 (0.38)
Land title+ 0.169 (0.59) -0.376 (1.08) -0.092 (0.05) 1.815 (0.23) -0.931 (0.11) -0.792 (0.18)
Participation political 0.096 (0.50) -0.341 (1.48) 1.270 (1.44) 1.573 (0.30) -5.408 (1.02) 2.566 (1.29)
Participation non political 0.271 (1.24) 0.476* (1.68) -0.275 (0.28) 8.424 (1.42) -4.843 (0.84) -3.306 (1.23)
Kinh language 0.010* (1.82) -0.002 (0.39) 0.077 (2.10) 0.292 (1.78) -0.462 (2.86) 0.093 (1.06)
Current formal debt+ -0.476*** (2.58) 0.051 (0.19) -1.074 (1.18) -11.858 (2.36) 11.799 (2.44) 1.133 (0.44)
Elevation 0.001** (2.15) -0.001* (1.81) 0.012 (2.97) 0.039 (1.97) -0.067 (3.59) 0.016 (1.66)
Distance to village centre -0.455 (1.54) 0.728 (1.52) -3.469 (1.97) -9.075 (1.19) 18.056 (2.26) -5.511 (1.26)
Distance YC -0.006 (1.44) 0.005 (0.91) -0.041 (1.97) -0.146 (1.26) 0.240 (2.24) -0.053 (0.95)
Distance to shop 0.198*** (3.00) -0.029 (0.44) 0.606 (2.05) 5.292 (3.05) -5.696 (3.13) -0.201 (0.32)
Distance to market -0.007 (0.47) 0.000 (0.00) -0.016 (0.19) -0.299 (0.66) 0.260 (0.56) 0.055 (0.24)
Liquidity (log) 0.133** (2.14) 0.008 (0.13) 0.682 (2.03) 5.903 (2.39) -6.376 (2.58) -0.209 (0.32)
Farm income (share) -0.020*** (3.29) 0.024*** (3.87) -0.107 (3.00) -0.284 (1.83) 0.561 (3.19) -0.170 (3.54)
Wage income (share) -0.009 (1.34) 0.009 (1.23) -0.039 (1.23) -0.042 (0.23) 0.163 (0.81) -0.082 (1.30)
Observation 287 χ2 326.1***
Log-likelihood -215.5 p-value wald test (ρ=0) 0.055
z-stat are based on robust standard errors – Bold numbers are marginal coefficients significantly different from 0 at the 10% level of error probability – *
p>0.1, ** p>0.05, *** p>0.01.
5.4. Formal lending in Yen Chau 85
The Wald-test on ρ yields a p-value of 0.055, we reject the hypothesis independence
between both equations. This probability to participate in one sector is affected by
the participation in the other sector, hence both decisions are not independent.
Among human capital indicators, age of the household head, its gender, the pres-
ence of men and women, and the education level of household members influence
sectoral choice. The probability of participating in the formal sector increases with
age, but decreases above 58 years (87th percentile). It increases for male-headed house-
holds, and with the availability of male labor force in the household. The marginal
effect however is not significantly different from 0 in predicting the four probabilities,
but we find that the likelihood of participating in the formal sector only decreases
with the presence of women in the household. The education level of active mem-
bers reduces the probability of participation in the non-formal sector, but again its
marginal effect is different from 0 in none of the four predictions.
Probability of participation in the formal sector decreases with the area of paddy
land managed by the household, once this area reaches 3.3 acres per capita (53rd
percentile). Looking at the marginal effects, we also observe a mild negative slope
of this variable in explaining the probability of participation in the formal sector
(columns (3) and (4)) and a mild positive slope in the probability of borrowing from
the informal sector only, and not borrowing at all. As already seen, the ability of
households to speak Kinh matters for their access to formal credit. This is observed
again, with a significant and negative slope in predicting participation in the non-
formal sector only. As expected, households which had a debt running in the formal
sector by the beginning of 2007 are less likely to participate in the formal sector.
Although in theory, a household is not allowed to hold two debts from a formal lender
at the same time (VBARD or VBSP), a number of households do so in practice. We
do not find a negative effect on the probability of borrowing from the formal sector
only, but a negative effect on the probability of participating in both sectors, and a
positive effect on the probability of participation in the informal sector only.
Geographic location explains a substantial share of sectoral choice. All else being
equal, the elevation of a household’s homestead positively influences participation in
the formal sector, but negatively affects participation in the non-formal sector (the
coefficient remains small in magnitude). Households living closer to the city center are
more likely to participate in the formal sector only, and less likely to borrow from the
non-formal sector only. The estimated marginal effects are quite large (an additional
traveling minute leads to a decrease in the probability to take part in the formal
sector only of 3%, and increase the probability of falling in the third category by 18%)
an effect that has to be imputed to transaction costs. The further the village from
a shop the more likely its inhabitants are to participate in the formal sector. The
relationship is insignificant regarding distance to market. The lack of availability of
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informal credit sources is a reason for taking part in the formal sector. The variable
measuring households’ liquidity position positively affects participation in the formal
sector, but negatively affects the probability of being a non-formal borrower only.
One interpretation is that those in need of liquidities turn to the informal sector
rather than to the formal one where the risk of being rejected due to underestimated
creditworthiness is higher. Finally, and as observed before, household income sources
matter in sectoral choice. Households specialized in farming have a higher probability
of participating in the non-formal sector, and a lower probability of taking part in the
formal sector.
The results shown here indicate that there is scope for improvement regarding the
share of the formal sector in credit transactions in the area. Formal credit substitutes
expensive informal loans to some extent, and households accessing formal loans are
likely to reduce their participation in the informal sector. This extent is limited
however, as we observe a large share of formal clients borrowing additionally from the
non-formal sector. In 2007, 94% of VBSP clients and 87.5% of VBARD clients also
contracted informal loans. One interpretation is that loan amounts offered by VBSP
are insufficient in covering farmers’ needs. The average loan size offered by VBSP for
a duration of three years is lower than the total average amount borrowed by even
poorer farmers for one year. This may however, be untrue in the case of VBARD.
A second interpretation is that informal and formal loans are imperfect substitutes,
and formal loans are used to finance other purposes than those financed through
informal contracts. This also explains the low share of formal loans used in financing
agricultural input. As seen in section 5.3.1, farmers have a high demand for credit
to finance agricultural input and food consumption. Long- and medium-term credit
offered by VBSP and VBARD are unlikely to serve this need.
5.5 Impact of the government micro-credit program on wel-
fare
VBSP bank was established to supply credit to the market segment left uncovered by
VBARD, and by doing so to empower farmers in their decision-making and reduce
rural poverty. The credits offered by VBSP have been tailored for the poor,: interest
rates are low, and thanks to low amounts, and high duration default risks are quite
low. The previous sections revealed that despite its announced objectives the bank
has a low targeting efficiency among the poor. We have also seen that the ability to
fully substitute expensive informal loans is limited as farmers’ credit demand often
exceeds the average loan amounts provided by banks.
The program is still largely subsidized and constitutes an important spending for
the government. In this section we explore the impact of the program on the welfare
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of its participants, namely on households’ levels of expenditure per capita, and asset
value.
5.5.1 The propensity score matching approach
When the assignment of treatment (here participation in VBSP credit program) is
not random, the usual impact estimator (i.e. difference-in-difference estimator) leads
to biased estimates, due to selection bias and the presence of confounding factors. We
use the propensity score matching (PSM) technique to correct these biases. The main
advantage of PSM over other impact methodologies (i.e. instrumental variables or
control function methods for instance) is that it does not impose a functional form
on the distribution of the outcome variables. A main disadvantage, however, is that
estimates are likely to remain biased if selection is too heavily based on unobservable
characteristics (Blundell and Dias, 2009). The PSM approach suits well the charac-
teristics of the credit program under study, and the richness of the dataset available
enables us to control for a number of observable characteristics. As seen in section
5.4.2 selection of households into the program depend households’ demand for credit,
household characteristics that are observable by village MO and other villagers, as
well as village characteristics influencing resource availability. Each year and in every
village, there are eligible households willing to participate in the program who are
not able to because of limited resources. Most villages however apply a turnover in
allocating credit, and households considered ‘eligible’ whose access was denied because
of limited resources one year, will have a higher probability of receiving a loan in the
next years. In such condition, it is reasonable to expect that once controlled for ob-
served village characteristics and household creditworthiness indicators, the allocation
of credit is close to random.
The PSM approach was introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). It is based on
the conditional independence assumption (CIA), i.e. the assumption that conditional
on a set of observable characteristics X, the assignment of treatment is independent
from the studied outcome.
Y0, Y1 ⊥ D|X, ∀ X (5.4)
where Y0 and Y1 are the outcome values of non-treated and treated households,
respectively, D denotes treatment and takes the value 1 when the individual has re-
ceived treatment and 0 when otherwise. X is a vector of observable characteristics.
Conditional on X therefore, the assignment of treatment can be considered as ran-
dom. Matching method thus suggests to match control and treated households on
X to obtain an impact estimate. In practice however X is likely to be multidimen-
sional, which renders matching difficult. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) go further
and demonstrate that if the CIA holds for X, it also holds for the propensity score
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P (X) = P (D = 1|X) which is the probability that a household receives treatment
conditional on X:
Y0, Y1 ⊥ D|P (X), ∀ X (5.5)
Treated and control households are matched within classes of P (X). A further
requirement is that the ‘common support’ condition is satisfied: the propensity score
must be estimated only for classes of P (X) in which control and treated are of sufficient
number to be compared. This also means that each household included in the impact
estimation must have a positive probability to be both treated and untreated. We
estimate the impact of the treatment on the treated, noted ATT (as opposed to the
ATE which measure the impact on the overall population) which is estimated as
follows:
τATT = EP (X){E[Y1|D = 1, P (X)]− Eˆ[Y0|D = 0, P (X)])} (5.6)
τATT is thus simply the difference in outcome between treated households (first term)
and the estimated counterfactual Eˆ[Y0|D = 0, P (X)] that is obtained through obser-
vations within the control subsample. The calculation of the counterfactual can be
based on different algorithms that assign different weights to control observations in
their comparison with the treated observations.
5.5.2 Estimation of the propensity score and matching algorithms
The treatment variable denotes participation of a household in the VBSP credit pro-
gram in 2005-2006. Outcome variables measure household level of per capita total
expenditure, food expenditure and non-food expenditure, which includes clothing,
but excludes durables, education and health expenditure. Because these variables
were measured over the 12 months preceding the survey, the data overlap both years
2006 and 2007 and will not be affected by household credit access in 2007. Other
outcomes relate to the value of durable goods purchased by the household in 2005 and
2006 and households asset value at the beginning of 2007. As seen in section 5.3.2 and
5.4.3 we suspect VBSP credit program to have a higher impact on consumption and
asset acquisition than on agricultural outcome. Formal credit accounts only for a mi-
nor share in households’ agricultural input purchase. Investment in livestock however
is one of the most widely cited purposes of borrowing a VBSP loan, and we therefore
test for an impact on the value of household livestock holding in 2007.
The selection of explanatory variables used to estimate the propensity score was
done in two steps. Starting from the set of variables used in modeling demand and
access to VBSP credit in section 5.4.2, we adjust the model to ensure a good match-
ing quality, and avoid an over-parameterization of the propensity score which may
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jeopardize balancing condition and matching qualityCaliendo and Kopeinig (2008).
We remove insignificant variables based on the estimates of the standardized bias be-
fore and after matching (see (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008, p.48)). Estimates of the
propensity score matching are presented in the appendix of this paper, Table 5.11.
In order to increase comparability between treated and control observations, we
adjust the estimation sample. In a first stage, we drop observations from households
that had no demand for credit during the period considered (this leads to a reduction
of the number of observations by 23%). That is, we exclude households that did
not apply for credit during that period because of no need (but keep households we
were too discouraged to apply). Since results are likely to be under-evaluated by the
presence of households that have received in that period a VBARD loan, we thus
exclude in a second stage all households that have been VBARD clients between 2004
and 2006 (column (2)).
Two different algorithms are employed as a check for robustness. A one-to-one ap-
proach (the nearest neighbor method) is inappropriate here considering the relatively
small sample size. The so-called radius matching compares the treated households
with all control households whose distance in propensity score does not exceed a cer-
tain distance (caliper). The second method is the kernel matching method. Each
control household is compared with the treated one, but the weights are assigned to
each matching partner according to distance between treated unit and the control
ones.
Statistics on the matching quality of both algorithms and within both subsam-
ples are shown in Table 5.8. In all cases, results indicate a good matching quality.
Standardized bias is reduced by more than 90% in most cases. The Pseudo-R2 after
matching is also significantly reduced, and covariates which were jointly significant
before matching become insignificant after matching.
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Table 5.8: Impact of VBSP credit program, results from propensity score matching estimates
Before matching After matching
Radius Kernel
Mean Mean (caliper=0.09) (bandwidth=0.07)
treated control Diff. t-stat Diff. t-stat Diff. t-stat
A. All household with positive demand for credit
Daily per capita expenditure 17.45 15.17 2.52 (2.52) 0.12 (0.11) 0.03 (0.03)
Daily per capita food expenditure 9.72 8.87 0.96 (1.74) -0.11 (0.17) -0.16 (0.25)
Daily per capita non food expenditure 4.07 3.07 1.09 (2.64) 0.27 (0.53) 0.24 (0.45)
Value of durables purchased between 2005-2006 5 243.7 3 769.7 1 339.9 (1.54) 1 301.9 (1.25) 1 394.7 (1.31)
Value of durables begining of 2007 13 174.9 6 155.8 7 332.6 (2.65) 1 208.3 (1.11) 1 137.7 (1.03)
Value of livestock held by household in 2007 17 555.4 12 603.2 4 786.1 (2.81) -721.8 (0.35) -1 161.4 (0.55)
N Treated 61 56 56
N Control 162 162 162
Standardized bias 23.98 2.00 2.81
Pseudo-R2 0.20 0.01 0.02
P-value χ2 0.000 1.000 1.000
B. Non VBARD clients and positive demand for credit
Daily per capita expenditure 15.64 13.97 2.56 (2.21) -0.92 (0.67) -0.99 (0.72)
Daily per capita food expenditure 8.65 8.13 0.90 (1.45) -0.92 (1.28) -0.99 (1.35)
Daily per capita non food expenditure 3.62 2.86 1.12 (2.26) 0.05 (0.08) -0.01 (0.02)
Value of durables purchased between 2005-2006 5 115.9 3 201.9 1 837.8 (1.80) 2 748.1 (2.13) 2 781.7 (2.11)
Value of durables beginning of 2007 8 213.5 5 205.7 3 811.0 (3.66) 3 151.1 (2.34) 3 131.9 (2.29)
Value of livestock held by household in 2007 15 893.5 11 346.8 5 916.8 (2.78) -694.9 (0.26) -572.3 (0.21)
N Treated 44 41 41
N Control 99 99 99
Standardized bias 1.88 2.05 2.56
Pseudo-R2 0.25 0.02 0.01
P-value χ2 0.000 1.000 1.000
All figures are in thousand VND, and estimated in constant 2007 prices, using Consumer Price Index published by General Statistical
Office of Vietnam – In 2007, 16.000 VND ' 1US$ – Bold figures indicate significance at the 10% level of error probability
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5.5.3 Impact estimation
The simple comparison of outcomes (t-test) between treated and control households
shows important and significant differences. Treated households have higher level of
food and non-food per capita expenditure, and a higher level of total expenditure per
capita. They possess more durables and a higher value of livestock. After matching
however, these differences vanish, and we do not observe any significant impact within
the subpopulation of households having a positive demand for credit of VBSP credit
program.
Turning now to the second subsample of non-VBARD clients, we find, as expected,
that the estimated differences after matching are larger. The estimates indicate no
impact on household per capita expenditure, but significant differences in asset in-
dexes. Results indicate that households purchased more assets during the time that
they were clients, resulting in a higher total value of durables owned at the beginning
of 2007. The estimated impact on durable purchase is substantial and average 2.75
million VND (' 175 US$). The estimated difference in durables holding amounts up
to 3.1 million (' 194 US$). As a matter of comparison, the average annual income in
the area amounts to 25 million VND (' 1562 US$), and the estimated differences in
durables holding represent about 12.4% of this income. VBSP loan amounts average
7.5 million VND, we find that on average, about 40% of this amount is spent on the
purchase of durable goods. If we do not observe impact on expenditure in the short
run, in the long run the impact might become positive as the accumulation of durables
will contribute to increase households’ risk bearing capacity and their ability to un-
dertake long term investments (Zeller and Sharma, 2000). Our estimations indicate
furthermore that this impact is likely to increase as the microcredit program targets
households having no access to VBARD loans12.
Finally, we find no impact on livestock holdings. This is surprising at first, as a
large share of VBSP loans are officially spent on financing investment in livestock (i.e.
referring to declared loan uses of borrowers). Semi-structured interviews, conducted
by Kim Anh (2010) and one author of this paper, reveal that livestock investment is
indeed the best and most frequent purpose declared when applying for a VBSP loan.
After receiving the loans however, many farmers use the money to finance durables or
housing expenses. A respondent cited by Kim Anh (2010) explains that some farmers
avoid sanctions from the bank by borrowing one of their neighbor’s buffalo the day
12We check for the robustness of estimated impact using the Rosenbaum bounds methodology
described in Rosenbaum (2002) and DiPrete and Gangl (2004). Results are not presented here but
are available upon request. They indicate that the estimated impact on durable purchase in 2005-2006
is sensitive to the presence of unobservable factors explaining in the selection into treatment, thus the
estimated impact is likely to vanish as the weight of unobservable variables increases in the selection
process. However the estimated impact on asset holding in 2007 is relatively robust to the presence
of unobservable characteristics. The estimated impact stays significant for values of gamma ranging
from 1 to 1.6
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the bank staff comes to check investment. Estimates presented here confirm that such
practice is more than anecdotal. The low level of risk associated with VBSP loans on
the one hand, and the fact that many wealthy and credit unconstrained households
benefit from these loans on the other hand, explains this low impact.
5.6 Discussion and policy recommendations
Three striking results emerged from the analyses. First, the ability of formal lenders
to respond to local demand is limited, and consequently, the informal sector remains
the first lending sector. Overall however, results show that demand for credit in
the area is very high, and the market is rather fluid, since most farmers, even the
poor, are able to access credit from various sources to finance consumption and the
purchase of agricultural inputs. Despite advantageous contracts, the formal sector
remains a secondary credit source. Our results suggest that if high transaction costs
and the important risks associated with VBARD loans can shift preferences of some
farmers towards other lenders, such explanations do not hold true in the case of
the VBSP, the state-owned microcredit bank. VBSP operates inside villages and
offers cheaper and safer loans than any other lender. The choice to borrow from
the informal sector instead of VBSP is rather induced by the limited credit supply,
and thus by a rationing of clients. The shortcomings of the microcredit program lie
not only in the limited supply but also in some of its settings. One major drawback
is that the program does not present itself as a reliable banking partner. Given the
politicized and complex lending procedure of the bank involving decision-makers at the
commune and village levels, as well as mass organizations, it is almost impossible for
a household to predict the possibility of accessing a VBSP loan. Villages may receive
a great deal of credit in one year, and too little or no credit at all in other years.
Rather than a banking partner, the bank simply acts as a government institution
implementing credit distribution policies which are riddled with administrative and
political uncertainties. This micro-credit program therefore does not respond to the
high need for regular credits to finance consumption and agricultural input. Long
repayment period prevents clients from contracting any other formal loans for three
years. Yet, the amounts lent by VBSP are too low to cover households’ total credit
demand. Under such conditions, VBSP program is unlikely to substitute informal
loans, but may in fact increase farmers’ reliance on informal lenders in the years
following the contract.
Beyond preference and credit rationing, we find evidence that the persistence of
the informal sector is explained by an imperfect substitutability between formal and
informal credit. Thanks to good level of trust, and good information access, the
informal sector is able to provide flexible loan contract terms with variable maturation
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at moderate interest rates, and most transactions are in-kind. Comparatively, the
‘one size fits all’ approach of the VBSP, combined with its lack of predictability is not
competitive. Informal transactions in addition entertain social relationships within
communities and other social networks. We also find that many farmers seek to
diversify their loan portfolio, presumably as a way to reduce both default risks and
their dependence on a single sector.
Second, our results show that Vietnam’s intervention through a ‘commercial’ bank
and a ‘policy’ bank for the poor does not induce a more equitable allocation of credit
than the existing informal sector. Initially designed for the poor, VBSP loans rarely
reach their targets. The community-based targeting system, while offering some seri-
ous conceptual advantages, is not functioning well and seems particularly inadequate
in the context of a microcredit program. Allocation results in a distribution that is
worse for the poor than a random allocation would be, the system instead favors the
wealthier and those having access to other sources of formal credit. Decentralized
and community-based development has gained much interest among policy makers
and development practitioners in the last ten years, yet some authors have expressed
their doubts about the benefits to be expected from such an approach Conning and
Kevane (2002); Platteau and Abraham (2002). The case presented here provides a
good illustration of the inefficiencies and mistargeting that may arise in such pro-
grams. ‘Endogenous community imperfections’, as labeled by Platteau and Abraham
(2002) on the one hand, and incentives of credit agents (here village MO) being heav-
ily drawn on the repayment performance of clients on the other hand are two factors
hindering accurate targeting Platteau and Abraham (2002); Aubert et al. (2009). The
mistargeting constitutes an important leakage of state resources which urgently needs
to be addressed.
Finally, agricultural productivity is affected only indirectly by the government’s
rural finance policy. VBARD appears to serve the non-farm sector rather than fi-
nancing agricultural investments. The microcredit program also contributes little to
investment in the off-farm and the livestock sectors. The low level of risk associated
with these loans, and the fact that they are borrowed by well-off households, partly
explains this low impact. As a consequence, the program does not contribute to in-
creasing households’ per capita expenditure, at least not in the short term. This last
finding is in line with existing empirical evidence showing little or no impact of mi-
crofinance on welfare in the short term (cf. Banerjee et al. (2010)). Furthermore, by
setting the interest rate below inflation level, the credit program discourages saving
and encourages low return investments, such as the purchase of durables for consump-
tive purposes. While long term positive income effects can be expected, the extent
of these effects on poverty reduction will be limited as long as the richer households
capture these resources.
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Several policy adjustments need to be undertaken in order to address these inef-
ficiencies. We suggest some recommendations which could help with improving both
the efficiency and equity outcomes of Vietnam’s policy. First, restoring the financial
viability of the VBSP is important to ensuring its sustainability, and freeing the state
from unnecessary expenditure. One way to do this is for VBSP to expand its activ-
ities to collecting deposits and thereby to mobilize capital. Given the high demand
for liquidity in the area, such a service is expected to meet a high demand under
the condition that the product is attractive to farmers and that it is well advertised.
Contrary to general wisdom, the poor have a demand for saving products and do save
already through informal and sometimes insecure means (Zeller and Sharma, 2000;
Rutherford, 2000).
The other, more imminent way to achieve financial sustainability is for VBSP
to increase its lending rates. In addition to increasing revenues, such a measure
may raise borrowers’ incentives to invest in profitable activities, in the off-farm or
livestock sector, and increase targeting efficiency as incentives to exclude the poor at
the benefit of the wealthy and politically connected people are reduced. Our data
show that households’ demand for credit, even by the poor, is relatively inelastic.
Using the data published on the MIX market database (MIX, 2011) and calculations
proposed by (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2007, p.237) we estimate that
lifting the interest rate per annum up to 14.3% would enable the bank to become
financially sustainable13. Thanks to low lending costs permitted by the reliance on
village organization, the bank is able to recover its sustainability while proposing loans
at rates remaining significantly lower than those found in the informal sector and just
above the inflation rate level.
Second, more effort must be spent on targeting the poor. In addition to better
training of bank staff and village MOs, reducing the selection power of the latter is
necessary. The establishment of a monitoring mechanisms or incentive-based systems
ensuring that selected clients are those targeted could avoid important mistargetings.
Some mechanisms are in place already, documents stipulating household income level
and signed by the village head must be submitted to the bank for approval. However,
as observed in the fields, many borrowers under estimate their revenue on these doc-
uments14. The application of sanctions to punish such practices may help preventing
them. In addition, a better targeting would reduce the bank’s clientÕẫle and enable
the VBSP to increase loan size and frequency, and thereby improve the predictability
of obtaining a loan from the view point of borrowers.
Finally, in Vietnam as in many developing countries and given the specific de-
mand for short term credit, the scope for substituting informal sector through formal
13This figure assumes a default rate of 5%.
14In some cases we could verify directly, as the data set collected also contains income and poverty
classification data.
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contracts is limited. The informal sector thanks to good information access and high
levels of trust is able to offer more flexibility in in contracts and is likely to con-
tinue playing a major role in the area. Policies may seek to reinforce the efficiency
of this sector instead of weaken it. Policies strengthening the legal system so as to
enlarge enforcement capacities of informal lenders would contribute to secure financial
transactions in this sector, raise its efficiency and lower interest rates.
5.7 Conclusion
Vietnam, with the establishment of two state-owned banks and a highly subsidized
microcredit program is applying old recipes to the rural finance sector. Using a rich
dataset on the credit transactions and access from 300 farm households randomly
selected in the district, we have explored the rural credit market and its actors, in-
vestigated econometrically the determinants of demand and participation in the two
formal banks, as well as the interaction of this market sector with the other lenders
that are active in the area. Finally, we assessed the impact of the government’s micro-
credit program on household welfare. Analyses conducted have uncovered a number
of inefficiencies in terms of financial sustainability, poverty outreach and impact that
need to be addressed in order to save state resources which could be spent more ef-
fectively to reduce poverty. We formulated above some recommendations which could
partly solve these inefficiencies such as: expanding bank’s activities towards collecting
saving, identifying better targeting mechanisms for the state microfinance program
to concentrate on the poorest segment of the population, raising formal interest rates
in this program, strengthening the legal system so as to offer informal lenders better
enforcement capacities.
The present study does not show the long term impact of the micro-credit pro-
gram since its implementation. It is in fact likely that the program has helped many
households to improve their living standards and has contributed to reducing poverty
in the study area. This result, as shown, was achieved at a high cost. VBSP, the
state microcredit program, given the high level of subsidies received, resembles more
of a low-cost transfer program rather than a competitive micro-credit program. Such
a model heavily draws on Vietnamese rich web of political and social organizations
and is hardly replicable elsewhere. Its sustainability and persistence in the long run
fully depends on government’s will and capacity to maintain the program. One of the
initial objectives of the microfinance movement from the earliest stage of its develop-
ment, was to increase poor clients’ creditworthiness over time so as to link them with
existing formal credit markets. This objective is clearly not pursued by VBSP but yet
could enable the bank to target populations in need while empowering former clients.
Beyond the case study, findings in this paper carry out general lessons for finan-
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cial market development in developing countries. First, this case study shows that
accordingly with theory, under good information availability and a high level of trust,
the informal sector can efficiently provide credit to all households at relatively mod-
erate interest rates. Policies enhancing levels of social capital, information flows and
reinforcing legal institutions can contribute to reducing transaction costs and thereby
improving the efficiency and outreach of the informal sector, and enable it to cover a
market segment that cannot be reached by formal lenders. Second, our results high-
light the pitfalls of community-based targeting systems especially as applied to credit
projects, as well as the inefficiencies of ‘supply-driven’ credit program (as opposed to
demand-driven) which results almost inevitably in credit rationing and misallocation.
The study finally highlights that contract diversity and reliability of credit access
in particular are pivotal feature in rural credit programs to respond farmers’ credit
demand, and enhance investment capacity.
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5.8 Appendix
Table 5.9: Principal component factors of the wealth index, descriptive statistics
Factor
Variable Mean S.D. loadings
Cooking meal in separate kitchen+ 0.75 0.43 0.650
Cooking meals in one of the rooms+ 0.22 0.41 -0.632
No toilet+ 0.1 0.30 -0.706
Lighting source is Elecricity+ 0.82 0.39 0.735
Lighting source is Gas/Oil/Kerosene lamp+ 0.09 0.29 -0.715
Roof made of big tiles+ 0.29 0.46 -0.646
Roof made of tiles+ 0.62 0.49 0.678
Floor is made of earth+ 0.15 0.35 -0.584
Nb years household was classified as poor in 2002-2006 1.06 1.87 -0.753
Value of cupboard* 1 546 1 875 0.763
Value of living room set* 284 468 0.612
Value of electric fans* 73 92 0.716
Value of video player* 327 363 0.597
Value of color television* 1 286 1 210 0.723
Eigen value 6.503
% Variance explained 0.465
Overall KMO 0.869
+ indicate dummy variables (1=yes, 0=no)
* Value in 2006, means displayed in thousand dong, variables are logged in the factor estimation
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Table 5.10: Description of household and village level explanatory variables (alphabetical order)
Variable Description Mean S.D. Min Max
Active females Number of female actives 1.34 0.70 0 4
Active male Number of male actives 1.23 0.77 0 6
Age head Age of household head 43.72 12.42 17 88
Dependants Number of dependants 2.35 1.56 0 12
Distance to market Distance to closest market (in km) 6.19 7.19 0 27
Distance to shop Distance to closest shop (in km) 0.32 1.29 0 6
Distance village cen-
tre
Distance between household homestead and its village
centre (in km)
0.34 0.35 0.03 3.30
Distance Yen Chau
Distance to Yen Chau city (traveling minutes by motor-
bike)
43.37 36.64 5 160
Durables 2004
Value of durables owned by the household in 2004 (in
million VND per capita)
2.00 5.65 0 85.97
Education Average education level of adults 4.90 2.91 0 12
Elevation Elevation of homestead (meter above the sea level) 515.98 240.07 281 1088
Farm income
Percentage of household cash income derived from farm-
ing in 2002
85.75 25.30 0 100
Formal debt
Household had a debt running in the formal sector at the
beginning of 2007+
0.45 0.50 0 1
Income shock
Household has experienced an income shock in the five
years preceding the survey (complete crop failure, loss of
a working animal, loss of a working adult, payment of
dowry)+
0.74 0.44 0 1
Kinh language Percentage of adults speaking Kinh language 85.07 21.42 0 100
Land title Household holds a land title+ 0.87 0.34 0 1
Liquidity
Value of ’liquid’ assets owned by households in 2007
(durables and livestock) (Million VND)
12.13 9.81 0 66.46
Male head Household head is male+ 0.91 0.28 0 1
Paddy area 2004
Area of paddy managed in 2004 (in acre per
capita)
3.58 4.57 0 59.95
Paddy area 2007 Area of paddy managed in 2007 (in acre per capita) 3.77 4.69 0 59.95
Participation - P
Weighted mean of household member participation in po-
litical organizationsa
1.07 0.51 0 4
Participation - NFP
Weighted mean of household member participation in
non political and financial organizationsa
0.25 0.41 0 3.25
Poor classification
Household was classified as poor at least once in 2004-
2006+
0.26 0.44 0 1
Poorer village Household lives in a relatively poorer village 0.20 0.40 0 1
Richer village Household lives in a relatively richer village 0.30 0.46 0 1
Upland area 2004 Area of upland managed in 2004 (in acre per capita) 25.05 18.02 0 110.67
Upland area 2007 Area of upland managed in 2007 (in acre per capita) 29.61 19.63 0 123.33
Wage income
Percentage of household cash income derived from wage
in 2002
10.81 21.55 0 100
Zone I Commune belongs to Zone I, well-off economic zone 0.41 0.49 0 1
Zone III Commune belongs to Zone III, poor economic zone 0.10 0.31 0 1
+ indicates dummy variables (1=yes, 0=no)
In 2007, 1 Million VND ' 62.5US$
aPolitical organizations are those which directly depend on the state control: communist party and mass orga-
nizations (Farmer, Women, Youth, Veterans, Elderly and Fatherland front Unions). Non political and financial
organizatiosn regroup all other kind of associations, excluding credit groups. Weights account for the degree of
participation of each household member, with the highest weight assigned to group leaders, and a lower weight
assigned to non active members.
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Table 5.11: Estimation of the propensity score matching – Probit estimates
Participation in VBSP credit
program (2005-2006)
(1) (2)
Coef. z-stat Coef. z-stat
Education 0.085* (1.86) 0.064 (1.10)
Active males 0.514*** (3.30) 0.493** (2.39)
Active females -0.232 (1.35) -0.061 (0.27)
Paddy area -0.128* (1.81) -0.082 (0.94)
Paddy area squared 0.005 (1.53) 0.003 (0.71)
Upland area 0.024 (1.31) 0.048** (2.04)
Upland area squared 0.000 (0.94) -0.000* (1.77)
Durables 2004 0.011 (0.48) -0.005 (0.06)
Classified as poor -0.436 (1.52) -0.562* (1.68)
Farm income share -0.914 (1.18) -1.314 (1.17)
Wage income share -1.990** (2.07) -2.877** (2.12)
Distance village centre -0.636* (1.70) -0.402 (1.00)
Richer village 0.260 (1.08) 0.283 (0.84)
Poorer village 0.706* (1.91) 0.460 (1.04)
Zone I -0.055 (0.22) -0.113 (0.33)
Zone III -1.275** (2.35) -1.446** (2.50)
Constant -0.369 (0.45) -0.156 (0.14)
Observations 223 143
Pseudo-R2 0.196 0.248
χ2 51.3*** 43.8***
% correct predictions 0.76 0.74
* p>0.1, ** p>0.05, *** p>0.01
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Are ethnically diverse communities
“bad” communities? An emiprical
study on social capital formation in
Northern Vietnam
Camille Saint-Macary, Manfred Zeller
Abstract
Using data from rural communities in which ethnic heterogeneity was in-
duced within through involuntary resettlements policies in the 1960s, we estimate
the exogenous effect of ethnic heterogeneity on individual participation in local
organizations and households’ social network capital. The effect on participa-
tion depends on organizations’ political nature and the public nature of managed
goods. We find no direct impact on social network capital but an indirect effect
through interactions with identity and participation. Results do not confirm the-
oretical predictions of a negative relationship but show that ethnic heterogeneity
can encourage bridging connections, and, as such, foster innovation and economic
development.
6.1 Introduction
Over the past decade, rural communities have been recognized increasingly more by
scholars and practitioners as essential actors in economic development, and have been
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given greater influence over the design and implementation of development policies
and projects. The so-called decentralized and community-driven development projects
represent, according to Mansuri and Rao (2004), about US$7 billion of the World
Bank’s portfolio. In Vietnam as well, after decollectivization in 1988, communities
have been entitled to a central role in the implementation of anti-poverty policies,
infrastructure development projects, and other reforms such as land allocation. This
trend is based on the belief that communities, thanks to better information access
and higher enforcement capacities, have a comparative advantage, when it comes to
allocating resources and implementing projects equitably and efficiently, over remote
national decision-makers.
Despite this strong interest, concerns have been raised. Some argue that communi-
ties within and across countries are not uniform in their ability to implement projects
effectively; they point to the existence of community-level features that can greatly
influence the economic performance and the success of the decentralized approaches
(see for instance Platteau and Abraham (2002); Conning and Kevane (2002); Khwaja
(2009)). Social capital, broadly defined as the “norms and networks that enable peo-
ple to cooperate” has appeared as a powerful concept in explaining the economic
performance of communities, and their ability to implement such projects successfully
(Woolcock, 1998; Khwaja, 2009).
Since the emergence of the concept in economic literature, and the seminal work
of Coleman (1990) and Putnam (1993), the literature has grown exponentially study
the economic importance of social interactions. At the micro-economic level, evidence
shows that social capital, measured by participation of community members in local
organizations or social networks, has a positive impact on income levels (Narayan
and Pritchett, 1999; Haddad and Maluccio, 2003; Grootaert and Narayan, 2004), on
credit access (Okten and Osili, 2004), and on the adoption of new technologies (Isham,
2002)1. Khwaja (2009) finds the impact of community social features on the success
of infrastructure projects in Northern Pakistan to be significant, i.e. projects are more
likely to succeed in “good” communities; but also finds that these effects can be altered
by project design, and thus good projects can also succeed in “bad” communities.
Surprisingly, little research has focused on assessing the determinants of the for-
mation of social capital, i.e. what makes a community “good” or “bad” in terms of
participation in collective life, cooperation, or formation of social networks. Alesina
and La Ferrara (2000), Glaeser et al. (2002) and La Ferrara (2002) studied the deter-
minants of individual participation in local organizations in the U.S. and in Tanzania.
A larger set of the literature has examined the determinants of social network for-
mation in rural contexts (Udry and Conley, 2004; De Weerdt, 2004; Goldstein et al.,
2005; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007; Santos and Barrett, 2010; Chantarat and Barrett,
1See Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) for a more complete review.
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2011). Many of these studies have focused on the roles of identity, geography and
other socio-economic characteristics in network formation, but none – to the best of
our knowledge – have yet looked at community features as factors that either inhibit
or enhance the formation of social networks.
Ethnicity is often indicated as an important element of social capital formation.
Ethnic heterogeneity, in particular, is frequently seen as one factor that inhibits in-
teractions among individuals in a social group because of preference, communication
barriers, and social sanction effects (Glaeser, 2001; Bates and Yachovlev, 2002; Alesina
and La Ferrara, 2005; Putnam, 2007). The issue, however, has rarely been investi-
gated empirically in micro-economic studies. Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) study the
effect of heterogeneity on participation in U.S. communities and find it to be negative.
Looking at the effect of heterogeneity on collective action in Nepalese forest commu-
nities, Varughese and Ostrom (2001) find no apparent relation. La Ferrara (2002)
explores the determinants of participation in rural communities of Tanzania and finds
that tribal fragmentation does affect participation incentives, albeit in an ambiguous
way, depending on the type and entry rule of the social group considered. In many
areas, identification and interpretation of ethnic heterogeneity effects is particularly
difficult because communities were formed endogenously. Voluntary migration from
“bad” to “better” locations (with respect to market links, social conditions, or areas
of targeted policy intervention, such as food aid) causes heterogeneous communities
to often be better located, or to differ from other communities in further variables of
social cohesion.
The study takes place in a mountainous district of Northern Vietnam where we
know that ethnic heterogeneity was induced in the 1960s at the village level by invol-
untary, government organized migration. Vietnam is an ethnically diverse country:
54 ethnic groups are officially recognized by the government. The Kinh majority rep-
resents 82% of the population, and the remaining 18% is made up of the other 53
ethnic minority groups. These groups vary both in size and in their degree of inte-
gration with the Kinh majority. Ethnic minorities live mostly in mountainous areas,
in the Northern Uplands where this study takes place, and the Central Highlands re-
gions. On average they are poorer than the Kinh majority, due to greater remoteness,
lower endowments in natural- and other types of capital, as well as lower returns on
characteristics (van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001; Baulch et al., 2007; Epprecht
et al., 2011). The relationship between the state and the ethnic minority groups has
evolved dramatically over time and remains, to this day, complex (Michaud, 2009).
Resettlement of Kinh households in mountainous areas, and the settlement of swidden
cultivator tribes2, was required after independence in order to, among other objectives,
integrate ethnic minorities into the country’s political project.
2Swidden cultivator tribes are groups traditionally practising slash-and-burn cultivation with semi-
nomadic settlement patterns, such as the H’Mong.
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Our data was collected in 2007 in a mountainous district of the Northern Uplands
where (re)settlement policies have been implemented after independence from France
(1954). The area is now occupied both by ethnically homogeneous communities in
which migration has seldom taken place, and heterogeneous communities in which in-
voluntary migration organized by the government has altered village composition. We
show that the degree of ethnic heterogeneity within communities is strongly affected
by these (re)settlement policies, but systematically associated with better locations
and endowment, indicating a relatively exogenous process of population mixing. This
situation therefore makes for a unique opportunity to empirically study the role of
ethnic diversity.
This article seeks to contribute to the empirical literature about the economic
effects of ethnic heterogeneity, making use of this distinct setting to analyze ethnic
heterogeneity within villages exogenously, and therefore to test for its impact. We
explore the effect of heterogeneity on aspects of social capital which have shown to
greatly matter in economic development, namely participation in local organizations
and households’ social network capital. Furthermore, we also develop what we believe
is a novel measure of financial social network capital based on a measure of households’
borrowing capacity (credit limit) from their social networks relative to their income.
Results point to an ambiguous effect of ethnic heterogeneity. First its effect on
participation appears to depend on the type of organization considered, its political
affiliation, the entry rule or whether it manages public or club goods. Second, the
results show no direct effect of ethnic heterogeneity on households’ social network
capital, but an indirect effect through interactions with other variables.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we review the literature in Section
6.2 and present the settings and the data in Section 6.3. The econometric models are
presented in Section 6.4, results are presented and discussed in Section 6.5 and we
conclude in Section 6.6.
6.2 Ethnic heterogeneity and social capital, a review
6.2.1 Defining social capital
This section presents the concept of social capital and introduces the theoretical lit-
erature that is motivates the empirical work in the later sections.
The literature exploring the effect of social capital has grown exponentially since
the emergence of the concept in the late 1990s. Despite the success it has had in
scientific literature, defining and delimiting this concept 20 years after its emergence,
as something tangible and measurable, remains a challenging issue (Dasgupta, 2000;
Schuller et al., 2000; Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004; Hayami, 2009). Putnam (1995,
p.664) famously defined social capital as the “features of social life – networks, norms
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and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared
objectives”, a definition which has influenced much of the research in the last two
decades. Earlier works, by Bourdieu (1986) and Coleman (1990), presented individ-
uals as the owners and first beneficiaries of social capital. Bourdieu (1986, p.286)
defined social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are
linked to possession of a durable network”. Social capital thus encompasses structural
(networks, associations) and cognitive dimensions (norms, trust) and is both individ-
ual and communal in dimension. Without entering the discussion of whether it is
best seen as an individual asset or a community feature, we note that the study of
the determinants of social capital requires an individual perspective. The decisions to
join a network, to participate in collective organizations or to cooperate in the elabo-
ration of public goods are indeed made individually (Sobel, 2002; Glaeser et al., 2002;
Mogues and Carter, 2005). The ‘amount’ of social capital available at the individual
or community level however, has implications for both individuals and communities
due to the existence of important spillover effects, which are difficult to disentangle.
Theoretical works and empirical evidence suggest that the level of social capital in
a community is at least partly endogenously determined, and that individuals decide
whether to join a group and cooperate, based on economic, social or institutional
conditions (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). Glaeser et al. (2002)) and Mogues and
Carter (2005) have developed economic models of investment in social capital, in
which individuals decide to invest based on their objective utility function. Alesina
and La Ferrara (2000),Glaeser et al. (2002) and La Ferrara (2002) have explored
empirically the determinants of participation in local organizations in Tanzanian and
U.S. communities based on similar hypotheses. Community features such as income
inequality, ethnic diversity and remoteness are all potentially important factors. The
literature on collective action also highlights the institutional framework, in addition
to exogenous community characteristics, such as the definition of property rights and
the existence of clear cooperation rules, as important determinants of collective action,
and thus of cooperation among individuals (Ostrom, 2000). Here, we focus on ethnic
heterogeneity as an influential factor of social capital formation.
Two sets of the literature provide theoretical grounds on which to study the effect
of ethnic heterogeneity on social capital in its broader definition. The first relates to
a growing segment of literature studying the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on public
good formation (social capital being considered as a public good), and the second
refers to the literature linking identity to social network formation.
6.2.2 Ethnic heterogeneity and public goods
The literature on ethnic heterogeneity and public good formation usually concludes
in a negative relationship (Alesina et al., 1999; Costa and Kahn, 2003; Miguel and
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Gugerty, 2005; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Habyarimana et al., 2007). The expla-
nations provided, however, have diverged. Some have referred to the lack of social
sanction mechanisms available in ethnically and culturally diverse societies. The exis-
tence of sanction mechanisms is expected to enhance cooperation among individuals by
enhancing one’s anticipation of others’ behaviours, and securing cooperative choices.
This mechanism is invoked by Miguel and Gugerty (2005) to explain the lower level
of public spending on schools in rural Kenya in ethnically diverse communities.
Others have referred to preference-based mechanisms which can be divided into
two subsets (Alesina et al., 1999; Habyarimana et al., 2007). First, people of different
cultural and ethnic backgrounds are expected to have different preferences, and the
weak ‘commonality of tastes’ – and thus of interests in public goods – in ethnically
diverse communities impedes agreements on the elaboration of public goods. Second,
individuals may have preferences not only on the nature of public goods, but also bout
interacting with people of different cultural backgrounds. The latter was proposed by
Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) to interpret their results of the negative impact of
heterogeneity on participation in local associations in U.S. communities.
Finally a third mechanism, that Habyarimana et al. (2007) refer to as a ‘technical
mechanism’ relates to cultural material that homogeneous communities can rely on
when designing public goods and that enables them to cooperate more effectively.
This material includes language, the ability to understand anticipate each other’s be-
haviour, and the existence of rules facilitating cooperation. Other studies suggest,
however, that the relationship may not always operate in the above-mentioned direc-
tion, i.e. that more homogeneity is conducive to more effective cooperation. Alesina
and La Ferrara (2005) refer for instance to a set of the literature showing that heteroge-
neous groups, by bringing together people with different skills and backgrounds, may
be better equipped to solve problems in an innovative manner. This third mechanism,
however, refers to the ‘impact’ of social capital (i.e. to the outcome of cooperation)
rather than to its determinants, although community members may choose (not) to
participate in collective actions based on their anticipation of the high (low) returns
of their interactions with others.
Based on these theoretical considerations, ethnic heterogeneity is mostly expected
to lower levels of social capital, i.e. of cooperation among individuals. Empirical
evidence, as pointed out in the introduction, remains relatively scarce and seems to
vary from one cultural-geographic context to another.
6.2.3 Identity and social network formation
A second portion of the literature that sheds light on the role of ethnic heterogeneity
on social capital looks at the role of identity in the formation of social networks. The
economic importance of identity, in its broad definition, is explored by Akerlof and
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Kranton (2000)3. The literature on endogenous social network formation also high-
lights the importance of identity. Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) explore the formation
of risk sharing networks in the Philippines and find that geographic proximity, which
may be related to kinship, is the main factor of association, while economic factors
do not appear to be significant. Goldstein et al. (2005) study factors of inclusion
in mutual insurance networks in Ghana by looking at the probability of which one
obtains help within and outside his household when a shock occurs. They find that
membership in the village’s main lineage, and participation in secular organizations
are the two main factors that increase the probability of receiving help outside of
the household. Santos and Barrett (2010) investigate the formation of information
networks in Ghana to assess the relative importance of identity and material interest
(measured by differentials in productivity). They conclude that both identity and
interest matter in information networks. The role of identity in network formation
appears, therefore, to depend heavily on the type of goods exchanged through net-
works, whether information, credit or insurance. Ethnic heterogeneity, due to a higher
dispersion of identities and kinship within groups, is likely to hamper social networks
formation.
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) defined identity as “a person’s sense of self”, suggesting
that elements that form one’s identity vary between social environments and from one
person to another, and thus that identity is a relative and rather subjective concept.
Following this approach, identity is defined not only by a person’s type (whether
male or female, from a certain ethnic group or born in a particular place) but also
by the identity of the other group members, and her differences from others in the
same group. The subjective identity of an individual living in a community of her own
ethnicity differs from what her subjective identity would be if she lived in a community
of a different ethnic group, and differs again from what it would be if the community
were very mixed or international.
This subjective identity is likely to affect both her willingness and capacity to con-
nect with others. Chantarat and Barrett (2011) develop a theoretical model on social
network formation showing how individuals decide to connect with others based on the
cost of establishing a relationship. This cost is a function of the social distance, thus
the difference in identity between two individuals. One can consider in this framework
that heterogeneity affects these costs of establishing relationships. Two individuals
that have fairly different identities may feel distant in a homogeneous environment,
but this subjective distance may shrink in a more heterogeneous community.
To sum up this literature review, the causal effect of ethnic heterogeneity on so-
cial capital formation is likely to be important. In a collective view of social capital,
3Unlike these authors, our approach of identity does not encompass an economic dimension such
as income. Since the focus of this work is on ethnicity, we concentrate on exogenous and immutable
aspects of identity, such as sex, ethnicity, family name, place of birth, etc.
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theoretical evidence points to a negative effect on both cooperation and on the level
of participation in collective action. Empirical evidence, however, has not always con-
firmed this relationship, and some research suggests that the institutional framework
matters more. With the more individual perspective of social capital, or social network
capital view, heterogeneity has an ambiguous impact. On the one hand, identity is
shown as an important element of social network formation – because individuals that
have close identities are more likely to connect – and thus the dispersion of identities
induced by ethnic heterogeneity is likely to impede social network formation. Ethnic
heterogeneity on the other hand, by affecting the definition of subjective identities,
as perceived by individuals themselves or by their neighbours, is likely to have an
indirect and ambiguous effect on social network formation.
6.3 The data
6.3.1 The settings
Vietnam is an ethnically diverse country. According to the official classification, the
Kinh majority (82% of the country’s population) shares the nation with 53 other
ethnic groups, so-called ethnic minorities. The empirical study takes place in the
Northern Uplands, one of the most ethnically diverse regions of Vietnam. The area
nowadays is home to 31 ethnic groups, and observed levels of diversity are high even
within communes, because of the complex settlement patterns of populations over
time in the region (Michaud et al., 2002). After independence from France in 1954,
the regime made it a priority to unify the people, and to integrate ethnic minorities
into the nation’s political project, as well as to foster development of upland areas
and ensure food security in the lowlands. The resettlement of lowland villages into
the uplands, and the settlement of swidden cultivator communities, was undertaken
in this perspective, and often accompanied by acculturation programs (Hardy, 2000;
Pelley, 2002; McElwee, 2004; Baulch et al., 2007; Michaud, 2009; Friederichsen and
Neef, 2010).
Our study area is Yen Chau, a rural district located along the national road N6,
which links Hanoi with the provinces of Son La and Dien Bien Phu. Three ethnic
groups inhabit the area: the Thai which account for 55% of the district’s population,
the H’mong (20%), and the Kinh (13%). Other ethnic groups (the Sinh Mun and
Kho Mu) are also present but represent only a small fraction of our sample (<1%).
The Thai were the first settlers and have occupied the lowlands mainly, while the
H’mong have settled primarily in the uplands (Neef et al., 2003). (Re)settlement of
villages in the study area began in the early 1960s, a few years after the country
gained independence from France. In some cases, entire villages were resettled by the
government, as is true for eight villages in our sample. Additionally, Kinh households
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were moved from the Red River Delta to Yen Chau and resettled into existing villages.
Host villages were selected based on land quality and availability. Newly settled
households received compensation in the form of land, housing assistance or monetary
support. Host villagers in most cases were not compensated. Seven out of our 20
sample villages were asked to host new comers between 1960 and 1982. The number
of households resettled varied between 10 and 100 households, which in some cases
doubled the initial village population.
Ethnic groups present in the area have different customs, social organizations,
languages, clothing and eating habits. The Thai, for instance, are traditionally orga-
nized into hierarchical social structures with matrilineal lineage (Mellac, 2006), while
in the H’mong case, social structure is more horizontal with patrilineal lineage system
(Corlin, 2004). Customs regarding, for example, the establishment of newly married
households, the inheritance of land, or land allocation among community members
differs between the three groups. Traditional practices however have been strongly
attenuated by several decades of integration policies, resettlement interventions and
land reform (McElwee, 2004; Friederichsen and Neef, 2010).
Villages, although not officially recognized as an administrative unit, are the places
where major decisions affecting households’ livelihood are made. The allocation of
untitled land, the granting of formal credit, the definition of households’ poverty status
entitling them to participate in specific assistance programs, and access to irrigation
are, among many others, important decisions that are made at the village level. The
literature further emphasizes the strength of social relations within villages, and the
political challenges that they constitute for the state. An old saying in Vietnam
stipulates that the “King’s law gives way to the village custom”(Phep vua thua lang in
Vietnamese). A recent example is provided by Kerkvliet (2005) the author shows how
villagers in the lowlands opposed the state administration during decollectivization
through ‘everyday politics’, and how these contestations and local adjustments led to
redefinitions of the national policy. In the uplands, the implementation of the 1993
land law in particular, aimed at individualizing land access, has resulted in tensions
and opposition from upland communities (Bryant, 1998; Sikor, 2004)4.
6.3.2 The survey
The data were collected in 2007 and 2008 in Yen Chau district. A representative sam-
ple of 300 households was selected following a two-stage cluster sampling procedure.
A village-level sampling frame was constructed encompassing all villages of the dis-
trict5, including information on the number of resident households. First, 20 villages
4Wirth et al. (2004); Sikor (2004); Mellac (2006) provide specific examples in Thai communities,
and Corlin (2004) discusses this issue in the H’mong context.
5The urban centre and four communes located along the border with Laos for which research
permits were difficult to obtain at the time of interview were excluded from the sampling frame.
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were randomly selected using the Probability Proportionate to Size (PPS) method.
Next, 15 households were randomly selected in each of the selected villages using up-
dated village-level household lists. Since the PPS method accounts for differences in
the number of resident households between villages in the first stage, this sampling
procedure results in a self-weighing sample.
The survey covered a wide range of topics and included a detailed module on so-
cial capital, as well as on households’ credit experience and access to different sources.
The social capital module gathered detailed information on individual participation
in organizations, on levels of trust, reliance on networks in case of shocks, etc. Ad-
ditionally, a census of all residents6 was conducted in each of the 20 sample villages,
by which we obtained information on the ethnicity and family names of all residents.
The settlement history of each village was retraced through focus group discussions
with the village elders and structured interviews with knowledgeable villagers.
6.3.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 6.1 presents some descriptive statistics of village and household characteris-
tics in homogeneous and heterogeneous villages. Ethnic and name fragmentation are
measured with a Herfindahl-Hirschman fragmentation index:
FRAGv = 1−
T∑
i=1
pi2iv (6.1)
piiv is the share of households belonging to a group i in village v; T is the total
number of groups in the village, defined by ethnicity or family names. The index
FRAGv can be interpreted as the probability that two individuals taken randomly in
the village belong to different ethnic groups, or carry different family names. Of the
20 sample villages, nine are completely homogeneous, and 11 are ethnically mixed.
The degree of heterogeneity within those mixed villages varies widely, and the ethnic
fragmentation ranges from 0.01 to 0.5 in these villages. The observed fragmentation
score for names varies from 0.27 to 0.82 in the most diverse villages.
6The literature suggests that clanship used to be important within the Thai and H’Mong ethnic
societies (Mellac, 2006; Corlin, 2004) but that through efforts of acculturation and integration, and
the successive land reforms the importance of clans nowadays is nowadays limited. Family names
are the closest indicators of clanship that we can use. However, we must note that two individuals
carrying the same family name do not necessarily belong to the same clan, but the probability that
they do is higher. We recorded 31 different family names for a total of 2,296 households within twenty
villages.
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Table 6.1: Village and household-level characteristics by village ethnic heterogeneity
T-test/ Spearman
Homogeneous Heterogeneous χ2 test correlatione
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. p-value p-value
A. Village characteristics (n=9) (n=11)
Ethnic fragmentation index 0 0 0.17 0.17 0.009 -
Name fragmentation index 0.53 0.15 0.69 0.11 0.013 0.011
Resettlement took place in that village+ 0.11 0.33 0.64 0.50 0.017 0.061
No. of resettled households 1.11 3.33 33.54 43.51 0.031 0.064
Elevation (m.a.s.l.) 501 246 527 250 0.820 0.890
Distance to
market (km) 3.7 4.9 8.7 8.9 0.147 0.265
city center (travelling minutes) 40.6 33.8 45.5 40.9 0.777 0.546
paved road (walking minutes) 18.3 19.0 13.6 20.6 0.607 0.369
Within-village coefficient of variation
per capita daily expenditure 1.86 0.73 2.12 0.76 0.445 0.271
titled upland 1400 1115 1501 897 0.826 0.529
titled paddy fields 461 1027 352 291 0.739 0.051
Population (inhabitants) 463 277 579 219 0.312 0.426
Share of households from ethnic
Kinh 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.31 0.097 0.002
Thai 0.77 0.44 0.72 0.37 0.772 0.084
H’Mong 0.22 0.43 0.08 0.27 0.405 0.906
B. Household characteristics (n=135) (n=165)
Per capita daily expenditure 14.5 6.5 16.3 6.5 0.017 0.013
Share of off-farm income in total cash income 0.03 0.14 0.04 0.14 0.584 0.557
Farm size (m2 per capita) 3185 2026 3667 2322 0.020 0.059
HH head born outside the province+ 0 0.00 0.14 0.35 0.000 0.000
HH head’s father born outside the district+ 0.07 0.09 0.19 0.39 0.000 0.000
Participation in local organizations
All 1.37 0.62 1.36 0.65 0.862 0.949
Mass organizationa 1.05 0.47 0.94 0.38 0.027 0.226
Communist party 0.03 0.11 0.05 0.14 0.311 0.975
Professional organizationb 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.17 0.107 0.795
Civic organizationc 0.13 0.21 0.19 0.30 0.046 0.278
Credit limit from friends and relatives per unit
of incomed
400 501 624 1053 0.024 0.087
aFarmer Union, Women Union, Youth Union, Eldery Union, Veteran Union and Fatherland front Union.
bExtension clubs and other professional associations.
cSchool committee, Health committee, Parent group, Civil security, Environmental group.
dIn Thousand VND. In 2007, 16.000 VND ' 1US$.
eSpearman correlation test between variable and ethnic fragementation index.
+ indicates dummy variables
6.3. The data 111
The strong correlation between the degree of heterogeneity and the occurrence
of resettlement in the village, as well as the number of households that have been
resettled indicates that these resettlements constitute the major source of observed
heterogeneity within villages. We find no association between heterogeneity and geo-
graphic factors such as elevation or distance to markets, to the city centre or to paved
roads. Nor do we find any significant association between heterogeneity and income or
land inequality (measured with coefficients of variation). Kinh households are present
only in heterogeneous villages, while the presence of Thai and H’Mong does not vary
between village types.
Looking now at the second part of the table displaying household characteris-
tics, we find significant associations between heterogeneity and the level of household
per capita expenditure, but no apparent association with households’ income diver-
sification. The size of individual farms is also larger and positively correlated with
heterogeneity. This corroborates interview findings indicating that households were
resettled in villages where land was available. When asked about other selection cri-
teria, none of the villages in which households were resettled could respond, and the
lack of correlation with other village characteristics shown above also confirms this
finding.
We find significant associations between heterogeneity and migration. A large
share of household heads was born outside the province and migrated to the village
at some point, as is also true for the older generations. Finally, participation in local
organizations does not differ on average between villages. We find, however, that
homogeneous villagers participate more in mass organizations while heterogeneous
villagers participate more in civic organizations.
Mass organizations (or unions) are associations created by the state at the time
of independence as a way to convey and apply at the local level the principles and
policies of the communist governance. They are present at each administrative level,
from the state to the village. At the local level, each of the six unions (cf. Footnote
in table 6.1) carries out different tasks and objectives. All play an important role in a
village’s everyday life as village union leaders sit on the village board and participate
in village level decision making. The women’s, farmer’s, veteran’s and youth unions
act as credit agents for the state microfinance bank (the Vietnam Bank for Social
Policies), and organize the allocation of Bank’s loans among villagers. The farmer
union in some villages is responsible for contract arrangements between villagers and
input and output traders and for organizing agricultural extension and therefore plays
an important role in farming decisions. Having one member taking part in these unions
is therefore important for accessing public resources and information. In some villages,
participation is even compulsory, and individuals are de facto considered members of
their corresponding union (i.e. Women’s union for women, Farmer’s union for farmers,
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etc.). This explains, together with the high interests these unions represent, the high
observed rates of participation in these organizations.
Civic associations also manage public resources encompassing school committees,
health committees, and security groups. However, entrance into these associations is
not compulsory, but results more of a free choice. We also notice the low participation
rates in the communist party in both village types. Whereas in urban and lowland
areas, participation in the communist party may provide some advantages, the role
of the party in rural areas is more limited, even though the village communist party
secretary also sits in the village board. Finally, we report, in the last line of Table 6.1,
the measure of household informal (from friends and relatives) credit limit per unit
of income, which we use later on as an indicator of households’ social network capital
(see Section 6.4.2). This measure of credit access draws on the credit limit approach
developed by Diagne et al. (2000). The credit limit is a measure of the maximum
amount a household could borrow at the time of survey from a certain lender given
its current debt to the lender. We focus here on households’ credit limits from their
friends and relatives. As explained by Diagne et al. (2000), it is reasonable to expect
farmers to have accurate expectations towards their borrowing capacity thanks to
their extensive experience in borrowing from different sources due to the seasonality
of income earnings. In the study area we find that a household on average contracts
six loans per year, of varying amounts and from different sources. About two thirds
of these loans are for small amounts (below 200 thousand VND ' 12.5 US$ in 2007),
and obtained from informal sources.
Table 6.2 reports descriptive statistics on households’ credit limits from different
sources by terciles of income (proxied by the level of per capital daily expenditure). We
find for both the formal and the informal sector that the richest 33% of respondents
have a credit limit three times greater than that of the poorest third of respondents.
This gap is further accentuated for credit from friends and relatives. On average, the
richest third can borrow four times more from their social network than the poorest
third, indicating the importance of reciprocity in social relationships related to finan-
cial issues. The amount one is able to borrow from others depends on how much one
is able to lend. We report statistics denoting the share of this credit limit that was
being borrowed at the time of the interview. Poor households use a larger share of
their credit limit than their richer counterparts, which confirms that this source is
particularly important for the poor. The last line in Table 6.1 show a positive associ-
ation between this measure of social network capital, and the degree of heterogeneity
in the village.
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Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics on household credit limit, per expenditure tercile
Poorest Middle Wealthiest
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Daily expenditure per capita 8.7 2.3 14.8* 1.7 23.0* 4.2
Credit limit
Formal sector 8,587 7,467 19 558* 23,344 29 053* 31,843
Semi-formal sector 1,895 3,430 2,068 2,933 5,388 20,376
Private lenders 8,511 8,775 11 937* 14,129 20 496* 37,175
Friends and relatives 3,231 4,754 9 510* 17,435 12 748* 17,972
% currently borrowed 20.3 30.3 17.9 29.1 10.2* 20.3
per unit of income 374 527 629* 1,116 566* 809
All figures are in thousand VND. In 2007, 16.000 VND 1 US$.
* Indicate a difference from the first tercile significant at the 5% level of error probability
6.4 Empirical strategy
6.4.1 The participation model
The model of participation we estimate follows closely those of Alesina and La Ferrara
(2000) and La Ferrara (2002). It considers that an individual decides to participate
in an organization if he derives a positive net utility. The net utility he gains from
participating in one type of organization is expected to depend on his own character-
istics, the characteristics and identity of the household to which he belongs, and his
village’s attributes:
Bk
∗
ijv = α
kX1ijv + β
kX2jv + γ
kIjv + δ
kDv + εijv (6.2)
where Bk
∗
ijv is the expected utility of an individual belonging to household j in
village i, when participating in association v; X1ijv is a vector of individual charac-
teristics ; X2jv is a vector of household characteristics ; Ijv denotes the identity of
the household ; Dv are village attributes ; αk, βk, γk and δk are parameters to be
estimated and εijv is the error term. Letting P kijv denote the observed participation
of the individual i in association k, we expect that the individual decides to take part
in the association k if his or her net utility is positive:
P kijv = 1 if B
k∗
ijv > 0
P kijv = 0 if B
k∗
ijv ≤ 0 (6.3)
Explanatory variables included in the participation model are described in the
Appendix, Table 6.5. Individual-level variables account for age, gender, education,
and occupation. We include a variable indicating whether the member speaks more
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than one language, as this helps to reduce social distance between two individuals of
different ethnic groups.
The included household-level variables account for the effect of households’ de-
mography, wealth level and identity. Demography is expected to ambiguously affect
an individual’s decision to participate, depending on the labour constraint faced by
the household and the nature of benefits gained through membership. Variables ac-
count for household size and the presence of dependants, which affect labour allocation
within the household and determine the time available for participation. One would
expect members of larger households to participate less in associations for which ben-
efits linked to membership are less than proportional to the number of members. On
the other hand, when the labour constraint is binding, the effect of household size
becomes positive.
We control for households’ wealth-level by using a composite index of 14 variables
expressing different dimensions of long-term wealth (see the principal component fac-
tors of the wealth index already presented in the appendix of chapter 5, Table 5.9).
We prefer this index of long-term wealth to a measure of per capita expenditure which
was measured at the same time as participation, and is more volatile, and probably
endogenous.
Finally, we include variables denoting the households’ identity. The variables take
into account three dimensions of identity: ethnicity, household name and the places of
birth of the household head and spouse. The first two dimensions are captured through
ethnic dummy variables and an index of inherited social distance (ISD) between the
household and its neighbours according to ethnicity and family name. We finally
include a dummy variable indicating whether the household spouse or head are native
to the village7.
The ISD variable captures the relative aspect of one’s identity (see Section 6.2.3),
i.e. the difference of the household from its neighbours along variables denoting im-
mutable identity features. A commonly used approach to calculate such an index is
the Euclidean distance. Here, as we measure the distance between a household and
all other villagers, we could write :
ISDjv =
√∑
k
(xkjv − x¯kv)2 (6.4)
where ISDjv is an index of inherited social distance of household j in village v;
k = [1, 2] refers to the type of characteristics, i.e. ethnicity and name; xkjv is the
observed characteristic k of household j in village v; and x¯kv is the average of x
k in
7We have seen earlier that among the three ethnic groups present in the area, two have patrilineal
traditions while the Thai follow matrilineal structures, and traditions regarding the establishment of
newly married couples also differ between these groups. We thus account for the place of birth of
both the spouse and the head.
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village v. Because ethnicity and lineage are discrete variables, we convert them into
dummy variables and rewrite the inherited social distance index as such:
ISDjv =
√∑
k
(1− x¯′kjv)2 (6.5)
where x¯′kjv is now the share of villagers sharing the same characteristics k as the house-
hold j. ISDjv thus increases with the number of villagers being dissimilar to household
j. Finally, we include village-level control variables that capture geographic charac-
teristics and village composition, among which is the index of ethnic heterogeneity
described in Section 6.3.3.
We run separate individual-level regressions to estimate the determinants of par-
ticipation in each organization type as a function of the individual, household and
village characteristics described above and using probit estimates, with sandwich esti-
mators of the standard error. We test for the endogeneity of the ethnic fragmentation
variable using an instrumental variable approach. The instrument used is a dummy
variable indicating whether resettlement policy took place in the village after the
independence. Results are displayed in Table 6.3 and discussed in Section 6.5.1.
6.4.2 The social network capital model
We now turn to the second model that we build to estimate determinants of house-
holds’ social network capital. We focus here only on the financial dimension of social
network capital, through a measure based on households’ access to credit from their
friends and relatives (see section 6.3.3). It takes into account one aspect of individual
social networks that matters greatly in rural development. Social networks represent
an important source of credit, particularly in areas where the credit market is missing
or fails to provide loan to all households at market price. Extended family and intra-
community networks, thanks to better information access and to better monitoring
and enforcement capacities, are able lend to their networks at low interest rate, mak-
ing this source particularly attractive, especially for poor households. Because of the
covariant nature of credit demand and shocks in rural areas, this source of credit can-
not fully respond to households’ demand for capital, but strongly enhances farmers’
risk bearing and consumption smoothing capacities (Zeller and Sharma, 2000).
The dependent variable Yjv is the household’s credit limit from friends and relatives
per unit of income described in section 6.3.3. It measures how much one is able
to borrow from his friends and relatives per unit of income. We argue that this
variable is a good measure of household social network capital. First, it relates directly
to Bourdieu’s definition of social capital (see Section 6.2.1. Second, it is strongly
correlated with three important dimensions of a social network: its size; the intensity
of the ties linking the household with network’s members, in particular their level of
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trust of the household8; and finally the wealth level of members in this network, and
their lending capacity.
Based on the literature on social network formation (Granovetter, 1973; Dasgupta,
2003; De Weerdt, 2004; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007; Santos and Barrett, 2010; Chan-
tarat and Barrett, 2011), we develop an econometric model to estimate the determi-
nants of households’ financial social network capital. The model can be seen as a
model of investment in social network, where a household’s stock is a function of in-
nate and immutable characteristics such as identity, and of social decisions. We use a
log-linear specification to estimate parameters of the following equation9.:
lnYjv = α+ βXjv + γEjv + δPjv + ηIjv + λDv + ujv (6.6)
where Xjv are household demographic variables, Ejv indicate a household’s level of
human capital, Pjv indicate the participation of household members in associations,
Ijv denotes the identity of the household; Dv are village attributes.
Table 6.5 in the Appendix, section 6.7 describes and summarizes variables included
as explanatory variables in the model. In addition to variables controlling the age
and education level of adults, and the gender of all members, we include a variable
measuring farmers’ wealth level, using the same asset-based index as in the previous
model which may be perceived by others as a measure of households’ creditworthiness.
As in the previous model, we account for three dimensions of identity: ethnicity,
inherited social distance and birth place of the head and the spouse. The variable for
participation takes into account participation in all types of organizations.
We estimate household-level OLS regression on households’ social network capital,
using village-level controls (described in Table 6.1) in a first stage and village dummy
variables in a second stage. As in the previous model, we test for endogeneity of the
ethnic fragmentation variable using the resettlement policy as the instrument. We
test for hypotheses discussed in section 6.2.3, relative to the effect of ethnic hetero-
geneity on subjective identity and social decisions by interacting ethnic heterogeneity
variable with identity and participation variables Results are presented in Table 6.4
and discussed in Section 6.5.2.
8Most loans from friends and relatives were borrowed in 2007 at 0 interest rate (70%), and on
average, interest rate was significantly lower all other lenders, for equivalent amounts and maturation.
9A non-negligible share of households (6%) declared having no access to credit from their friends
and relatives, and a log-transformation of the dependent variable leads to the eviction of these obser-
vations. We replace the dependent variable as ‘0’ for these observations. Our results are robust to
different treatments of these values, and the log-linear model performs better than the linear one.
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6.5 Results
6.5.1 The determinants of participation
Probit estimates of the participation model are reported in Table 6.3. The first column
presents the model that predicts participation in any association, and the following
columns present estimates of models predicting participation in different types of
organizations, namely mass organizations, the communist party, professional, and
civic organizations.
We test for the endogeneity of ethnic fragmentation using an instrumental variable
approach. The instrumental equation is presented in Table 6.6 of the Appendix, and
shows that the occurrence of involuntary resettlements in the village, the instrument,
strongly influences the village ethnic composition and the observed degree of hetero-
geneity. The results of Wald-tests of exogeneity are presented at the end of Table 6.3,
for each equation. The tests lead us to reject endogeneity in the first three models
(any organization, mass organization and communist party), but not in the last two
models that predict participation in professional and civic organizations. We report
in the first three columns results from the simple probit estimates, while in the last
two columns, the IV probit estimates are reported (i.e. after instrumentation)10.
Individual characteristics such as age and gender significantly explain participa-
tion. The probability of participation increases with an individual’s age, but starts
to decrease once the person reaches 64.5 years. Women are significantly more likely
to take part in any organization. Individuals with a higher level of education are also
more likely to participate, as are those whose main occupation is farming.
Households with many members and those with a high dependency ratio are less
likely to participate, indicating that labour allocation within the household does plays
a role. These results however, do not point to a binding labour constraint but shows
that the benefits from participation are generated at the household level rather than at
the individual level, and thus the marginal net utility from having one more member
participating in the organization is negative. The availability of dependants, like
elderly members in the household, may give adult members more time to invest in
these organizations. In this general model, we do not find that households’ wealth level
is an explaining factor, which rejects the hypothesis of a budget constraint. Household
members whose head or spouse are native to the village have a higher probability of
participating, and members of H’Mong households, everything else being equal, are
less likely to take part in any organizations. Other identity indexes are found to be
insignificant.
Finally, ethnic fragmentation is found to have no direct impact on participation.
10Due to space constraint we do not present estimation results before instrumentation for these
two models. Those are available upon request to the authors.
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Household members living in more remote locations (higher elevation or further from
a paved road) are more likely to participate. This may indicate that access to services
(extension or credit) in the more remote villages is likely to be facilitated through
participation in organizations. It may also indicate higher social pressure for villages
to participate. Estimates of the first model, as can be seen from the following column
are heavily influenced by mass organizations which constitute an important share
of households’ total participation. Entrance into these organizations is not always
a free choice, and indeed determinants of participation in other organizations differ
significantly.
In the communist party model, we find that education and the ability to speak at
least two languages are significant and positively influencing factors. Household demo-
graphic variables do not appear as significant factors, but the wealth level, as measured
by the asset-based index, does influence participation positively. The H’Mong, all else
being equal, participate more than other ethnic groups. This ethnic group is culturally
and politically more marginalized than other ethnic groups in the area, and Vietnam
in general (Corlin, 2004). Taking part in the communist party might provide a cru-
cial opportunity for H’Mong people to gain political power. The larger and the more
remote the village is, the more likely an individual is to take part in the party.
Members of professional organizations are younger than those of the mass organi-
zations. The probability of participation increases with age, but decreases beyond the
age of 49. Non-farmers and members other than heads or spouses are more likely to
participate. Participation increases with the dependency ratio and household’s wealth
level. The probability of participation increases as the distance between the village
and the paved road increases, and we find a negative and significant effect of ethnic
heterogeneity.
Civic organizations, as explained in section 6.3.3, manage public resources, such
as schools and health committees, and environmental or security groups. Unlike mass
organizations however, these associations are not state-created, but defined within
communities. Induction into the groups is voluntary, but because important public
resources are managed by these organizations, membership is expected to be influenced
at the village level. The probability of participation increases with age, but decreases
after the age of 37. Males and educated individuals, as well as household heads and
spouses, are more likely to take part in these organizations. We find, as for mass
organizations, that participation decreases with household size, but increases with the
household dependency ratio. The asset-based wealth index, which might be related to
social status, is found to have a positive impact on participation decision. If ethnicity
or the birth place of household heads and spouses are not found to have a significant
effects, we find that the index of inherited social distance (ISD), which captures the
difference of identity between the household and its neighbours, negatively affects
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participation. All else held equal, the less similar the household is to its neighbours,
the less likely the household members are to enter such organizations. Finally, we
find that ethnic heterogeneity positively influences participation, while other village
attributes are found to have no impact.
We thus find ethnic heterogeneity to have an ambiguous effect on participation
incentives, an effect that depends on the type of organization considered, the entry
rule, and on the types of goods that are managed by the organization. Participation in
the communist, party, which may be viewed as compliance with the political regime,
is negatively influenced. Participation in professional organizations is also negatively
affected, while participation in civic organizations is positively influenced. Inherited
social distance however, is found to have a negative impact on participation in this
last model. We thus do not find ethnic heterogeneity to negatively affect participa-
tion in the management of public resources, as is suggested, for instance, by Alesina
and La Ferrara (2005). The authors develop a model that shows how ethnic hetero-
geneity might favour the emergence of private goods, while homogeneity is expected
to enhance the formation of public goods. While estimates here do not provide in-
formation on the quantity and quality of public goods generated at the village level,
they do show that if the quality of public goods were negatively affected by ethnic
heterogeneity, as is suggested in other literature, this would not be a result of lower
preference mechanisms (and lower participation), but rather of cooperation failures
(among participants). The negative sign of inherited social distance shows however,
that the competition for managing these public resources might be important, and
those who inherited “better” social positions are more likely to participate in the con-
trolling of these goods. The negative indicator for professional organizations is more
puzzling, as these organizations manage what can be qualified as club goods. This
sign can be interpreted as a greater ability and willingness of individuals living in an
homogeneous environment to organize professionally, as a way to increase productiv-
ity. This may occur more in homogeneous environments, where individuals can make
use of a common cultural material (see Section 6.2.2) and cooperate effectively.
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Table 6.3: Probit and IVProbit estimates of the determinants of participation in local organizations
All organization Mass organization Communist party Professional Civic organization
organisation
(1) (2) (3) (4)b (5)b
Probit Probit Probit IVProbit IVProbit
dF/dx t-stat dF/dx t-stat dF/dx t-stat dF/dx t-stat dF/dx t-stat
Age 1.071 *** (2.79) 0.796 * (1.85) 0.705 *** (3.40) 1.432 *** (3.53) 1.302 ** (2.07)
Age squared -0.009 ** (2.19) -0.005 (1.14) -0.006 *** (2.84) -0.015 *** (3.33) -0.018 ** (2.27)
Male+ -5.391 ** (2.34) -7.465 *** (3.09) 0.903 (0.86) -1.722 (1.21) 5.453 *** (2.67)
Education 1.670 *** (4.02) 1.010 ** (2.27) 1.687 *** (4.94) 0.586 ** (2.27) 0.806 ** (2.16)
Speaks two languages+ 3.612 (0.94) 6.469 (1.58) 6.986 * (1.80) 1.105 (0.76) 3.809 (0.97)
Farmer+ 9.212 *** (2.99) 15.618 *** (5.07) -1.054 (0.97) -4.050 *** (3.61) 0.593 (0.21)
Head or spouse+ 4.301 (1.32) 6.149 * (1.81) -0.788 (0.48) -3.180 ** (2.22) 10.011 *** (2.67)
Household size -2.110 *** (3.02) -2.245 *** (3.24) 0.208 (0.90) -0.148 (0.45) -1.439 ** (2.11)
Dependency ratio 22.031 *** (3.34) 17.763 *** (2.60) 0.407 (0.14) 5.983 ** (2.39) 10.229 * (1.88)
Wealth index 1.127 (0.90) 0.094 (0.07) 2.104 *** (2.64) 1.646 *** (2.60) 2.416 * (1.94)
Inherited social distance -3.862 (0.62) 0.378 (0.06) -3.997 (1.59) 2.879 (1.02) -19.937 *** (3.34)
Native+ 6.346 * (1.80) 5.842 (1.55) 1.824 (0.84) -0.996 (0.68) 3.932 (0.97)
Ethnic Kinh+a -9.078 (1.35) -8.544 (1.21) 5.696 (1.40) 3.405 (1.32) 3.460 (0.56)
Ethnic H’Mong+a -26.550 *** (3.49) -33.008 *** (4.08) 14.473 *** (4.16) - 3.037 (0.44)
Elevation 0.035 *** (3.49) 0.040 *** (3.73) -0.005 (1.25) -0.002 (0.63) 0.009 (1.16)
Population -0.010 (1.57) -0.013 ** (1.98) 0.006 ** (2.33) 0.003 (1.00) 0.004 (0.83)
Distance to paved road 0.219 *** (2.71) 0.221 *** (2.62) 0.093 ** (2.30) -0.095 * (1.70) 0.019 (0.23)
Distance to market 0.068 (0.29) 0.086 (0.33) 0.287 ** (2.38) 0.036 (0.41) -0.302 (1.44)
Ethnic fragmentation 0.103 (1.04) 0.117 (1.10) -0.196 ** (2.32) -0.319 * (1.76) 0.481 ** (2.06)
N 986 986 986 986 986
χ2 132.2*** 148.1*** 114.5*** 147.1*** 136.0***
P-value Wald-test exogeneity 0.644 0.548 0.548 0.012 0.100
% participants correctly predicted (0.25 cutoff) 100 100 64.4 65.0 41.6
Marginal effects reported in percent – t statistics in parentheses based on standard errors clustered at the household level
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
+ indicates dummy variables, (yes=1, no=0)
aThe missing group is Thai. We do not include the ’other ethnic’ group dummy (0.1% of the sample) as this leads to the eviction of part of
the observations. In column 4, the dummy ethnic H’Mong is also removed as none of the H’Mong households in our sample takes part in such
organization and the inclusion of the variable leads to the eviction of a substantial share of the population.
bInstrumented variable is ethnic fragmentation, instrumental equation is shown in the appendix.
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6.5.2 The determinants of households’ social network capital
OLS estimates of the financial social network capital model described in Section 6.4.2
are reported in Table 6.4.
In the first column, we test the direct impact of ethnic heterogeneity on house-
holds’ network size using control variables to capture village heterogeneity. The small
difference observed between Columns 1 and 2 in coefficients and in the adjusted-R2
indicate that the control variables capture village heterogeneity well. We test, as in
the previous model, for endogeneity of the ethnic fragmentation variable using the
same instrument as above, i.e. the occurrence of involuntary resettlements of house-
holds in a village after independence. With a partial-R2 of 0.10, an F statistic of 31.4,
and a Wu-Hausman test yielding a p-value of 0.39 we confidently treat the variable of
ethnic fragmentation as exogenous.
We find that a household’s informal lending network size decreases with the age
of adult members, but is not affected by the gender of household members nor their
education level. Unsurprisingly, households’ farm size and wealth level positively
influence their borrowing capacity from their friends and relatives. Inherited social
distance and whether the household heads or spouses are native to the village are not
significant, but once village fixed effects are controlled for, we find that this latter
variable has a positive and significant effect. The participation of household members
also positively influence households’ borrowing capacity from their social networks
and this effect is even stronger once we control for village fixed effects. Comparatively
to Thai, Kinh households have a larger borrowing capacity from their networks, while
the H’Mong and other ethnic groups can borrow less. Once we control for village fixed
effects (Column 2), these effects become larger. Ethnic dummy variables in the village
fixed-effect model capture ethnicity effects in heterogeneous villages, because ethnicity
in homogeneous villages is captured by the village dummies. Therefore, these results
indicate that a H’Mong household living in a H’Mong village has higher borrowing
capacity than it would in a heterogeneous village.
Village-level variables, including ethnic heterogeneity are found to have no direct
effect on households’ level of social network capital.
In the third column, we test for interaction effects between ethnic heterogeneity, i.e.
the dispersion of identities within the village and identity and participation variables.
The idea here is to test whether village-level heterogeneity indirectly affects such
capital by influencing the effect of identity, and participation variables. While identity
variables capture households’ inherited level of social network capital, the participation
variable captures an investment that household member may undertake, consciously
or unconsciously, as a way to expand their personal network. Following the discussion
on subjective identity in Section 6.2.3, we expect that heterogeneity affects the way
individuals perceive their own identity and the identities of their neighbors, and thus
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their ability and willingness to connect with their neighbors. We present results in
Column 3 of Table 6.4. As pointed out by Brambor et al. (2006), results displayed in
regression tables provide limited information on the combined effect of two continuous
variables, as the effect of one is estimated at the mean value of the other. We report
in Figure 1, in addition to the table results, an estimation of the marginal effects of
the three interacted variables for different values of ethnic heterogeneity with their
respective 95% confidence interval (these are marginal effects on the log value of the
dependent variable).
Results show that being a village native in a homogeneous village has a positive
effect on households’ access to credit from their social network, but that this effect
decreases as ethnic heterogeneity in the village increases, and becomes quickly insignif-
icant. No statistically significant effect is found regarding inherited social distance.
Finally, the marginal effect of participation is also positively influenced by the degree
of heterogeneity in the village. The marginal effect becomes significantly different
from 0 for a value of ethnic fragmentation that is greater than 0.1.
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Table 6.4: OLS estimates of household social network capital.
DV:log of households’ credit limit from friends and relatives per unit of income
(1) (2) (3)
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
Household characteristics
Age adults -0.021** (1.98) -0.023** (2.22) -0.025** (2.37)
Share female 0.174 (0.36) -0.004 (0.01) -0.003 (0.01)
Education adults 0.046 (1.11) 0.032 (0.75) 0.024 (0.58)
Farm size 0.009* (1.70) 0.012** (2.13) 0.012** (2.23)
Wealth index 0.267* (1.73) 0.187 (1.15) 0.142 (0.85)
Inherited social distance (ISD) -0.015 (0.03) -0.073 (0.14) -0.442 (0.75)
Native+ 0.393 (1.38) 0.591* (1.86) 0.891** (2.59)
Participation 0.208* (1.78) 0.245** (2.11) 0.162 (1.10)
Ethnic Kinh+ 0.900** (2.05) 1.367* (1.79) 0.474 (0.49)
Ethnic H’Mong+ -0.982* (1.69) -1.965*** (2.67) -1.343 (1.46)
Other ethnic+ -1.454* (1.90) -1.473** (2.17) -1.507** (2.34)
Village characteristics
Elevation 0.001 (0.93)
Population -0.000 (0.47)
Distance to paved road -0.000 (0.04)
Distance to market -0.011 (0.61)
Ethnic fragmentation -0.721 (1.08)
Village dummies NO YES YES
Interaction terms
Ethnic fragmentation x ISD 5.540 (1.21)
Ethnic fragmentation x Native+ -3.617* (1.69)
Ethnic fragmentation x Participation 1.015 (1.56)
N 299 299 299
Adjusted-R2 0.174 0.195 0.206
F 5.15*** 3.40*** 3.34***
t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Now we consider identity variables as indexes of households’ innate social charac-
teristics, and participation as an index of households’ investment in social life. Results
indicate here that while the innate characteristics pay off in homogeneous settings in
terms of social network capital, they lose their value as the degree of heterogeneity
increases. Conversely, while investment efforts have no significant return in homoge-
neous communities, their returns appear to increase as ethnic heterogeneity increases.
In the literature on individual social capital, differentiates distinction is often made
between bonding and bridging social capital, the former referring to the strong links
tying similar individuals (kinship ties and close friendship), while the latter refers
to weaker ties linking more distant individuals (Gittell and Vidal, 1998; Woolcock,
1998; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). The combination of the two, rather than the
possession of one type, is seen as the most conducive to economic development (Gra-
novetter, 1973; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). The above-mentioned results show
that bonding ties are more important in homogeneous settings, since identity plays a
strong role there. A household’s social network is likely to be composed of households
sharing the same identity, if this social network is sufficiently rich, individuals may
not seek out additional relationships. This provides an explanation for the low re-
turn of participation on households’ social network capital observed in homogeneous
villages. As pointed out by Dasgupta et al. (2005), the marginal utility of creating
new relationships, and therefore the incentives to do so, decreases as the amount of
inherited relationships increases. In heterogeneous settings, on the other hand, where
individuals are de facto more distant, individuals need to invest in expanding their
networks, and participation in local organizations, as we saw, is a mean of doing so.
This raises questions regarding social mobility in homogeneous settings. If indeed
social networks are determined by inherited position, the capacity of those who were
born in low positions (or who migrated to the village) to move upward in the social and
economic space appears to be rather limited. Heterogeneity instead seems to induce
more flexibility in the way people connect with each other, and seems to favour the
emergence of bridging connections. Hayami (2009) notes that the bridging connections
help in adapting ‘obsolete social norms’ to current contexts. By ‘obsolete social norms’
he refers to norms and other institutions established overtime in traditional societies
aimed at ensuring a social order, which may become inefficient as the economic and
natural context evolves quickly (i.e. population growth and natural resource scarcity,
transition to a market economy, etc.). These norms need considerable time to adapt
to changing conditions, and the social interactions between individuals of different
identities and traditions are likely to speed up this process. Based on our finding,
we conclude that heterogeneous communities may be more likely to adapt rapidly to
changing economic and ecological contexts.
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Figure 6.1: Estimated marginal effects of variables Native, Inherited social distance
and Participation on social network capital, for different values of ethnic fragmenta-
tion.
Marginal effects on the DV: log value of credit limit per unit of income.
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6.6 Conclusion
The economic importance of ethnic diversity is gaining interest in the literature. In-
dicated as a factor that explains differences between levels of development observed
in different countries or regions (Easterly and Levine, 1997), a growing body of litera-
ture seeks to explore the existence of mechanisms in place at the microeconomic level.
Social capital, while difficult to capture in a single and tangible measure, appears as
a powerful concept to explain differences in the economic performance of groups or
societies. It is also often cited as one of the mechanisms through which ethnic het-
erogeneity undermines the economic performance. This article reviewed the literature
and explored this question empirically. The existing empirical evidence on this rela-
tionship is relatively scarce, and findings appear to vary strongly from one country to
another.
Recognizing the multi-faceted and complex nature of social capital, we use two
measures and study two of its facets, namely participation in local organizations
and households’ social network capital, concentrating, for the latter, on a measure
of households’ financial social network. We make use of a particular setting in a rural
district of Northern Vietnam in which ethnic heterogeneity within communities has
been externally induced through resettlement policies conducted by the government
in between 1960 an 1982. Using a detailed individual-, household- and village-level
dataset collected in 2007/2008 on individuals’ membership in organizations, house-
holds’ credit access, and village-level settlement history among many other issues, we
estimate econometrically the determinants of participation in local organizations as
well as the determinants of households’ social network capital.
Our results show that ethnic heterogeneity has an ambiguous impact on participa-
tion incentives, and that this effect strongly varies depending on the type of association
considered, namely its political nature, the type of entry requirements, or whether it
manages public or club goods. Using the past resettlement policy as an instrument,
we are able to test and control for endogeneity of ethnic heterogeneity. The results do
not confirm the negative relationship between ethnic diversity and participation in the
management of public goods that is predicted in the literature, but show in fact a pos-
itive impact. Results, furthermore, indicate that competition for the management of
these goods is important within villages, and that identity and ethnicity in particular
play a significant role in determining who among village members will take part. We
find however, a negative impact on participation incentives in the communist party,
and also on professional organizations which are aimed at creating club goods. These
results do not seem to confirm the prediction that participation in the elaboration of
public goods decreases with the degree of heterogeneity.
We then develop an econometric model of household investment in social network
capital, focusing on finance-related social networks. We hypothesize that households’
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level of such capital is both a function of innate characteristics, denoted by identity
and inherited social distance between the household and its neighbours, and invest-
ment decisions such as participation in local organizations. We find no direct impact
of ethnic heterogeneity on households’ network social capital even after controlling for
the endogeneity of this variable. However, a household’s wealth level and variables de-
noting its identity and the participation of its members in local organizations appear
to play a significant role. Furthermore, the test for the existence of interaction effects
between ethnic heterogeneity, identity, and participation variables shows that ethnic
heterogeneity has an indirect effect on households’ social network capital. We find
that households whose head or spouse are native to the village have a greater level
of capital in homogeneous villages, but that this effect is diminished as ethnic hetero-
geneity increases. On the other hand, the effect of participation in local organizations
is insignificant in the homogeneous setting, but becomes significant and increases in
magnitude as the degree of heterogeneity increases. These results indicate that social
mobility might be limited in homogeneous settings, where inherited economic sta-
tuses are likely to persist through generations. Conversely, in heterogeneous settings,
households seem more disposed to invest in establishing bridging connections, which
may help communities to adapt to rapidly changing conditions (population growth,
climate change, etc.).
We believe that our approach and results, regarding the impact of ethnic diver-
sity on participation and social networks capital, point to some understudied effects
that deserve further attention. Ethnic heterogeneity matters economically, but its
impact is ambiguous: sometimes positive and sometimes negative. We conclude that
ethnically heterogeneous communities are not necessarily “bad” communities. On the
contrary, results in this paper show that at the micro-level heterogeneity can also in-
duce dynamism in social relations, favoring the establishment of bridging connections,
which can help foster innovation, cross-cultural learning, social mobility and possibly
economic development. These results are encouraging for overall development.
As previous works have shown, the institutional setting plays an important role
in how individuals connect and cooperate with each other, and can compensate for
village composition effects. Vietnam, after 40 years of collectivization, and about
15 years of a slow transition process, has maintained an important control over ru-
ral institutions. Everyday life and local behaviors still remain strongly influenced
by communist precepts. For example, the government frequently delivers certificates
rewarding ‘good’ farmers, neighbors, and others. Collective life and cooperation, in
addition, are strongly anchored in Vietnamese culture. Although we cannot test the
institutional hypothesis here due to lack of variability between villages, the institu-
tional setting in place at the regional level may also play an important role. Finally,
this paper has not addressed in detail the negative consequences induced by involun-
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tary migrations and acculturation policies in Vietnam and its neighboring countries,
such as Laos (Evrard and Goudineau, 2004). The cultural trauma and negative con-
sequences on households’ livelihoods remain largely understudied, although they are
likely to be important. Therefore, the objective of this paper was by no means to
promote or defend such policy, but rather to make use of this particular context to
study the impact of ethnic heterogeneity.
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Table 6.5: Description and summary statistics of explanatory variables
Variable Description Var.a Mean S.D. Min Max
Age Age of HH member I 37.53 17.60 15 100
Male =1 if member is male I 0.48 0.50 0 1
Education Education level of member I 5.28 3.75 0 13
Farmer =1 if main occupation is farming I 0.77 0.42 0 1
Head/Spouse =1 if member is the HH head or
the spouse of the HH head
I 0.58 0.49 0 1
Age adults Mean age of adults members H 39.14 10.29 20.5 88
Share female Share of females in HH H 0.52 0.17 0 1
Education adults Average education of adults in
HH
H 4.93 2.91 0 12
Inherited social dis-
tance
Inherited social distance index H 0.67 0.26 0.2 1.4
Native =1 if HH head or spouse were
born in village
H 0.79 0.41 0 1
Participation Weighted mean of participation
of all members above 15 in H.
Weights account for degree of
participation (highest for leader,
lowest for non actives)
H 1.42 0.75 0 5
Farm size Area operated in 2006 with long
term use right, in acre per capita
H 27.80 19.37 0 132.9
Wealth index Wealth index (Principal Compo-
nent Factor)
H 0.00 1.00 -2.8 0.9
Elevation Elevation of homestead in meter
above the sea level (m.a.s.l.)
H 516.51 240.63 281 1088
HH size Family size (all members >
6month in the house)
H 4.64 1.99 1 15
Dependency ratio Dependency ratio H 0.33 0.23 0 1
Ethnic Thai =1 if H head is Thai H 0.75 0.43 0 1
Ethnic Kinh =1 if H head is Kinh H 0.09 0.29 0 1
Ethnic H’Mong =1 if H head is H’Mong H 0.15 0.35 0 1
Other ethnic =1 if H head is from another eth-
nic group
H 0.01 0.10 0 1
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Table 6.6: First stage instrumental equation of the participation model.
DV: Ethnic fragmentation index
Coef. t-stat
Age 0.035 (0.22)
Age square -0.001 (0.61)
Male+ 0.493 (0.80)
Education -0.303 (1.64)
Speaks two languages+ 0.619 (0.29)
Farmer+ -0.181 (0.16)
Head or spouse+ 0.509 (0.46)
Household size 0.685 (1.22)
Dependency ratio -1.582 (0.43)
Wealth index 0.295 (0.69)
Inherited social distance 14.181 *** (4.22)
Native+ -2.640 (0.74)
Ethnic Kinh+a 5.242 (0.93)
Ethnic H’Mong+a 4.242 (0.96)
Elevation -0.018 *** (3.35)
Population -0.004 (1.21)
Distance to paved road 0.149 *** (4.14)
Distance to market 0.659 *** (6.15)
Ethnic fragmentation -
Resettlement of households+ 10.648 *** (5.22)
N 986
Adjusted-R2 0.293
F 10.560***
t-stat are based on robust standard errors clustered at the household level
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Chapter 7
Discussion and conclusions
Vietnam’s mountainous region has undergone important transformations over the last
two decades. The transition of the country from a centrally-planned to a market-
oriented system has entailed in rural areas important institutional changes and a
redefinition of the role of the state, markets and communities in allocating resources
and organizing social and economic life.
While at the national level the reforms have permitted high economic growth rate
and a drastic reduction of poverty, mountainous areas and its inhabitants, ethnic mi-
norities, have lagged behind in the process. In addition, the rapid population growth,
combined with the intensification and expansion of agricultural production into fragile
ecosystems has considerably increased pressure on natural resources, and accentuated
the risk for the economy to get trapped in vicious circle whereby poverty and en-
vironmental degradation mutually reinforce each other. Drawing on a conceptual
framework (cf. introductory chapter, Section 1.2), that highlights the determinant
role of institutions, in particular of land institutions, financial markets, and social
capital in addressing the poverty-environment nexus, this thesis has investigated how
the current institutional framework addresses challenges faced by mountain people,
and contributes to reducing poverty and enhancing environmental sustainability in
the region.
In this perspective, this thesis first assessed the impact of Vietnam’s land titling
policy on tenure security, the adoption of soil conservation technologies and the func-
tioning of the land market. Second, it investigated the functioning of the credit market
and the role and impact of the rural credit policy in this market. Finally, this research
estimated the impact of ethnic heterogeneity on the formation of social capital, i.e.
on participation in local organization and on social network capital. The method of
inference for this research was mostly quantitative and based on the design econo-
metric models to test research hypotheses. Qualitative information was also used to
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formulate research questions, design the questionnaire, and triangulate quantitative
findings. These analyses were built on a primary database collected in Yen Chau
district in 2007/2008 and on qualitative information collected through focus group
discussions and semi-structured interviews with local stakeholders.
Extensive conclusions are provided at the end of each chapter (Sections 3.7, 4.5,
5.7 and 6.6). Section 7.1 summarizes the main findings, and highlights in particular
the success and failures of the current institutional framework to foster sustainable
development. We discuss the overall findings and their policy implications in Section
7.2, and discuss orientation for further research in Section 7.3.
7.1 Summary of major findings
Since 1993, Vietnam has engaged in a major land reform aimed at establishing a
quasi-private property regime on agricultural land. Despite the complicated and
lengthy process that the policy has engaged, the government has been able to dis-
tribute nearly all agricultural land and issue long term use right certificates (LURC)
to almost all farm households and within a short period, and to ensure an egalitarian
land distribution. The reform, in this respect, has been a success. In mountainous
areas, the implementation of the reform has been complicated by conflicts with eth-
nic minorities due to overlapping customary and formal institutions on the one hand,
and by the will of the local government to keep control over land use and to provide
land to newly established households on the other. These complications led the local
government in Yen Chau to readjust the policy, resume its intervention, and in some
cases to reallocate land that had already been distributed. Results show, in addition,
that there is a great uncertainty regarding the reallocation or prolonging of use rights
at the end of their term. This is a pressing issue: in many areas, this term will end
in 2013, while in Yen Chau, most use rights will be valid until 2019. Our data reveals
that the reallocation has fostered mistrust of land institutions by farmers, and the
large majority (82%) still expects further reallocation to take place before the end
of their use right terms. Estimates of the household-level and plot-level models of
adoption of agroforestry reveal a positive impact of the possession of land titles, but
indicate that reallocation threats as perceived by villagers have a substantial discour-
aging effect. Both the land title and the reallocation threat are found to interact, in
particular, the second effect appears to decrease the magnitude of first one. These
results indicate that: (1) perceived tenure security matters (2) the issuance of land
titles has not ensured tenure security and (3) farmers have anticipations and interpret
signals.
A land market has not fully emerged after the land reform in Yen Chau. The data
shows that land sale and lease transactions remain rare, and that most transactions
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occur through intra-familial free transfers. These transfers enable a more equitable
distribution than initially induced by the reform. These results contrast with national-
level findings which show that the reform permitted the emergence of an equitable and
efficient land market (Ravallion and van de Walle, 2008b; Deininger and Jin, 2008).
The current system enables almost all farmers in the area to access and cultivate land,
and thereby limits inequality in the short term. In the long run however, negative
consequences are likely to arise. As long as the market does not function well, the
newly established households which did not received land or titles in the first place can
acquire land only through intra-familial transfers or village funds. With continuing
population growth and degradation of land resources, these possibilities will vanish.
Many villages had already allocated all village funds in 2007, rendering further expan-
sions impossible. In addition, the absence of a land sale market prevents voluntary
migrations towards other areas offering better economic opportunities. Under the cur-
rent system and without significant technological progress, the agricultural production
sector is bound to lbe abandoned by the young generation, depriving it of a qualified
and dynamic workforce.
Empirical investigations on the functioning of rural credit markets, and the impact
of the rural credit policy were presented in Chapter 5. First, the credit market in Yen
Chau is found to function relatively well, as all farmers – including the poor – are
able to finance agricultural input and consumption through loans. This success is
attributed to the important degree of social interactions observed in Yen Chau. The
rich web of local associations allow information to circulate well, generating high levels
of trust and contributing to reduced transaction costs on the credit market. Informal
interest rates, as a consequence, are relatively low compared with those applied in
similar socio-economic contexts of other developing countries. Credit transactions
among friends and relatives are also very common. Both state-owned banks offer
competitive contracts, but remain a secondary credit source for most farmers and for
the poor in particular. The Tobit estimates of the determinants of non-formal interest
rates show that poor farmers pay higher interest rates in this sector.
Second, the state-owned commercial bank (VBARD) does not discriminate against
poor households, but has a limited outreach in the area. In addition to the constraints
imposed by the bank itself (e.g. the deposit of collateral), results indicate that some
farmers face risk and transaction cost constraints that prevent them from applying to
this program. The policy bank (VBSP) mandated to deliver micro-credit contracts to
poor farmers has a wider outreach. The community-based targeting system employed
enables the bank to save important costs, but does not function well in terms of tar-
geting. The poor are more frequently denied access than other farmers, although they
do not apply less. This mistargeting is attributed to ‘community imperfections’ and
to the fact that credit agents’ incentives are too pendent on the repayment perfor-
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mance of banks’ clients. The substitutability between the formal and informal sector
is further investigated through a model testing for the interaction of farmers’ partic-
ipation in the two sectors. Whether both sectors interact, and the way they do has
strong policy implications. Yet, in the literature, this has rarely been investigated
with micro-economic data in developing countries. Results confirm the weak substi-
tutability hypothesized in the literature, and indicate that both sectors compete to
some extent, but the potential for the formal sector to expand its market share is
limited.
Finally, the propensity score matching estimates of the impact of the government
micro-credit program does show significant welfare impacts. Overall, results of this
research permit the revealing of some inefficiencies in current policies in terms of fi-
nancial sustainability, outreach and impact. These failures cause an important leakage
of state resources and need to be addressed.
Finally, Chapter 6 investigated whether the high level of ethno-linguistic diversity
observed in the research area undermines the formation of social capital. As explained
in the conceptual framework of the introductory chapter (Section 1.2), the level of so-
cial capital in a society, defined as the norms and network that enable people to act
collectively, can increase its economic performance, by enhancing functioning of mar-
kets, enabling farmers and communities to overcome market failures, or by fostering
collective action, cooperation, and the creation of public goods. The determinants of
social capital formation have rarely been investigated at the micro-economic level. The
literature predicts that ethnic heterogeneity negatively affects levels of social capital,
due to preference, technical, and social sanction mechanisms (see Section 6.2). We
make use of a peculiarity in Yen Chau’s settlement history to test the exogenous im-
pact of village ethnic heterogeneity on individual participation in local organizations
and on households’ level of social network capital. In Yen Chau, heterogeneity at the
village level was induced within villages by the resettlement policies conducted by the
government in the 1960s and 1980s. Lowland Kinh villagers and H’Mong swiddening
cultivator tribes were moved to the district as part a broad policy aimed at integrating
ethnic minorities in the country’s political project. As a result, levels of ethnic hetero-
geneity observed are not systematically associated with better locations. This setting
enables us to test the endogeneity of village composition, and correct this source of
bias using the resettlement policy as an Instrumental Variable (IV) in the estimations.
Results indicate that the extent and direction of the effect on participation depend on
the type of organization considered, namely its political nature, the entry rule, and
the type of good that is managed, whether public or club good. Second, we do not find
evidence of a direct effect of heterogeneity on households’ level of social network capi-
tal measured by its borrowing capacity from friends and relatives, per unit of income.
However, we find heterogeneity to have an indirect impact through its interaction
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with variables capturing households’ identity and the participation of their members
in local organizations. While the place of birth appears as a significant determinant in
homogeneous settings, this effect vanishes as heterogeneity increases. On the contrary,
participation of household members has a positive effect on households’ level of social
network capital, an effect that becomes significant in heterogeneous communities and
increases along with the degree of heterogeneity. Overall, these results do not confirm
theoretical predictions of a negative relationship but show instead that heterogeneity
can induce dynamism in social relations by favoring the establishment of bridging
connections which in turn can foster innovation and cross-cultural learning, enhance
social mobility, and eventually encourage sustainable development.
7.2 Discussion of research findings and policy implications
This research has permitted the identification of successes and failures of the current
institutional framework in addressing the challenges faced in mountainous regions,
namely the need to alleviate poverty and enhance food security, to promote agricul-
tural growth while ensuring environmental sustainability, and by doing so, guarantee
the welfare of future generations. This section discusses successively the results rela-
tive to the combination of the state, market and communities in the uplands and its
implication for sustainable development, and those relative to the political economy
of mountainous areas in Vietnam. It also derives main policy recommendations.
The four research chapters of this thesis provide insights into how the state, mar-
kets and communities interplay in the uplands and affect rural economic lives. As
put by Hayami (2001, p.318), “How to combine community, market and state in the
economic system is probably the most important agenda in development economics”.
The combination of the three organizations determines the institutional framework
and the resulting incentive structure in the economy, and, by such, affects resource
allocation, farmers behavior towards resource use, and has a strong impact on the
sustainable development of the region. Research on land institutions shows that the
state seeks to maintain control over land use and allocation and was able through
strong enforcement to impose its law on communities and thereby weaken customary
practices. The land market, on the other hand, does not function well presumably
because of interferences with the state and the resulting uncertainties. The interplay
between the state and the market on the rural credit sector has been discussed in
detail in Chapter 5. In this sector, the intervention of the state prevents the estab-
lishment of independent formal lenders and thus the development of a competitive
formal sector which could improve the functioning of the market, by fostering institu-
tional innovations and improving credit access of poor households. Yet, as the results
show, the informal sector has well-developed and competes to some extent with both
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state-owned lenders. This demonstrates that conditions for the establishment of a
competitive market are good in the area.
The strong enforcement and action capacities of the state are certainly strength.
This has enabled the state to deeply transform the economy, increase its efficiency, and
reduce poverty throughout the country (cf. introductory chapter). In comparison, the
weakness of the state is perceived in many developing countries such as in Africa as a
major problem. Yet, these successes come at the cost of important inefficiencies. First,
inefficiencies, in terms of poverty, are linked to low poverty outreach of formal banks
and the weakness of the land market that disadvantage young generations. These
inefficiencies also affect the rural economy. The micro-credits are not used to finance
profitable activities, but permit instead well-off households to purchase durables. The
absence of a land market also creates efficiency losses, by preventing the transfer of
land from less productive to more productive farmers, and by causing young farmers
to migrate. Finally, these inefficiencies hamper environmental sustainability, due to
low incentives for conservation investments that the institutional framework creates.
State interventions such as the rural credit policy are very costly, and do not yield
intended impacts.
The state so far does not seem to attach much importance to the power of incentive-
based mechanisms that can arise from the development of competitive markets, but
shows its intention to keep control over land use and agricultural development in the
region. Beyond economic motives, the objective is to maintain political stability in
the area, limit discontent among ethnic minorities, and keep control over populations
that have already opposed the state in the past1.
The land use policy of the government translates well the low trust of the state
in incentive-based mechanisms. Likewise, its response to soil degradation and related
environment issues in Yen Chau has been to enforce the establishment of rubber plan-
tations in the area, against farmers’ will2. Yet, as shown in Chapter 3, the clarification
of the land law and a greater transparency in the state’s objectives could eliminate
suspicions regarding future reallocation and enhance the adoption of long-term conser-
vation technologies, at a lower cost. Experience elsewhere has shown that establishing
markets for environmental services is possible through the implementation of Payment
for Environmental Services (PES) mechanisms. These mechanisms create incentives
1Some ethnic groups, including H’Mong and some Thai subgroups joined the war against the
Vietminh, on the side of the French (1950-1954) or the Americans (1962-1975). As explained by
McElwee (2004) opposition of ethnic minorities to state policy have been frequent during past decades
and still take place. In May 2011, thousands ethnic H’Mong people marched in the street of Dien
Bien Phu (located next to Son La, further west) to claim a greater autonomy. The demonstration was
rapidly quashed by military intervention. The event was so rare that is was relayed by international
media, see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13284122 or http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/05/06/world/asia/06briefs-Vietnam.html – last accessed on October 25, 2011.
2Several village in Yen Chau have been targeted to establish these plantations. This measure has
met a strong opposition from the locals. In some cases, the police had to intervene and force farmers
to plant the seedlings.
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for land users (the suppliers of environmental services) to undertake conservation
costs which are covered by identified beneficiaries (‘buyers’ of environmental services)
(Engel et al., 2008).
Thus one recommendation of this thesis concludes to is for the state to reinforce
and/or develop institutions that support the functioning of incentive-based mecha-
nisms in the area. Results show that the socio-economic conditions enabling good
functioning of markets and related incentive structure are quite good in the area.
Greater transparency and credibility of the state is needed to achieve objectives of the
land reform. The opening of the rural finance sector to independent actors (such as
NGOs, or other independent MFI) would enhance the functioning of the market, par-
ticularly for the poor, and free the state from unnecessary expenditure. Reinforcing
the legal system in addition would enable the informal sector to function better. The
implementation of PES mechanisms, for instance in watersheds, between upland and
lowland farmers, could help to address environmental issues in the area3.
One main source of success of the current framework is to be found in the intri-
cate web of political and non political organizations that exist in mountainous regions
enabling a rich social life, and allowing the government to reach even the most re-
mote areas through policies. This web is due first to legacies from the collectivization
period during which rural life was organized by and around cooperatives. The Mass
Organizations which play an essential role in conveying state policy and in farmers’
everyday life are directly inherited from that period. The sense of collectivism is also
strongly anchored in the Vietnamese culture4. The historical and anthropological lit-
erature highlights that this sense of ‘collectivism’ existed before the collectivization
period, and has been ‘instrumented’ by the communist regime to impose the col-
lectivist system (Jamieson, 1993, pp.217,256-257; Bergeret, 2003, p.30-33; Kerkvliet,
2005, p.39)5.
The Mass Organization system enables the state to implement policies in remote
areas but also permits a vertical circulation of information from the state to the grass-
roots and vice-versa, enabling the government to test and adjust policies based on
feedback from the field. The book of Kerkvliet (2005) shows concretely how lowland
villages, through everyday politics have influenced national policy at the time of decol-
lectivization. Hence, this model also empowers rural citizens. Yet, mountain people
3A study by Schad et al. (2011) studies the institutional system at place when a flood occurs in
Yen Chau. It notably analyzes how this system affects farmers’ perception of the event and their
incentives to undertake preventive measure against floods (through soil conservation technologies for
instance). Results show that the current system may not provide the right incentives to farmers, as
responsibilities during flood management are not assigned relative to the role of actors in flooding,
but follow hierarchical administrative structures.
4See Marr (2000) and Them (2006) for discussions of the notion of ‘collectivism’ and ‘individual-
ism’ in Vietnamese culture.
5To these authors, this trait of the Vietnamese culture also explains why the regime has met little
opposition during its implementation and persisted so long in Vietnam’s rural areas.
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and ethnic minorities, due to their minority status, remain politically marginalized
and their voices are unlikely to weigh in the political debate. The literature highlights
the complex political relationships between the state and minority groups6.
The density of these social relationships also benefits the local economy, by reduc-
ing transaction costs through good levels of information circulation and the resulting
high levels of trust7. Although this relation is not tested empirically (because of the
lack of variability in the data), this partly explains in the view of the author and in
view of the literature highlighting the role of social capital on the functioning of finan-
cial markets (Zeller, 1998; Dufhues et al., 2011), the good performance of the informal
credit sector. As highlighted in Chapter 5, the difficulties experienced by formal in-
stitution in increasing their market share is explained by their own inefficiencies, but
is also due to the presence of a vibrant informal sector.
This thesis has also investigated factors that enhance the formation of social cap-
ital, by studying the determinants of two important of its facets, namely the partici-
pation of citizens in local organizations and the formation of financial social networks.
The empirical literature, as highlighted in Chapter 6 remains very scarce on this is-
sue, and it is one important contribution of this thesis to provide evidence on this
issue. Results show that the ability (or willingness) of people to interact socially and
form social networks does not result from innate and given factors such as ethnicity
and identity, but is also enhanced by the institutional and policy framework. Ethnic
heterogeneity in addition is found to induce dynamism in these social relations, which
contrasts with the ‘conservatism’ of homogeneous communities. The policy message
delivered by these findings is not to be found in the resettlement policies conducted
in Vietnam and elsewhere in South East Asia that have induced potentially large neg-
ative human and cultural consequences, but rather in the positive consequences that
social interactions among people of different cultures can generate for the economy.
Policies aimed at promoting social interactions, and by such favoring bridging con-
nections among people of diverse cultural and social backgrounds may yield positive
spillover effects in the economy.
One other recommendation is for Vietnam to support the emerging civil society
in the mountains, to help it to organize politically and raise its voice. This will
help the government to adapt policies to mountainous contexts, to better address
its challenges, and to enhance sustainable development in the region. These measures
may come as a complement to current policies, notably those aimed at providing safety
6See for instance McElwee (2004); Michaud (2000, 2009); Friederichsen and Neef (2010).
7As can be seen in the round 1 questionnaire in the Appendix (questions 6.4.3a to d, p.15)
respondents level of trust was measured and this data has been analyzed by the others. The data
shows very high level of trust, less than 3% of respondents answered negatively to these trust related
questions. These questions were adapted from the integrated questionnaire on social capital developed
by the World Bank (Grootaert et al., 2002)
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nets and reducing poverty in the areas. Horizontal inequalities8 between the Kinh and
other ethnic groups remains a pressing issue in Vietnam (Minot et al., 2003; van de
Walle and Gunewardena, 2001; Baulch et al., 2007). As two recent reports from the
World Bank have shown, Vietnam is making progress in this direction, by enhancing
the functioning of the state and integrating young and qualified individuals in the
direction of the party, and by supporting the emergence of an independent civil society
in the country (World Bank, 2009, 2004). These efforts will hopefully be pursued in
mountainous regions and among ethnic minorities. The creation of the Committee for
Ethnic Minorities (CEM, former Committee for Ethnic Minorities and Mountainous
Areas (CEMMA)) in 1993, a group aimed at representing the voice of ethnic minorities
among public authorities, and its empowerment in 2008, demonstrates good intention
in this direction, even though observers judge its action as inefficient (Baulch et al.,
2007)9.
7.3 Orientation for further research
This thesis has provided substantial insights into the vast topic of the political and
institutional economy of sustainable development of Vietnam’s uplands. It was beyond
the scope of this work to provide a comprehensive and exhaustive overview on this
broad question. Instead this thesis has investigated four of its aspects which appeared
during field work and which seemed, in view of the literature, particularly relevant.
Hence, many questions remain open for further research, and this thesis and its result
provide guidance for the orientation of future research. First, possible extension relate
to issues that could not be investigated because of methodological limitations. Second
the research has permitted the identification of topics of high relevance which have
not been much researched on in this thesis or in the literature in general.
One methodological constraint faced by the researcher comes from the confinement
of the data collection into one research district, and the use of cross sectional data (i.e.
measured for one single period of time) to estimate impacts. Both limitation in time
and in space have limited the possibility to capture some variability (which can be in
time or in space) in variables that would have been needed to estimate their impact10.
Likewise, further investigations on the impact of land titling policy or on the impact
of the credit policy could not be conducted, because of lack of variability in certain
variables of interest. Indeed for the credit case, since both formal banks operate in
8Horizontal inequality is defined by Stewart et al. (2005) as the inequalities between groups,
while vertical inequality refers to the inequality between people. Horizontal inequalities occurs when
ethnicity – or other identity traits – is strongly correlated with economic status.
9See also an article from the Indigenous Right Quarterly at http://www.aitpn.org/IRQ/Vol-III/
issue_4/story06.html.
10Yet, one methodological advantage is that the heterogeneity in environmental and other unob-
servable aspects is limited and is unlikely to affect impact estimates.
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all villages of the district, it was not possible to construct a veritable control group.
Thus, the expansion of existing data to a panel data set where the time variability of
variables of interest can be exploited would expand research possibilities to estimate
impacts11.
This thesis has not looked in detail at how the institutional frameworkaffects the
efficiency of land use in Yen Chau, and in particular the adoption of new agricultural
technologies. Yet, land tenure security, credit access and social networks are important
factors in this perspective (Feder et al., 1985). The agricultural extension institutions
in place (Farmer Union or government agricultural extension) strongly promote the
cultivation of maize as the most wealth-enhancing crop in the area. As shown by
Keil et al. (2008) however, detrimental effects on the environment are important.
Livestock farming in contrast appears as a potentially promising option to improve
livelihoods in the short and long term. Further research may thus seek to investigate
the institutional and economic constraints to the development of this sector.
Also, further investigation of the functioning of incentive-based mechanisms would
provide valuable guidance for designing future policies. In this vein, a deeper study of
the land market, for instance through the econometric analysis of the determinants of
farmers’ engagement in transaction would provide valuable insights on the reasons un-
derlying its malfunctioning and help to address this issue through policies. Similarly,
research investigating the interactions between land and credit institutions would pro-
vide useful information relevant for policies. Finally, another perhaps more imminent
research question would be to study potentials for the implementation of Payment for
Environmental Services in the management of watersheds in Vietnam’s mountainous
areas as a way to break the poverty-environment nexus in the area.
Finally, this thesis has not looked in detail at the mechanisms underlying the per-
sistence of horizontal inequality in the area, i.e. of inequality between ethnic groups.
Yet, these remain an important issue, even in a small area like Yen Chau district.
The H’Mong in particular remain significantly poorer than any of the other groups in
Yen Chau. Yet, we could not identify in the data particular signs of discrimination in
terms of land allocation, or in the implementation of anti-poverty programs12. In all
articles presented here, ethnic effects have been controlled for but were not studied
in detail13. A deeper investigation of the constraints faced by H’Mong households
11This is actually one objective pursued in the fourth phase of F2 subproject.
12On the credit market however, we find that H’Mong villages receive significantly less VBSP funds
than other villages. According to the data and information obtained during informal discussions with
H’Mong villagers and credit institutions, this has not always been the case. But the bad experience due
to the non repayment of loans in these villages has induced VBSP to limit its action in those villages.
One consequence is that H’Mong households heavily depend on unfair credit contracts delivered by
shopkeepers established next to their village. Some get trapped in bad debt circle. In one village
(Keo Bo C), many farmers had their land mortgaged to the shopkeeper because of unpaid debt and
had to work as workers on these lands.
13Indeed the objective was rather to understand the economic mechanisms that cause these in-
7.3. Orientation for further research 141
to integrate the economy would help with understanding mechanisms underlying the
persistence of poverty in this group, and assist in identifying policy options to break
this negative spiral.
equalities than to study the cultural and anthropological factors. A thorough analysis of the ethnic
effects would have required a quasi-anthropological approach for which the author is not qualified.
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3.10. What kind of lock does the main entrance have? 
(Gather this information through observation only) 
No lock...................................................................
Wood or metal bar to close from inside only.........
Key lock.................................................................
Security key lock/metal frame with padlock.........
1 
2 
3 
4 
3.11. How many rooms does the dwelling have ? 
( Include detached rooms in same compound if same household 
    Exclude bathrooms, toilets, kitchen and basement) 
 Number 
3.12. What is the size of these rooms in squared meter? Main living room 
 
Other room-1 
 
Other room-2 
 
Other room-3 
  
m² 
3.13. What type of roofing material is used in the house?  
Straw leaves…......................................
Wood, bamboo…..................................
Canvas, tar paper…..............................
Panels (wood)…...................................
Galvanised iron….................................
Tile…....................................................
Big Tile….............................................
Concrete……... …................................
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
3.14. What type of exterior walls does the house have? 
Leaves, branches…...............................
Bamboo….............................................
Wood…................................................
Galvanized iron….................................
Earth…..................................................
Brick, stone….......................................
Concrete…............................................
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
3.15.  What type of flooring does the main room have? 
Earth…..................................................
Bamboo….............................................
Wood…................................................
Concrete…............................................
Brick….................................................
Concrete with additional covering…....
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
3.16. What type of cooking fuel source is primarily used? 
Leaves/ grass/ rice husks/ stubble/ straw / 
thatch/ stems...............................................
Wood...............................................................
Coal/ charcoal..................................................
Kerosene..........................................................
Biogas..............................................................
Bottled gas.......................................................
Electricity........................................................
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Household id : ________ 8
3.17. What is the main source of lighting for your main living rooms?  
Cannot afford lighting at night..........................
Candles/ battery lamb/ Resin torches................
Gas, oil, kerosene lamp.....................................
Electricity (public, shared connection).............
Electricity (public, owned connection).............
Generator...........................................................
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
3.18. What is your primary source of drinking water?  
River, lake, spring, pond..................................
Rain water........................................................
Public well – open...........................................
Public well – sealed with pump.......................
Public tap.........................................................
Well in residence yard – open.........................
Well in residence yard – sealed with 
pump...........................................................
Outside tap.......................................................
Inside tap.........................................................
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
 
7 
8 
9 
3.19. What type of toilet facility do you have?  
Bush, field...........................................................
Shared kneel-down toilet....................................
Owned kneel-down toilet....................................
Shared sit-down toilets........................................
Owned sit-down toilets.......................................
Shared flush toilets..............................................
Owned flush toilets.............................................
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
3.20. Where do you usually cook your meals ?  
Outside................................................................
In one of the rooms in the house.........................
In a separate kitchen...........................................
1 
2 
3 
 
3.21.Do you have any of the following utilities for your household ?  
 
a.Piped water 
 
b.Electricity 
 
c.Telephone 
 
d.Mobile (cell phone) 
 
Yes, own connection.......... 
Yes, shared connection........
No........................................
1 
2 
3 
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4. Assets based indicators 
4.1. Assets owned 
 
Assets type and code 
4.1.1. 
Number 
owned 
4.1.2. 
Total resale value at the 
current market price 
 
‘000 dong 
Animals   
a. Buffalo   
b. Pig   
c. Goat   
d. Cattle   
e. Dog   
Farm assets   
f. Motor tiller   
 
 
4.2. Land use certificates: 
 
4.2.1  Does your household own a Red book at the moment? 
 Yes…............... 1 
 No…................ 2 >> 4.2.4. 
 
4.2.2. If yes, in which year did you get it for the first time?       Year 
 
4.2.3. How many plots are currently registered on your certificate? 
 a. Residential land 
  
b. Perenial crop land 
  
c. Agricultural land 
 
 
4.2.4. Does your household own a Red book for forestry land at the moment ? 
 Yes.................. 1   
 No…................ 2 >> 4.3 
 
4.2.5. If Yes, How many Red boks does the household own?  
² 
 
 
Forest. 
Red 
book 
ID 
4.2.6. 
In which year did 
you get it for the 
first time? 
4.2.7. 
Is it a shared or 
individual 
certificate? 
4.2.8. 
If shared, how 
many 
households own 
this certificate? 
4.2.9. 
Number of 
plots currently 
registered on 
this book 
4.2.10. 
Total area 
registered in 
the certificate 
 
 
M² YEAR 
1= Shared 
2= Individual NB OF HH 
1      
2      
3      
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4.3. Irrigation system on cultivated plots. 
 
 
 
Type of irrigation 
system 
Plot registered on Land Use Certificate Other plots cultivated by the household 
4.3.1. 
How many plots do 
you cultivate at the 
moment? 
4.3.2. 
How many plots do 
you lend or rent 
out? 
4.3.3. 
How many do 
you rent or 
borrow from 
someone else? 
4.3.4. 
How many do you 
rent or borrow 
from the 
commune/ 
village? 
4.3.5. 
How many other  
plots do you 
cultivate?* 
 
# plots 
Total area 
m² 
 
# plots
Total area
m² # plots
Total area
m² # plots 
Total area 
m² # plots
Total area
m² 
TOTAL           
a. Technical irrigation a/           
b. Semi-technical irrigation b/           
c. Simple irrigation system c/           
d. No irrigation system           
a/ With concrete channels being fed by a reservoir or big river, and gates to regulate the water flow. 
b/ Channels fed by a reservoir that ensure water for the whole year but with few or no gates to regulate the water flow. 
c/ Earth channels fed by rain water or small streams without a system to regulate the water flow. 
 
 
 
5. Food consumption 
 
5.1. a. Did any special event occur the last two days (for example, family event, guest invited, holiday festivity) 
Yes..............................
No............................... 
1* 
2 
 
*If the answer is ‘Yes’ the next question should refer to the last two days BEFORE the special event. 
b. How many meals were served to the household members during the last two 
days (or in the two days preceeding the special event)? 
 
# meals 
5.2. Where there any special events in the last seven days? (for example, family event, celebration, etc.) 
Yes............................. 
No............................... 
1* 
2 
 
*If the answer is“Yes”, the “last seven  days” the questions 5.3 - 5.5 should refer to the last seven days 
BEFORE the occurrence of the special event, 
5.3. During the last seven days, for how many meals were the following foods served in a main meal eaten by the 
household? 
a. Fresh fish 
 
b. Poultry 
 
c. Beef, buffalo 
 
d. Pork 
 
# meals served 
*explain: 
Household id : ________ 11
5.4. During the last seven days (or the last seven days before the special event), for how many 
days did a main meal consist of rice and vegetables only? (i.e. without any animal protein) 
# days 
5.5. During the last seven days (or the last seven days before the special event), for how 
many meals was rice replaced by cassava, or sweet potatoe? 
 
# days 
5.6. In the last 30 days, how many times did you buy rice? 
5.7. During the last 30 days, was there some days where your household did not have enough 
to eat? If yes, how many days?  
No = 0,  
Yes, write # of days 
                 
# days 
5.8. a. What is the amount of rice that you have currently in the house for your own 
consumption? 
 
b. For how many days will your stock of rice last?  
Kg of unhusked rice
 
  
# days 
 
Now I will ask question about the food eaten in your household in the past 12 months  
5.9. In the past 12 months did you and your household members feel that your food would run out before you had 
money to buy more/ or before the harvest?  
Yes.........................................
No..........................................
1 
2 
5.10. In the past 12 months how often did you have to borrow food from relatives or neighbours to make a meal?  
Never..................................................................
Rarely (1 to 6 times a year)................................
Sometimes (7 to 12 times)..................................
Often (a few times almost every month)............
Mostly (this happened a lot)...............................
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
5.11. a. Did you or another adult in your household skip meals during the past 12 months because you did not have 
enough money to buy food? 
Yes.........................................
No..........................................
1 
2 >> 6 
b. How often did that occur during the past 12 months?  
More than 180 days............................................
Less than 180 but more than 30 days................
Less than 30 days but more than 10 days..........
Less than 10 days last years...............................
1 
2 
3 
4 
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6.2. Membership in association, group or organization 
We want to ask now questions about the associations in which you or members of your household 
participate and has membership, including communist party, mass organisation or any other kind of 
organisation. 
 
(interviewer, ask the question for each member over 15,  to be sure to enter in the table below all the organisation 
the household participates in. If a member has membership in several organizations, then enter his ID several time 
in the first column and fill a line for each organization he participates in) 
 
6.2.1. 
ID of hh 
member (use 
ID from 
family roster) 
6.2.3. 
Type of 
organization 
 
 
 
(code 1) 
6.2.4. 
Degree of 
participation 
 
 
 
(code 2) 
6.2.5.  
During the past 12 months, did you 
make contributions to this 
organization... 
 
In cash.............................1 
In kind (e.g. labor, etc.)....2 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
Code 1 type of organization Code 2 degree of participation 
Mass organisation 
Farmer Union...............................
Women Union..............................
Youth Union................................
Veteran Union..............................
Fatherland Front..........................
Eldery Union................................
NGO providing services 
NGO providing extension 
service......................................
NGO providing microfinance 
services.....................................
Other NGO (family planning, 
health care, school education, 
and services for any other 
social sector)............................
VBSP Credit group......................
Other formal Credit group...........
Other informal credit/finance 
group........................................
Environmental group...................
  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Agriculture/trade organization 
Extension club...................................
Cooperative...................................... 
Traders association........................... 
Professional association................... 
Trade union...................................... 
Hobby club…................................... 
Political organization 
Communist Party............................. 
People’s committee.......................... 
Ethnic committee...............................
 
Other local groups/organization 
Religious group................................ 
Cultural association.......................... 
Parent group..................................... 
School committee............................. 
Health committee............................. 
Sport group........................................
 
Other (specify) ................................ 
______________________________
___________________________ 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
 
Leader....................................... 1 
Very active (other responsibility 
than leader)........................... 2 
Active....................................... 3 
Give help from time to time..... 4 
Not active................................. 5 
Other Pages?  
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6.3. Access to services and safety nets 
6.3.1. How would you qualify your access to the services listed below on a scale from 1 to 5 ? 
(1= very poor access, 5= very good access) 
 
a. Education/schools  
b. Health services/clinic  
c. Housing assistance  
d. Job training/employement  
e. Credit/finance  
f. Transportation  
g. Drinking water distribution   
h. Water distribution for irrigation  
i. Agricultural extension  
j. Sanitation service  
k. Justice/ conflict resolution  
l. Security/ police services  
 
6.3.2. Here are listed some services offered by the government to reduce poverty, 
Name of the service 6.3.2.1.  
Do you know 
about it ? 
 
 
 
 
1= Yes 
2= No>> next row 
6.3.2.2. 
If yes, have you 
received such 
support in the last 5 
years (since 2002)? 
 
 
1= Yes 
2= No>> next row 
6.3.2.3. 
If yes, in which 
years did you 
receive it ?  
(write several 
years if received 
more than one) 
 
Year(s) 
6.3.2.4. 
Amount received in the 
past 12 months ? 
 
 
 
 
 
‘000 dong 
a. Provision of Household 
Poor Certificate 
    
b. Access to loan with low 
interest rate 
    
c. Free health care/insurance 
    
d. Education tuition 
exemption and reduction/ 
free textbooks 
    
e. Kids are studying in new 
schools and classrooms 
    
f. Receiving support of 
accomodation or in house 
repairs/construction 
    
g. Monetary assistance 
    
 
 
6.3.3. How was your household classified by the commune in… 
 Hungry................... 1 
Poor........................ 2 
Medium................... 3 
Better-off................. 4 
Rich........................ 5 
Do not know........... 6 
…2002?  
…2003?  
…2004?  
…2005?  
…2006?  
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6.4. Social and political capital 
 
6.4.1. How many people do you or any member of your household know personally and who work in the following 
organisations? (please record only two way relationships) 
Type of organisation 
 
Level 
(i.e. administrative 
unit where the 
household is 
currently living) 
 
6.4.1.1. 
How many do 
you know? 
6.4.1.2.  
How many are 
relatives of the 
household 
head or the 
spouse? 
6.4.1.3.  
How many are 
close friends of 
household 
member? 
Communist party Commune     
Communist party District    
Communist party Province    
People’s committee Commune    
People’s committee District    
People’s committee Province    
Women Union Commune    
Women Union District    
Women Union Province    
Fatherlands front union Commune    
Fatherlands front union District    
Fatherlands front union Province    
 
 
6.4.2. In case of shock/problem such as the ones listed below, is it easy or not to resort to different persons of your 
network (listed below) ? 
 easy........................ 1  
 not easy.................. 2 
 
Nature of problem First degree 
relatives 
Other 
relatives 
Friends/ 
Neighbour 
Village 
head 
Mass 
organisation. 
a. Borrow money for education      
b. Borrow money for health expenses      
c. Borrow money for any positive event      
d. Borrow money for any negative event      
e. Borrow a water buffaloe      
f. Ask for labour      
 
 
6.4.3. Please tell me if in general you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
Strongly agree................... 1 
Agree................................. 2 
Disagree............................ 3 
Strongly disagree............... 4 
 
Interviewer, read slowly the following statement to the respondent:  
a. Most people in this village are basically honest and can be trusted. 
 
b. People are interested only in their own welfare. 
 
c. If I have a problem, there is always someone to help me. 
 
d. If you loose an animal (pig, poultry, or goat) someone in the village would help look for it or would return it to 
you.
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7. Estimates of objective and subjective poverty 
 
Interviewer: please show to the respondent the picture of a 10 step ladder.  
7.1. Here is a picture of a 10-step ladder (see next page). Imagine that at the bottom, on the first step, send 
the poorest people, and on the highest step, the tenth, stand the rich in Yen Chau district. On which step 
of this ladder is your household located ? 
 
7.2. Where on this ladder would you locate a household (husband, wife, 2 children or other dependants) 
who has an income equal to 800 thousand VND per month ? 
 
 
 
10 
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4
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6
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8
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The Uplands Program 
 
Research for Sustainable Land Use and Rural Development in 
Mountainous Regions of Southeast Asia 
Funded by DFG 
 
Subproject F2.3 : Targeting efficiency and impact assessment of rural 
credit and land allocation 
 
3rd Round: Impact Questionnaire – Household Survey –  
Vietnam 2007 
 
 
1. Identification 
 
 
1.1. Date of Interview:  
 
 
 
        
 Code 
 
1.2. Commune name     
 
 
1.3. Village name  
 
 
1.4. Household identification number 
(Please write this number on all pages) 
 
1.5. Name of respondent 
 (Name and ID)  
     
    
 
1.6. Name of the Household head 
 
 
 
1.7. Interviewer name and code 
 
 
1.8. Supervisor name and code 
 
 
1.9. Date checked by supervisor ____/____/____ 
 
 
 
1.10. Signature of the supervisor 
 
Day Month Year 
 
 0 7
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2. Credit 
2.1. Loans application and complete rejections 
 
2.1.1. Formal loans (include cash as well as in-kind loans, e.g., fertilizer, seeds) 
(interviewer, please notice that we understand application by a request the the household himself made from a formal 
lender/person providing the loan, or through an intermediary, but the lender knows about the real beneficiary) 
 
2.1.1.1. Have you or any member of the households applied for a loan from a formal organisation (VBSP, VBARD, 
village board, mass organisation, NGO) since 2002?   (i.e. application done under your name)  
 Yes...................... 1>>2.1.1.3 
 No....................... 2  
 
2.1.1.2. If no, what are the main reasons ? (multiple answer are possible)   >> 2.1.2 
No need.................................................................................................................. 1 
Do not have enough information on how to get such loan.................................... 2 
The procedure is too complicated.......................................................................... 3 
Those banks are too far..........................................................................................4 
Investment might be risky or not profitable from the view point of the lender.... 5 
Loan might be risky or not profitable from the view point of the borrower......... 6 
I felt that I would be rejected because other of our characteristics....................... 7 
We don’t have a Red Book.................................................................................... 8  
No guarantor.......................................................................................................... 9 
Other reasons_________________________________________________....... 10 
________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________  
 
2.1.1.3. How many times has your household asked or applied for loans from the VBARD/VBSP, Mass organisation or 
other formal institutions since 2002? 
 
2.1.1.4. How many of those applications have been completely rejected since 2002? 
 (Please list them below) 
 
 
Rejected 
loan ID 
2.1.1.5. 
Type of lender 
2.1.1.6. 
Year applied 
2.1.1.7. 
Amount demanded 
2.1.1.8. 
According to you, what 
was (were) the reason(s) 
for rejection? 
code 1 Year ‘000 dong code REJECT 
1     
2     
3     
4     
Enumerator: please write into brackets the code of the formal lender (i.e. the one who would provide the loan) if known. 
 
Code 1: Type of lender  Code REJECT 
VBARD.......................................
VBSP...........................................
Farmer union...............................
Woman union..............................
Veteran union..............................
Youth union.................................
Eldery union................................
Fatherland front union.................
Village board...............................
NGO (specify name)....................
Government company.................
Private company..........................
 Other (specify)._____________.
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
 No Red Book.................................................................................................... 1 
Not enough other collateral.............................................................................. 2 
Intended investment is not profitable in the eye of lender............................... 3 
Did not repay prior loan (default of payment)................................................. 4 
My outstanding debt is too high in the eye of the lender................................. 5 
No guarantor (group or person)........................................................................ 6 
Lender did not want to invest in our household because of our personal 
characteristics................................................................................................ 7 
Our household doesn’t belong to the population targeted by this lender......... 8 
Do not know why............................................................................................. 9 
Other______________________________________________________...... 10 
_____________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________ 
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2.1.2. Informal loans (include cash as well as in-kind loans, e.g., fertilizer, seeds) 
2.1.2.1. Have you applied (or  asked) for a loan over 1 million dong from informal lenders since 2002  
(for example, Relative, Neighbour/Friend, Private moneylender, shopkeeper,Ho Hui or other person non listed here 
Please include the applications done for this household, but under a different name) 
Yes........................... 1>>2.1.2.3 
No............................. 2 
 
2.1.2.2. If no, what are the main reasons ? (multiple answers are possible)    >>2.2 
No need.......................................................................................................................... 1 
Don’t know anyone to borrow from.............................................................................. 2 
Those lenders are too far................................................................................................ 3 
Loan might be risky or not profitable from the view point of the household (i.e. high interest 
rate, too high collateral, short repayment period, etc.)............................. 4 
I felt that my investment plans may not be seen profitable for the lender..................... 5 
I felt that I would be rejected because of our characteristics......................................... 6 
No guarantor.................................................................................................................. 7 
Other reasons.___________________________________________________......... 8 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.1.2.3. How many times has your household asked for loans (over than 1 million VND) from informal lenders since 
2002 ? 
 
 
2.1.2.4. How many of those application were rejected since 2002 ? 
 
Loan 
rejected 
ID 
2.1.2.5. 
Type of lender 
2.1.2.6. 
Year 
applied 
2.1.2.7. 
Amount 
demanded 
2.1.2.8. 
According to you, what was 
(were) the reason(s) for 
rejection?  a. Relation with 
the borrower/ 
type of lender 
b. Occupaction: c. Lives in: 
code 1 code 2 code 3 Year ‘000 dong code REJECT 
1       
2       
3       
4       
  
Code 1: Relation to the borrower Code 2: Occupation Code 3: Lives in 
First degree relative.................................. 1 
Other relative............................................ 2 
Close friend............................................... 3 
Other acquaintance/ neighbour................. 4 
Informal credit group................................ 5>>c. 
Main employer of a member of the hh..... 6 
Landlord of a land managed by 
household.............................................. 7 
None of above........................................... 8 
 
Shopkeepers........................................ 1
Trader.................................................. 2
Moneylender....................................... 3
Other private/self-employed person.... 4
Other government employee............... 5
In village.............................. 1 
Elsewhere in Yen Chau....... 2 
Elsewhere in Vietnam.......... 3 
Abroad................................. 4 
 
Code REJECT 
No land use certificate.............................................................................. 1 
Not enough other collateral...................................................................... 2 
No profitable investment in the eye of lender.......................................... 3 
Did not repay prior loan (default of paiement)........................................ 4 
My outstanding debt is to high in the eye of the lender........................... 5 
No guarantor............................................................................................ 6 
Lender did not want to invest in our household because of personnal 
chacteristics........................................................................................ 7 
Do not know why.................................................................................... 8 
Other__________________________________________________... 9 
____________________________________________________ 
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Household id: ________ 7
2.2.28. Concerning the formal loans you received, did you receive additional support (training, equipment, labor, etc,)? 
 Yes...................... 1 
 No....................... 2>>2.3. 
 
If Yes, on which loans (record loan ID)? 
2.2.29 
Formal 
loan ID 
from table 
above 
2.2.30 
From whom did you receive 
support? 
2.2.31 
What kind of support? 
code 1 code 2 
   
   
   
 
 
 
 
2.3. Potential credit access 
  
 
What do you think is the maximum 
amount you could borrow at this time 
from the following institutions/persons, 
considering your current situation? (if 
does not know, write ‘kb’) 
2.3.1. 
Currently, how 
much does 
your 
household owe 
to…. 
2.3.2. 
In case of an 
emergency (food 
shortage, 
sickness), how 
much could your 
household borrow 
now from… 
2.3.3. 
For income 
generating 
investment 
purposes, how 
much could 
your 
household 
borrow now 
from… 
2.3.4. 
For social 
events/obligations 
(wedding, 
funeral), how 
much could your 
household borrow 
now from… 
2.3.5. 
In total, what 
would be the 
maximum 
amount your 
household could 
now borrow 
from… 
 
‘000 dong ‘000 dong ‘000 dong ‘000 dong ‘000 dong 
a. ...VBARD      
b. …VBSP      
c. …Farmer Union      
d. …Women Union      
e. …Veteran Union      
f. …Youth Union      
g. …Elderly Union      
h. …Fatherland front Union      
i. NGO/International organisation  
 (if applicable) 
     
j. Government company      
k. Private company      
l. …Village board      
 
m. …Informal credit group (Ho Hui) (in sum)      
n. …Money lender (in sum)      
o. …Shopkeeper/trader (in sum)      
p. …Relatives (in sum)      
q. …Friends/Neighbour (in sum)      
Code1: organisation providing support  
Farmer Union............................................. 1 
Woman Union............................................. 2 
Veteran Union............................................. 3 
Youth Union................................................ 4 
Eldery Union............................................... 5 
Fatherland front Union................................ 6 
Village board............................................... 7 
Extension office.......................................... 8 
NGO (specify name) .................................. 9 
VBSP/VBARD........................................... 10 
Government/ private company.................... 11 
Credit group................................................ 12 
Other____________________________.... 13 
 
Code 2: kind of support  
Training....................................................... 1 
Input/equipment.......................................... 2 
Working force............................................. 3 
Social support (education, health, etc.)....... 4 
Other____________________________.... 5 
Household id: ________ 8
3. Source of cash income since 2002 (or since the year the household was established if established after 
2002) 
 3.1. 
In percentage, how 
much did [source] 
represent in your total 
income (i.e. gross 
revenue – production 
costs) in the past 12 
months?  
 
If ‘0’>>3.3 
3.2.  
If 3.1>0 
In 2002*, did you 
already have this 
[source]? 
 
 
3.3.   
if 3.1=0 
Was [source] a 
source of cash 
income for your 
household in 
2002*?  
 
 
3.4.   
In percentage, how 
much did [source] 
represent in your total 
income (i.e. gross 
revenue – production 
costs) in the year 
2002? 
% 
1= Yes>>3.4. 
2= No>> next row 
1= Yes 
2= No>> next row % 
Rice     
Maize     
Cassava     
Vegetables     
Other crops (Cotton, sugar cane, etc.): 
________________________________     
Fruit     
Livestock     
Fisheries     
Forest products (wood, medicinal plants, 
etc.)      
Agricultural trade     
Agricultural wage     
Non agricultural wage     
Non agricultural business     
Remittances     
Government aid     
* interviewer, in the case the household was established after 2002, replace ‘2002’ by the first year the household was established. 
If the household was established less than 24 months ago, skip the questions 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 
 
Interviewer, if needed, you can use the following tool to help the farmer to evaluate the share of different sources of 
income:
Past 12 months:       year 2002: 
Household id: ________ 9
4. Land allocation 
4.1. Forestry land 
4.1.1. Has your household received a Red Book for forestry land? (For this question, refer to the question 4.2.4 in the first 
questionnaire). 
 Yes...................... 1>>4.1.4. 
 No....................... 2  
 
4.1.2. If not, have your household applied for a Red Book for forestry land? 
Yes..................... 1 If Yes, When was it? year  
No....................... 2 >> 4.2. 
 
4.1.3. If Yes, what are the main reasons according to you, why you haven’t yet received the certificate?  (multiple answer 
possible) 
I only applied recently............................................................................................................ 1 >>4.2 
A previous transfer of this plot was not legally valid............................................................. 2 
Missing legal documents (inheritance letter, etc.) to prove the claim on this land................ 3 
Disputes concerning claims on the land................................................................................. 4 
The land claimed is allocated to other purpose by the commune.......................................... 5 
The commune has no land to allocate.................................................................................... 6 
Other_______________________________________________________________....... 7 
Do not know........................................................................................................................... 8 
 
4.1.4. Forest management.  
Red 
Book 
ID 
(cf Q1 
4.2.6-
10) 
4.1.4. 1 
Are you or a member of 
your hh active* in 
managing/protecting 
the forest on this plot? 
4.1.4.2. 
Do you receive 
compensation (in kind 
or in cash) for 
managing/ protecting 
the forest on this plot? 
4.1.4.3. 
Since you received the 
certificate, have you (or 
the group) increased the 
number of trees on that 
plot compared to the 
time you received it? 
1=Yes 
2=No 
1=Yes 
2=No 
1=Yes 
2=No 
1    
2    
3    
* By active, we mean that you allocate part of your time for this activity, other than attending meetings. 
 
4.2. Agricultural land 
4.2.1.  Has your household ever owned a Red Book for agricultural land? (Can be under the name of current members or 
dead parents) 
Yes..................... 1 
No...................... 2 >>4.2.5.  
 
4.2.3. If Yes, In which year has your household first received a Red Book for agricultural land? (if received through 
inheritance, write the year the Red Book was received from the parents)   year  
 
4.2.4. Since that date, how many (Re)allocations occured in your village (including the first allocation)? 
(please fill the table including the first allocation) 
 
A 
L 
L 
O 
C 
A 
T 
I 
O 
N 
4.2.4.1. 
Year of 
(Re)allocat
ion 
4.2.4.2. 
Did you 
receive more 
or less area of 
paddy on 
your Red 
Book? 
4.2.4.3. 
Did you 
receive more 
or less area of 
upland on 
your Red 
Book? 
4.2.4.4. 
Did you receive 
more or less 
area of 
perennial crop 
land on your 
Red Book 
4.2.4.5. 
How satisfied 
were you by 
this 
(Re)allocation? 
4.2.4.6. 
Give the 
main 
reason 
why? 
1=Very unsatisfied
2= Unsatisfied 
3= Satisfied 
4= Very satisfied
More (+) 
Less (-) 
same (=) 
More (+) 
Less (-) 
same (=) 
More (+) 
Less (-) 
same (=) code SAT 
1       
2       
3       
Code SAT: Reason for (un)satisfaction
Unsatisfied or Very unsatisfied 
Not enough land allocated................. 1 
Land allocated are not good............... 2 
Land taken away................................ 3 
Did not get the land we asked for...... 4 
Other_______________________.... 5 
_______________________________ 
 
Satisfied or Very satisfied 
Got enough land................................. 6 
Gained in tenure security................... 7 
Got good land.................................... 8 
Got more land.................................... 9 
Enabled us to get credit...................... 10
Other______________________.... 11
________________________________
Household id: ________ 10
4.2.5. If no, have you ever applied for a Red Book for agricultural land? 
Yes..................... 1 
No...................... 2 >> 4.2.8. 
 
4.2.6. If yes, when was it?   year 
 
4.2.7. If yes, what are the main reasons explaining that you didn’t receive yet the certificate ? 
I only applied recently............................................................................................................ 1 
A previous transfer of this plot was not legally valid............................................................. 2 
Missing legal documents (inheritance letter, etc.) to prove the claim on this land................ 3 
Disputes concerning claims on the land................................................................................. 4 
The land claimed is allocated to other purpose by the commune.......................................... 5 
There is no land available....................................................................................................... 6 
Unability to pay the tax required............................................................................................ 7 
Other_______________________________________________________________....... 8 
Do not know........................................................................................................................... 9 
 
Interviewer, read slowly and carefully the next question to the household, including the code, and ask household to choose his 
answer. 
4.2.8. Do you think that a reallocation of land in your village before the end of the Use Right Period (i.e. 2019 in most of 
cases)… 
…is very likely to occur?....... 1 
…is likely to occur?............... 2 
…is unlikely to occur?........... 3 
…will not occur?................... 4 
 
5. Land Tenure 
Now, I would like to know about all the plots you use (with or without certificate) or rent out at the moment. 
 
5.1. How many plots is your household managing at the moment?. Please refer to the first questionnaire, and take care to 
add the Fish ponds on the list, but not residential land unless it is cultivated. Include plots registered under forestry land  
if these are cultivated by the household (and if the household admit it) 
 
 
1. Paddy fields (green papers) 
Take as many paper as the household manages Paddy fields. Ask the farmer to classify the good ones, medium and bad 
fields according to water availability (good=2 or more harvest every year; medium= 2 harvest in good years; bad= 1 
harvest most of the years). 
In each of the three groups, write all the plots that are under the same property regime2 on one paper. 
 
2. On each paper, write (or ask the respondent if he can): 
 - the name of the plots 
 - the total area of the plots 
 - and the average distance of the corresponding plot in walking minute to the house. 
 
3. Fish ponds (pink papers) 
Take as many papers as the households manages fish ponds. Regroup the fish ponds with the same property regime on 
one paper, and write on each paper the name, the total area and the average distance from the house in walking minutes. 
 
4. Other plots (yellow papers) 
Take as many paper as the household manages other plots and write on each: name, area, and average distance from the 
house in walking minutes to the coresponding plot. 
 
5. Put on one side the plots that are registered under the Red Book, and the rest on the other side. 
 
6.  On first group, write on each paper a number from 1, starting with Paddy fields, then fish ponds and finish with others. 
 On second group write a number from 101, starting with the Paddy fields, then fish ponds and finish with others. 
                                                 
2 Property regime: 
With Red Book managed by the household, 
With Red Book not managed by the household (rented out, lent, mortgage away, etc.), 
Without Red Book rented/borrowed from someone, 
Without Red Book rented borrowed from the village/commune, 
Without Red Book other status (e.g. cultivated without permission). 
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6.19. Have some of your lands or neighbouring lands been affected by landslides during the last 5 years? 
 
a. your lands Yes............. 1 If yes, how many times did such problems occur in the past 5 years?  
No.............. 2 
 
 
b. neighbouring lands Yes............. 1 If yes, how many times did such problems occur in the past 5 years? 
 No.............. 2 
 
 
c. When such problems occurred on your lands, what share of your total annual income did you lose on average?
     % total income 
 
 
6.20. In the past 5 years were your income generating activities (transport) affected by road blockings due to 
landslides? 
Yes........................ 1  
No.......................... 2>>6.21.  
 
If yes, 
a. If yes, how many times did such problems occur in the past 5 years? 
 
b. When such problems occurred, what share of your total annual income did you lose on average?  
% of total income 
   
6.21. In your opinion, what could be done to reduce the incidence of landslides? 
Mitigate climate change............................................................ 1 
Afforestation............................................................................. 2 
More sustainable agricultural practices / techniques................ 3 
Other (specify)......................................................................... 4:___________________________________________ 
I don’t know.............................................................................. 5 
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7. Agricultural production and technology adoption 
7.1. Agricultural extension service  
7.1.1. Did your household attend meetings or receive visits by any institution providing agricultural extension service in 
the past 24 months ? 
Yes......................... 1 
No.......................... 2 >> 7.1.3. 
 
7.1.2. if yes, how many times? 
 
7.1.3. If yes, from which institution ? 
a. Institution name b. Institution type code 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
7.1.4. On what issue did you receive training/support from any institution in the past 24 months ? 
Number of meetings 
(visits) you attended on:
Knowledge transmitted 
 
Management 
(i.e. use of input, 
preparation) 
Technology 
(new variety, 
equipment, etc.) 
From 
Extension 
office 
From Other 
institutions Mark with X Mark with X 
a. Rice     
b. Maize     
c. Cassava     
d. Other crop  
1. ________________________ 
2. ________________________ 
3. ________________________ 
1. 
2. 
3. 
1. 
2. 
3 
1. 
2. 
3. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
e. Livestock production (specify which animal) 
1._______________________ 
2._______________________ 
3._______________________ 
4._______________________ 
5._______________________ 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
f. Fruit production (specify which fruit) 
1._______________________ 
2._______________________ 
3._______________________ 
4._______________________ 
5._______________________ 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
g. Fish production     
h. Soil conservation     
i. Intergrated Pest Management (without 
pesticides)  
   
h. Other (specify)______________________     
Code: Institution type  
Government extension service.......... 1 
NGO.................................................. 2 
Private enterprise............................... 3  
Government enterprise...................... 4 
International research organisation....5 
Other institution................................. 6 
_______________________________ 
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8. Subjective impact indicators 
 
8.1. Here is a picture of a ladder. Considering that the step ‘0’ represents your life conditions in 2002, on which step 
are you located today? 
 
 
8.2. Consider now that the step ‘0’ represents your access to credit in 2002. On which step are you located today? 
 
 
 
8.3. Consider now that the step ‘0’ represents your level of agricultural production in 2002. What is your production 
now compared to 2002? 
 
 
 
0 
+ 1 
+ 2 
+ 3 
+ 4 
+ 5 
- 1 
- 2 
- 3 
- 4 
- 5 
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